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The Kurdish Question, which dates back to the Ottoman Era, has been a constituent 
element of narratives of Turkish nationalism for the past 30 years. The Kurdish 
Question stands as the most prominent “other” of Turkish nationalism. The members 
of two groups, Kurds and Turks, became highly politicised throughout 30 years of 
internal conflict and through their daily encounters, giving way to a constant 
redefinition of the understanding of nationalism and ethnicity. The encounters and 
experiences of these two groups have facilitated the development of various narrative 
forms of personal nationalism in daily life. Accordingly, the daily manifestations of 
the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism have grown as an object of academic 
interest. The question of how ordinary people produce – and are produced in – 
personal narratives of nationalism is a subject that still needs to be addressed, and 
this thesis aims to fill this gap by examining the notion of “personal narratives”. 
Analysing nationalism through personal narratives enables us to see how hegemonic 
nationalist ideology is reproduced and practiced by individuals through various 
dynamics.  
  
The thesis finds that the determining theme in the personal narratives of Turks and 
Kurds follows fundamentally the official ideology of the state about the Kurds, 
which is based principally on „a strategy of denial‟. The macro political 
transformations of the 2000s and the increased potential of encountering the “other” 
in daily life underline the challenging nature of this ideological strategy of denial. 
Herein, while the Turkish participants define themselves as the benevolent party in 
their nationalist narratives, they mark Kurdish people as terrorists, separatists and 
primitives. In contrast, the narratives of the Kurdish participants are characterised by 
the adoption of a “self-defence” strategy against the dominant negative perceptions 
of Turkish society about their culture: they assert that they are in fact not ignorant; 
not terrorists; not disloyal citizens, and so on. The narratives of the Turkish 
participants about the ethnic “other”, the Kurds, generally follow a strategy of 
contempt and accusation; yet personal experiences give them the opportunity to 
politicise the problem on different grounds by empathising or humanising. On the 
Kurdish side, the subjects of the personal narratives are more often the state and the 
army than Turkish individuals, and again they construct a narrative that endeavours 
to reverse the dominant negative perceptions about Kurds. They attempt to negate the 
denial strategy through both collective and personal stories of the discrimination they 
have experienced over the years and generations. Vital questions such as through 
which mechanisms of resistance do ordinary people construct and practice their 
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My Personal Story: First Encounters  
 
My interest in researching nationalism in Turkey is derived mainly from my own 
personal experiences dating back to the 1990s, to my childhood, which was the time 
of my first encounter with the Kurds who have become the „other‟ to Turkish 
nationalism. I grew up in a small coastal town in the Black Sea region, where my 
family farmed hazelnuts. During my childhood, as a member of an agrarian family, I 
spent most of my summer holidays working in these fields, and it was there that I 
first encountered Kurds, who came to our town as seasonal workers for the harvest in 
July and August. The first feeling that I recall about this encounter was one of 
annoyance at the inequality inspired by my parents between the Kurdish children 
workers and me. Due to my age, my memories are full of stories about the Kurdish 
child workers rather than the adults. As the child of the taskmaster, I was worked 
with the Kurdish labourers for twelve hours a day under the same conditions, 
although the attitudes of my grandparents and parents towards me and Kurdish 
children workers were completely different. While I was able to take a short break 
without permission, the Kurdish workers, both children and adults, had to ask for 
permission from my grandparents and parents even to go to the toilet. I remember the 
feeling of shame when I witnessed my father slapping a Kurdish child in the face. In 
other words, in my memory, I witnessed Kurds being discriminated against by my 
own family members, who were always so compassionate and caring towards their 
own children. Throughout my childhood I tried to understand my parents‟ behaviour 
towards the Kurds. I was always warned to avoid speaking with the Kurdish workers, 
and the attitude of my parents was not just based on dislike, but also on anger, fear 
and contempt. Though not as poor as the Kurds, my family was also a low-income 
family, so the problem was not based simply on class. The interaction between „us‟ 
and the „Kurds‟ was shaped by the legacies of nationalism. As a child on the side of 
this taskmaster-labourer interaction with the power, the disparity between me and the 
Kurdish children workers forced me to think about this visible inequality, that is a 




town at end of the harvest, you would hear dozens of stories about the Kurds. While 
some of these stories underlined the prejudices held against the Kurds, some of them 
were quite positive memories of the Kurdish labourers.  
 
By this personal encounter that I lived with Kurds, I recognized the power of 
personal ideas and experiences that people formed through personal accounts in 
everyday life. As Mann and Fenton (2009: 531) argue, in order to understand the 
dynamics that determine the practice, framing, and narrating of ethnicity in everyday 
life, “it is necessary to attend to the nuanced social milieu within which different 
personal circumstances and social experiences intertwine”. Besides the collective 
encounters that the members of these two ethnic groups face, personal encounters 
provide a crucial source of information for reflection and discussion about politics. I 
have observed people who are not interested in politics speaking about the issue of 
ethnicity when they have personal experiences with ethnic „others‟. Rather than 
employing a political language to describe such encounters, or conceptualizing their 
ideas and experiences using such political terms as „nationalism‟ or „discrimination‟, 
„prejudice‟ they opt for another political language to account for their personal 
experiences with the „other‟. For them, some encounters, such those with a 
Kurdish/Turkish neighbour, or an annoying encounter with a Kurdish salesman in the 
bazaar, or the exclusionary attitudes of a friend in the workplace, or an emotional 
memory of a Kurdish labourer who worked for them in their hazelnut grove, cannot 
be regarded as political, but rather personal/anecdotal. That said I believe that these 
kinds of „daily‟ encounters are indeed political, and through these simple daily 
encounters and the ways people narrate their ethnicity, they become political actors, 
either wittingly or unwittingly.   
 
The data amassed during this research is not sourced exclusively from the personal 
experiences of the respondents, as relying on only one data source, such as personal 
experiences, discourse in the media or popular wisdom, would have a detrimental 
effect on the overall success of the study. An individual‟s account of ethnicity and 
nationalism in everyday life is based on several resources, which he or she draws 




that any political opinion cited by an ordinary person is based on three resources: 
media discourse, personal experience and popular wisdom, and by drawing upon 
these three resources within a conversation, the general frame of their account is 
constructed (Gamson, 1992: xi). Media discourse, popular wisdom and, most 
importantly, personal experience, all serve as sources of data for this research. 
Besides the concrete encounters with “others” in daily life, the accounts of the 
respondents document also the experiences of other people in their circles, as well as 
stories circulated in the public sphere and those constructed by the media. In this 
regard, the experiences of subjects themselves and of others, and the thoughts, ideas 
and feelings about ethnicity and the ethnic “other” emerged as distinct factors in the 
personal accounts of the respondents. As Ruane and Todd (2004: 225) argue, it is 
through a combination of collective and individual experiences that ethnic sentiments 
are created, although it should also be noted that “narratives of personal experience 
will be influenced by a socially embedded habitus of expectations, self-
understandings and values which are themselves shaped by social milieu” (Mann and 
Fenton, 2009: 520).  
 
Nationalism has always been a founder ideology, dating back to the pre-
establishment period of the Turkish Republic. Though the ethnic „others‟ of Turkish 
nationalism have varied in the ninety-one years of the history of the Republic of 
Turkey, Kurds have stood as the constant „other‟ of the Turkish nation state. While 
the roots of the Kurdish Question date back to the late Ottoman period, it was the 
armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers‟ Party [Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - 
PKK] and the Turkish army that forced the issue most prominently onto the agenda 
of the Turkish Republic after the 1980s. The official perspective that was developed 
and executed by the state was for years based on a strategy of denial, both of the 
Kurds as a distinct ethnic group and of the Kurdish Question. With the emergence of 
armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish State, the Question reached a tragic 
level which prevented the continued denial of the issue. Throughout the 1990s, 
villages inhabited by Kurds were burnt, more than 1 million Kurdish people were 
forced to migrate to urban areas, dozens of murders of Kurds remained unresolved 




report by a Kurdish political party, 3 thousand villages were burned and 3 million 
Kurds made homeless, as well as almost 10 thousand „mystery killings‟ by unknown 
perpetrators (Ergil, 2000: 128). Regardless, the strategy of denial of the existence of 
Kurds and the Kurdish Question remained in place in the official narrative of the 
State until the 2000s. It was in the 1990s that encounters between ordinary Kurds and 
Turks became more common due to voluntary and forced migration to western urban 
centres. These encounters occurred within the nationalist and suppressive atmosphere 
produced by the internal war. Through policies of the state and discriminative 
language produced and reproduced by the mainstream media, Turkish nationalism 
became taken for granted and an unquestioned component of the political language. 
Still, a continually ethnic conflict between ordinary Kurds and Turks living together 
in both the western and eastern part of the country does not exist. During the 2000s, 
sporadic attacks started to be made against Kurds living in western cities, which was 
the first sign of the antagonistic attitudes of the Kurds and Turks towards each other.  
 
Nationalism is a meta-narrative with has a great impact on the practising ways of 
ethnic identities of individuals. However, meta-narratives hide the concrete 
experiences, perceptions and practices of individuals. In other words, regarding 
nationalism as a homogeneous entity that is evaluated only through such huge 
phenomena as modernisation, capitalism and industrialisation, makes invisible how 
ethnicity and the ideology of nationalism are practiced and produced in everyday life. 
So, personal narratives are employed in order to shed light on the personal 
reproduction of ways of nationalism and ethnic identities in this research. Thompson 
states that;  
 
“… nationalism seems everywhere to be accompanied by happenings 
of great social and political magnitude in seeking to study it we tend to 
ask similarly big questions, and miss the many little sociological 
processes through which nations and national identities are more 
routinely sustained”  (Thompson, 2001: 18) 
 
I believe that personal narratives produced by individuals within or against this meta-
narrative function as reproductive tools of nationalism.  Grand exclusive and 




regarded as meta-narratives in this research. However meta-narratives are composed 
of various sub and conflicting narratives that are produced by narrative strategies that 
refer to discursive actions. In order to develop narratives, various strategies are 
employed. The aim of this research is to make the main arguments of the narratives 
on nationalism produced in personal accounts. To do this, strategies that are 
employed to construct the narratives will be followed through the personal accounts.  
 
The history of the Kurds, the Kurdish Question, the transformation of its demands 
and the rise of Turkish nationalism stand as areas of attractive academic interest for 
scholars, both in Turkey and in the international academic arena
1
. To date, the macro 
perspectives employed in these accounts have aimed to follow the roots of the 
Kurdish Question and to try to understand the Question by focusing on state policies. 
However, “there has been a little attempt to consider how national identification 
relates to experiences and events over the course of an individual‟s life” (Mann and 
Fenton, 2009: 518).  Saracoglu underlined that within the period in which historical 
steps were taken by the government related to the cultural and political rights of 
Kurds, rising antagonist discourse towards Kurds is avoided by scholars. (2009: 
641). This argument is admitted as a departure point for this research. The 
paradoxical situation related to the gap in the literature highlighted by Saracoglu can 
be read as a call for a perspective change for future researches into the Kurdish 
Question and Turkish nationalism. While Saracoglu points out the rise in negative 
perceptions towards Kurds, I feel it necessary to add the other side, the Kurds, to the 
discussion. This discriminative and antagonistic language developed by Turks, Lazs, 
Cerkezh, Arabs etc. towards Kurds determined the reactions that Kurds gave. In 
other words, everyday life is a venue for personal encounters that can only be 
understood by following the interactions and the forms of encounters. Avoiding one 
side of the encounter reduces the clarity of the arguments that are developed in an 
academic research that focuses on the ordinary and personal appearances of 
nationalism. As Saracoglu states, despite the positive political steps taken by the 
                                                 
1
 See Yeğen (1999), (2006), (2011); Barkey and Fuller (1997), (1998); Kurban and Yolacan (2008); 





government, the antagonist language produced and reproduced by ordinary Turks 
and Kurds towards each other still stands as an incomprehensible part of the issue. In 
order to shed light on this unknown side of the Question, some research is conducted, 
focusing on the personal, ordinary formations of the notions of ethnicity and 
nationalism in everyday life. In addition to Saracoglu‟s (2009), (2001) studies, 
Senturk‟s (2012),  Caglayan‟s (2007), (2013) studies are the examples that can be 
given for the research that focus on the gender perspective and the losses of the 
families of the Kurds. While Mater‟s (1999), Aktan‟s (2012), and Alatas‟s (2013), 
Matur (2011), Akin and Danisman‟s (2011) studies are not academic texts, they are 
quite successful to give an insight into personal experiences of mostly Kurds and 
partially Turks  living together in Turkey.  
 
This thesis suggests that ordinary people are involved practically in producing and 
reproducing ethnic identities, both in the course of their actions and in their personal 
accounts. The existence of an ethnic discord between Kurds and Turks in Turkey 
triggered the rise of notions of “ethnicity” and “nation” in both the political and 
social spheres of everyday life. Within such a politically and culturally polarised 
atmosphere, nationalism became a meta-narrative with the power to mediate all 
social concepts that exist within it. All concepts of ethnicity, nation and citizen are 
discussed, defined, written about and thought of through the frame of nationalism. 
The omnipresent nature and power of Turkish nationalism in both political and social 
life makes daily discussions between ordinary people about the ethnic other a 
nationalist narrative. This preference is in fact derived from the field experience.  
 
At the very outset of the interview, when I would introduce the research, the 
respondents would focus upon the term “nationalism”, singling it out from the many 
concepts to which I referred, such as “ethnic identity”, “the Kurdish Question”, 
“Kurdishness/Turkishness” and “story”, thus placing nationalism at the centre of 
their accounts. The respondents tended to state their ideas, feelings, thoughts and 
experience with the ethnic other in their daily lives, but basically, they were talking 
about nationalism. For the Turkish respondents, the notion of nationalism 




respondents also singled out the term “nationalism” from my sentences in order to 
frame their accounts, but mostly used it to highlight the negative consequences of the 
ideology of Turkish nationalism for their daily lives through personal stories.  
 
In this regard, all personal ideas, feelings and experiences were framed and narrated 
with reference to two topics: Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish Question. It should 
be noted that this thesis is not devoted specifically to either issue, as the intention is 
rather to understand how ordinary people see this ethnic conflict between the Kurds 
and Turks, how they define the “self” and the “other” in this encounter, and how they 
define their relationship with the ethnic other within this excessively nationalist-
driven political atmosphere.   
 
This thesis therefore aims to make an original contribution to knowledge by 
examining the ways of narrating about the conflict between Kurds and Turks in 
everyday life. The personal narratives of nationalism will be underlined by; 
 Employing a bottom-up approach that makes possible to see the personal and 
ordinary forms of ethnicity practices of Kurdish and Turkish individuals, 
making visible the ways they employ the ideology of nationalism through 
their narratives.  
 
 Centring the personal narratives that shed light on the thoughts and 
experiences with the ethnic „other‟ in the flow of everyday life.  
 
Research Aims and Questions 
 
The main objective of this research is to make sense of the personal stories of both 
Kurdish and Turkish individuals, collected through semi-structured interviews, in 
order to understand how relationships develop in everyday life among ordinary 
Kurds and Turks, and what kind of stories they tell about each other. The following 
research questions are addressed that in nationalist-driven social area; 
 
1. How do the Turkish and Kurdish respondents perceive and define this 
ethnic conflict? 
2. How do the respondents construct personal accounts? What kind of 




3. How do they perceive and define the “self” and the “other” within their 
personal accounts?  
4. Do they have any experience of concrete encounters with the “other”? 
Which types of narratives are developed in order to articulate their 
personal experiences with the “other”? 
 
Narrative inquiry is employed in both the methodology of the data collection and in 
the analysis of the data collected in Ankara between March and November 2011, 
involving 20 male and 20 female Kurdish and Turkish participants.  As befits a 
narrative inquiry perspective, giving voice to the silent masses of the society is the 
aim. Furthermore, it was ordinary Kurds and Turks with political affiliations to no 
political party or organisation that were preferred as participants in this research.  
 
Outline of the Thesis  
 
The first chapter presents an overview of the context of the Kurdish Question and 
Turkish nationalism, which facilitates an understanding of the present political 
situation in Turkey. By visiting the most prominent time periods in the emergence of 
the notion of nationalism in Turkey, the position of the Kurdish Question is clearly 
defined within Turkey‟s narrative of nationalism. The reasons behind the discomfort 
of the Kurds, the development of the Kurdish movement and the transformation of 
Turkish nationalism within the 90-year history of the Republic of Turkey are 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the approaches to nationalism employed throughout this research. 
In order to develop a discussion of nationalism from a bottom-up perspective, 
initially, macro theories of nationalism are visited. By the critiques targeting the 
macro theories of nationalism in terms of its blindness on the personal and daily 
appearances of nationalism, the necessity of the bottom up perspective is discussed. 
Through a literature review of some seminal works and descriptions of such concepts 
as “ethnicity in everyday life” and “everyday nationhood”, the theoretical perspective 






Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach. The tradition of “narrative 
inquiry”, employed as the data collection and analysis approach in this research, is 
explained. The importance of personal narratives in understanding as nationalism 
developed at length. To conceptualise personal narratives politically, a discussion is 
made of the political narratives and stories, as well as the related concepts of 
experience and encounter. This approach gives voice to the silent actors of society, 
bringing to light the different layers within the accounts of ordinary people. These 
are discussed under the key themes of talking politics, resistance and counter 
narratives.  
 
In Chapter 4, details of the qualitative study are presented, explaining how the 
research area was selected, how participants were recruited, and providing details 
about the interviews. As befits a narrative inquiry, the position of the researcher is of 
great importance and my personal encounters are discussed, addressing the issue of 
self-reflexivity. In addition to these discussions, ethical considerations and the 
limitations of the study and data are discussed.  
  
The next four chapters set out the findings of the research. Chapter 5 discusses the 
main narratives and narrative strategy, being the narrative of denial prevalent in the 
accounts of the participants. In accordance with the official discourse of the State and 
mass media over the last 30 years, the denial of both Kurdishness as an ethnic 
identity and the Kurdish Question is addressed by both Kurdish and Turkish 
participants in different forms and with different motives. The chapter sets out the 
main arguments employed to justify the denial of the Kurdish Question, while the 
main forms of denial employed by both Kurdish and Turkish participants, such as 
threats and counter narratives, present different angles seen in the narrative 
strategies.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on definitions of self and ethnic other which are employed. The 
ways of defining the self are discussed. While “being a nationalist” appears as the 




participants the prevalent means of self-definition was “we are discriminated 
against”, a narrative strategy of self-defence. Further, the chapter discusses the 
means of defining the ethnic “other”. For Turkish participants, the tendency was to 
speak about ambiguous bad and good Kurdish typologies based mainly on the 
arguments used in official State discourse. On the other hand, the accounts of 
Kurdish participants were formed within the narrative strategy of self-defence, with 
efforts made to explain why they seem different because of their cultural differences 
and efforts to prove their good intentions towards Turks through personal stories.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the personal stories of Turkish participants regarding 
encounters with Kurds in their daily lives. From these it is possible to see how 
narrative strategies of contempt and accusation are employed within the personal 
accounts. The dehumanisation of the Kurds in the accounts of Turkish participants is 
a common strategy and linked to descriptions of cultural differences described in a 
contemptuous tone. Besides the narrative strategies that locate Kurds in a passive 
subject position as structurally backward, different and primitive, there is a further 
narrative strategy of accusation employed by Turkish respondents that depicts Kurds 
as backward, uneducated and disloyal. The dilemma between these two narrative 
strategies in terms of subject positions emerged as a point of conflict that the 
participants had to overcome in the course of the interviews. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the personal stories of Kurdish participants based on their 
personal encounters with Turks. While Turkish respondents related dozens of stories 
about Kurds based on their personal encounters, the accounts of the Kurdish 
respondents were not related to ordinary Turks. It became apparent that the “other” 
for the Kurds was, rather, the Turkish State. The primary and most tragic encounter 
between Turks and Kurds was the presence of the military in the eastern part of 
Turkey throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The severity of this encounter and the 
collective and personal experiences within the Kurdish territory rendered the daily 
encounters with ordinary Turks unworthy of narration. The more tragic the tale, the 
more worthy of telling, according to the Kurdish participants. In this regard, their 




police. In this regard, the discrimination they experienced by the state and in 
different aspects of their daily lives not only appeared as a theme, but also as a 
narrative strategy. In this regard, personal stories revolved around schools, 
workplaces, universities and neighbourhoods. Following these stories of 
discrimination, strategies of resistance are discussed. From these stories of resistance 
it becomes possible to see how accounts are developed through the narrative strategy 
of “self-defence”; also, a “sense of being discriminated against” goes together with 





























1. The Kurdish Question: A Long History of Denial  
 
While the roots of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict date back to the late Ottoman era, the 
issue has stood as an unresolved problem throughout the history of the Turkish 
Republic. The founding ideology of the Turkish Republic was based on the notion of 
a „single nation‟, „single language‟ and a centralised „Turkish‟ nation, which brought 
about a „strategic denial‟ of the Kurdish ethnic minority group and the Kurdish 
Question. As a result, the Kurdish Question has become the most striking problem in 
Turkey over the past three decades. This tragic story features the loss of thousands of 
lives on both sides, the forced migration of thousands of people, and the destruction 
of homes and entire villages, and in this respect, the Kurdish Question cannot be 
defined simply as a political problem. 
 
A war has been raging between the Turkish army and Kurdistan Workers‟ Party  
(PKK) [Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan] guerrillas in Eastern Turkey for thirty years, 
but towards the end of the 1990s, conflict also permeated into the western part of the 
country. Just after the turn of the century, what had only been a military clash 
between state soldiers and guerrillas was transformed into a civilian conflict. The 
Kurdish Question became a permanent item on the agenda of both individuals and 
armed groups, and „recently, the problem appears to risk transforming into 
heightened tension - and even a clash - between Turks and Kurds‟ (Ensaroglu and 
Kurban, 2008: 12). Political discussions aimed at identifying the roots of the clash, 
analysing the political situation and criticising the policies of the institutions 
considered responsible, including Parliament, the government and the army, became 
an intrinsic part of everyday life in Turkey, and discussions could be heard related to 
the issue in coffee shops, schools, workplaces, homes, and even between children. 
Thousands of families had to deal with the sorrow of personal loss as a result of the 
conflict, and it became impossible to see this issue as a distinct political question that 
could be solved by politicians and the army. In other words, a significant portion of 
society has suffered first-hand the consequences of the war, and everyone in the 




In a study that aims to examine the encounters between individuals in everyday life 
through personal narratives, it might be appropriate to make a broad summary of the 
history of Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish Question. In order to understand the 
recent character of the Kurdish Question and the appearance of the problem in the 
everyday lives of ordinary people, it is necessary to revisit some of the turning points 
in the Kurdish Question, including the particular moments in which the Kurdish 
Question came face-to-face with Turkish nationalism. The main aim in this chapter is 
thus to make visible the transformation of the Kurdish Question from a political issue 
between Kurds and the State into a social problem between the Kurds and Turks, as 
well as the current situation and possible outcomes of this transformation. I will 
begin by presenting a short summary of the basic patterns of Turkish nationalism, 
after which I will move on to the Kurdish Question, situating it within a broad 
picture of nationalism.  
 
1.1. Emergence of the Kurdish Question: The Late Ottoman 
Era   
 
The roots of the Kurdish Question can be traced back to the pre-Turkish State. The 
nineteenth century, in what would be the latter decades of the Ottoman Empire, 
witnessed the initial insurrections of Kurds who had been living under the rule of the 
Empire for six centuries. Barkey and Fuller (1998) suggest that broad changes 
occurred over three periods: (i) First, the pre- and early independence years of 1920–
1939; (ii) second, the 1950s, with the transition to multi-party rule; (iii) and finally, 
the 1980s, during which the Kurdish Question underwent a significant transformation 
and gained its current character. Kurdish political organisations and movements 
emerged in different forms and followed different objectives during all these three 
periods, and the most prominent factor in the emergence of the Kurdish Question 
was the imposition of national identities by new multi-ethnic countries,
2
 including 
Syria, Iran and Iraq, and the denial of the Kurdish identity in these new constructions 
(Abbas, 1998: 82).   
                                                 
2
 Kurds lived under the rule of the Ottoman and Persian Empires for the five hundred years preceding 
the 20
th
 century. With the establishment of nation states in the region, the Empire was divided into 





In the Ottoman Empire, society was defined according to religious affiliation rather 
than nationality (Abu Jaber, 1967: 213), in what is known as the „millet‟ system. In 
this system, which operated for six centuries, no ethno-linguistic or racial hierarchy 
existed (Yegen, 1999: 557), although there was religious stratification. Society was 
composed of Muslims and non-Muslims, according to which, the Kurds, like other 
Muslim groups such as Circassians, Slavs, Arabs, Bosnians, Turks, and, were thus 
not a minority, but rather a component of the ummet
3
 (Saracoglu, 2009: 63). In this 
hierarchy, Sunni Muslims
4
 could take their place in the Ottoman bureaucracy 
regardless of their ethnic background. Only non-Muslims were recognised officially 
as a minority. In the Ottoman Empire, being a Sunni Muslim was seen as sufficient 
to be treated equally as a subject of the Sultan.   
 
Although ethnicity was not a politicised issue in the social structure of the Ottoman 
Empire, it did increase in significance during the Tanzimat
5
 period. As Shaw and 
Shaw (1977) point out, with the Tanzimat Reforms, control over the hinterland of the 
Empire became weaker and „nationalistic elements among the subject minorities, 
nourished and sustained by Western powers and Russia, demanded autonomy or 
independence from the Empire‟ (1977: vii). At the end of the nineteenth century, a 
number of rapidly growing nationalist independence movements began to emerge 
among the Christian populations, such as the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and 
Armenians, and this highlighted the importance of such factors as mixed 
communities and threats from other aggressive nationalist groups (Poulton, 1997: 
62–63). The emergence and spread of Armenian and Greek nationalism in Anatolia 
and the loss of the Balkans triggered the rise of consciousness of Turkish 
nationalism.  
 
                                                 
3
 Ummet means „community‟ in Arabic, although in common usage it refers to an Islamic community. 
4
 Besides  Sunni, the dominant Islamic sect in Turkey, Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Safii are the other 
sects in Islam.  
5
 Tanzimat (Reorganisation) occurred during the 1839–1876 period, and refers to a set of reforms 




Within the new political turmoil that was raging in the Tanzimat period, 
centralisation, in an attempt to prevent the collapse of the Empire, created discomfort 
in the Kurdish areas, provoking around fifty revolts (Barkey and Fuller, 1998:7). 
During the same period the Alevi, „who belonged to a sect that was separate from 
Sunni orthodoxy and represented the Turkish version of Shi'ism‟ (Sakallıoglu, 
1996:233), emerged as an „other‟. For the Tanzimat reforms, aiming at the 
centralisation of the Empire, possible Shi‟i subversion was regarded as a threat to the 
Empire, which was dominated by orthodox Sunni-Islam.  
 
Alevis are not Sunnis and they define themselves as Shi‟is (Yocum, 2005:583). 
Alevism spread particularly among the impoverished nomadic and semi-nomadic 
Kurdish and Turkish tribes (Bilici, 1998: 61); and the large Alevi groups are Turkish 
or Kurdish native speakers (Bruinessen, 1996: 7). The religious doctrine of the sect is 
Sunni-based; however, there are aspects of the two faiths that are somewhat 
different. While a Sunni Muslim prays in a mosque and practises the five conditions 
of Islam: belief in the one God; prayer five times a day; giving of alms; keep the fast 
in the month of Ramazan; and making the pilgrimage to Mecca; the religious 
doctrine of the Alevi sect is based on Bektasi tariqas
6
 which is attributed to İmam 
Cafer. In the Sunni sect, the prophet of Islam is Muhammed, while for the Alevi, 
Muhammed‟s son-in-law Ali is regarded as God. Furthermore, the Alevi do not 
believe in the Kuran, do not pray in the mosques, do not fast at Ramazan or go to 
Mecca (Shankland, 2003: x). Alevis supported a secularist state idea wholeheartedly 
in order to avoid the discrimination they experienced in Ottoman term. It is also 
asserted that the state never declared that the Turkish state against faith totally. After 
the 1950‟s and to the multi-party period, re-Islamification of the state emerged 
(Shankland, 2003:14-15) and stands as state heritage even today. A sunni-Muslim 
dominated state mind marked Alevis as the other within the Republic as well.  Alevi 




                                                 
6
 Tariqa is the term referring different schools or orders in Islam.  
7
 Kurdish Alevis rebelled in 1920 and 1937-38 against the Kemalist movement and the Republic, 
although they never joined forces in significant numbers with Sunni Kurds against the government 





Unrest among minorities throughout the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 shifted the 
whole political agenda, and the „others‟ of the Ottoman Empire became salient. 
During this period almost all of the Balkan territories with around four million 
inhabitants – were lost (Zurcher, 2004: 108). In this political atmosphere, such 
organisations as Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti [Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP)] and Young Turks
8
 were established aiming „to return to the constitutional 
rule that the Sultan had abrogated‟ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 8). The main 
ideological goal was the defence of „Turkism‟; however, two other „policy strategies‟ 
came to dominate the agenda: Ottomanism and Islamism. Ottomanism was designed 
to keep the Christian minorities integrated into the existing system, with emphasis on 
the equality of all “Ottoman citizens”‟ (Zurcher, 2000: 153); while Islamism aimed at 
unifying all Islamic minorities and developing relationships with other Islamic 
countries. The common aim was the most prominent problem of this period: how to 
save the Empire. As Ozkirimli and Sofos (2008: 28-29) observe, both Ottomanism 
and Islamism failed, and a nation state project based on Turkishness became 
dominant among the political elite. The main aim was:  
 
“Uniting all Turks living in the Ottoman Empire through bonds of 
ethnicity and religion … other non-Turkish Muslim groups who had 
already been Turkified to a certain extent would be further 
assimilated” (2008: 33).   
 
1.1.1. Sevres Treaty: A Penetrated Syndrome 
 
Following World War I, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the signing of the Sevres 
Treaty
9
 in 1920 were key milestones for the future of the Kurds, the Kurdish 
                                                                                                                                          
and in Corum in 1980, and in the incendiarism in Sivas in 1992, and the riots in Istanbul 
(Gaziosmanpasa) in 1995 which were supressed by the state armed forces. In all of these cases, Alevis 
were killed, assassinated and forced to migrate, whereas Sunnis were protected by the state.   
8 Young Turks was a group of reformist army officers and urban intellectuals who were progressive, 
modernist and opposed to the status quo. 
9
 The Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920 in Sevres, France, as a treaty of peace between 
the principal Allied Power (excluding Russia and United States) and the Ottoman Empire 




Question and Turkish nationalism. The Treaty was never ratified due to the War of 
Independence under the leadership of Ataturk against the Sultan and the occupying 
Western powers. After the nationalist victory over the Greeks and the overthrow of 
the Sultan, Ataturk‟s government had the opportunity to request a new peace treaty: 
the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 after the War of Independence by the Turkish 
Republic and the Allied powers.  The Lausanne Treaty defined the rights and 
freedoms for non-Muslim minorities in the new Turkish Republic (Bayar, 2013: 
108). In this Treaty, only non-Muslim groups were defined as minorities, in both the 
state Constitution and in international law (Gurbey, 1990: 11), and only the minority 
rights of the non-Muslim residents of Istanbul were recognised. All of the other 
ethnic minority groups, such as the Bosnians, Albanians, Georgians, Laze, 
Circassians and other non-Turkish Muslims living in all around the Turkey, were 
accepted as Turks and became assimilated during the Republic period (Ergil, 2000: 
125). However the social structure that Lausanne Treaty presented created a 
hierarchy of citizens. Especially Armenian and Greek Orthodox populations are 
marked as suspect populations and the integration into the new nation was denied 
(Bayar, 2013: 109). Assimilative and discriminatory executions of the state created 
tragic ends the stories of the non-Muslim citizens in the territory that they had lived 
for centuries. As Icduygu et.al. state “the emigration of non-Muslim minorities has 
taken a central place in creating a Turkish nation united in ethno-cultural terms” 
(2008:359). So the population exchange agreements that were made with Bulgaria 
and Greece in 1913, 47.000 Bulgarians and 100.000 Anatolian Greeks left Anatolia 
and emigrated to their “national states”. Also during the Armenian deportation held 
in 1915 which turned out to be a genocide, thousands of Armenians were forced to 
emigrate (2008: 364).  
 
The Treaty of Sevres was of great importance for the Kurds living in Anatolia. As it 
was stated in the Treaty;   
 
“If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty 
the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall 
address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a 
manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas 




that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends 
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute 
such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these 
areas” (The peace Treaty of Sevres, Article 6410). 
 
The term „Sevres Syndrome‟
11
, which refers to the basic patterns of recent Turkish 
nationalism, including suspicion that the West intends to dismantle Turkey, has its 
roots in this Treaty. The idea of a possible internal revolt supported by external 
forces revived fears of disintegration during these years. Serdar Kaya (2012) asserts 
that the narrative of Turkish nationalism communicates a „Hobbesian world‟ in 
which Turks are at war with almost everyone else. That is why in this scenario, Turks 
are compelled to be on the alert for the threat of external enemies who aim to 
separate the country, as they did in the past. Through this narrative, fear of 
disintegration is triggered, and paranoia about a possible return to the 'Treaty of 
Sevres' is kept alive (Kaya, 2012: 148). Although official written history of the new 
republic ignores its Ottoman heritage, it retains from the Ottoman era the notion of 
betrayal from insider elements such as the Armenians, Greeks and other non-Muslim 
groups who lived for centuries in the Ottoman territory. Every single Turkish citizen 
has been taught and has memorised that during the War of Independence, the 
struggle was against both internal and external enemies. This part of collective 
memory stems from the idea that “Muslims (and ethnically Turkish citizens) are the 
„true owners of the nation‟ while the non-Muslim citizens [remain] suspect” (Bayar, 
2013:122). So it is possible to say that the belief referring to the notion that there was 
no way the Ottoman Empire would have collapsed if the external forces had received 
no help from internal traitors, has a great importance in the collective memory of 
Turkish society. 
 
While the Sevres Syndrome focused on non-Muslim elements in the Empire as 
possible traitors, the pledge made to the Kurds in the Treaty of Serves emerged as a 
threat that may lead to the „disintegration of the country‟. However, the outbreak of 
war in Asia Minor delayed Kurdish-Turkish conflict for a short period of time. 
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 Retrieved from http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_II,_Annex_II,_and_Articles_261_-_433 




Despite the promises of the Treaty of Serves, during the War of Independence Kurds 
and Turks fought together, and the „commonality of the struggle and the brotherhood 
of the two people were stressed by K. Ataturk‟ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 9). This 
was the moment that the narrative of the Islamic brotherhood and the common 
struggle between Kurds and Turks was introduced. 
 
1.2. A secularist Nation State: The Turkish Republic  
 
1.2.1 Denial of Ottoman Heritage 
 
After victory in the War of Independence in 1923, the Turkish nation state was 
established under the leadership of M. Kemal Ataturk. As Ataturk was a member of 
the military, the founding position of the military and militarism became determining 
factors in all spheres of the newly established republic. The main principle of the 
new state was denial of Ottoman heritage, according to Islamic order of the Ottoman 
era was abolished and society was reformulated with predominantly Western 
influence. While the trend of Westernisation had already begun in the latter years of 





Policies and reforms introduced in the following years were designed to modernise 
and Westernise society within the frame of Turkism. The texts of Ziya Gokalp 
(1968), a sociologist who had been influenced by the writings of Durkheim, inspired 
the politics of the new republic. He wrote that the new society should be organised 
with three main influences: Turkism, Islamism and Westernism. According to 
Gokalp, „the mission of Turkism is to seek out the Turkish culture that has remained 
only among the people, and to graft into it onto Western civilization in its entirety 
and in a viable form‟ (Gokalp, 1968: 33). „While Gokalp emphasised religion, ethics, 
aesthetics and socialization as the denominators of the nation, the Kemalists saw 
ethnicity as the underlying factor of Turkishness‟ (Cagaptay, 2004:97).  
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 This expression is from the Decennial Speech of M. K. Ataturk that was given in the course of the 




In the single Party system of 1919–1946, the Republican People‟s Party (RPP) aimed 
to create a new ideology, structuring the Turkish nation-state around a kind of  
Turkishness and extreme nationalism, referred to as „Kemalism‟ (Gurbey, 1990: 10). 
The Ideology of Kemalism was declared in the Third Party Congress of the RPP, 
where its six principles were stated: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, 
secularism and revolutionism/reformism (Kadioglu, 1996: 187). 
 
The most important reform was the abolition of Islamic institutions associated with 
the Ottoman era. As stated above, Islam was the most significant element in the 
bringing together of Kurds and Turks. As Yegen (1999) affirms, the abolition of the 
Caliphate can be regarded as the end of the brotherhood of all Muslims regardless of 
ethnic origin (1996: 559). The aggressive secularist reforms executed by the 
administrative cadres, such as the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, brought unease 
to Kurdish groups. Other steps taken during the 1920s and 1930s in a bid to 
secularise the Republic included „the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and Pious Foundations, the abolition of religious courts, the proscription of male 
religious headgear, namely the fez, the dissolution of the dervish orders, the reform 
of the calendar- and the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, followed in 1928 by the 
adoption of the Latin alphabet‟ (Kadioglu, 1996: 186).  
 
This formulation of the new state went against the promise made by Ataturk to the 
Kurds before the War of Independence that a state would be established in the 
Islamic order (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 9). Ataturk
13
 declared the new policy in the 
introduction of the Constitution in 1923: 
 
“Our state is a nation state. It is not a multi-national state. The state 
does not recognise any nation other than Turks. There are other 
peoples that come from different races [ethnic groups] and who 
should have equal rights within the country; yet it is not possible to 
give rights to these people in accordance with their racial [ethnic] 
status” (cited in Yegen, 2009: 599). 
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By the 1920‟s, a series of Kurdish revolts were initiated by the Revolt of Kocgiri 
(1921), beginning with the Shayk Said revolt in February 1925, which triggered 
other revolts in Kurdish cities. In response, the government passed the Law for the 
Maintenance of Order (Takrir‟i Sukun Kanunu) in March 1925 (Kadioglu, 1996: 
187), and its sweeping powers were exercised violently in the Kurdish region over 
the following four years. The Revolt of Shaykh Said of Palu was the first insurrection 
against Ankara in this period. As Barkey and Fuller (1998: 11) state, “It was as much 
a revolt against the secularist and anti-Islamic tendencies of the new regime as it was 
the first stirrings, albeit regionally circumscribed, of Kurdish nationalism (1998: 11). 
 
Over the following months it became clear that the revolt had resulted in a much 
harsher execution of Ataturk‟s secularist plans, and the suppression of the religious 
order increased (Lewis, 1961: 261). However, these revolts targeting the policies on 
religious and ethnicity of the new nation state did not create a prejudiced idea 
towards Kurds in the society. However, for the first time, Kurds are regarded by the 
State as a group tending to threaten the unity of the new nation state. Ismet Inonu, 
who was Prime Minister at the time, summarised the official position of the state in 
1925 as follows: 
 
“We are, frankly, nationalists ... and nationalism is our only factor of 
cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no 
kinds of influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at – 
any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or „le 
turquisme” (cited in Lazreg, 2008: 6).  
 
In its early years, the government of the new republic launched a project to transform 
the economic, political and ideological structures as part of a large-scale 
modernisation movement. The „new‟ history of the Turkish Republic was written by 
the Society for the Study of Turkish History (Turk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti) and the 
Society for the Study of the Turkish Language (Turk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti), 
established in 1931, whose mandate was „the institutionalisation of Turkishness‟. 
Their main duty was to conduct pseudo-scientific research, seeking to prove that the 
Turks are one of the oldest civilisations in Anatolia, and that all Muslim ethnic 




Saracoglu, 2010). Although the idea of building a nation state under the name of 
„Turkey‟ was an appealing project for the intellectuals and politicians of the time, the 
creation of a unified national identity in the territory of Anatolia, in which several 
ethnic and religious minority groups were settled, would prove to be quite a 
challenge. Assimilation policies were required to erase the differences between these 
groups and to construct a common identity as a prerequisite for a new powerful 
nation; however, while the strategy of unification was successful among such 
minority groups as the Laz, Adyghe/Cerkez and Arabs, it did not work for the Kurds, 
and the Kurdish revolts initiated in the late Ottoman period were suppressed, covered 
up and denied for decades.  
 
Constitutional amendments underlined the requirements for being a citizen of the 
Turkish Republic, and in the law enacted in 1926, being a Turkish ethnically became 
a requirement for state employees (Yegen, 2004: 56). The only way for Kurds to 
adopt the new citizenship was by denying their own ethnic identity, and as a result of 
the Kurdish revolts against this legislation, the new Turkish state‟s policies of 
assimilation and homogenisation were enhanced. Accordingly, the Turkification of 
the multi-ethnic and linguistically distinct groups remained a highly challenging 
issue, particularly when it came to the Kurds (Zeydanioglu, 2009: 5). As Ergil 
asserts,  
 
“The Kurds, cut off from the rest (eastern and south-eastern parts) of 
the country by their remote location in the mountainous south-eastern 
regions, divided along tribal lines, and economically dependent on 
local landed elites, remained largely unaffected by the new regime‟s 
policies of assimilation and modernisation” (2000: 125).  
 
In the transforming discourse of the Republic, the Kurds were neither Muslim 
subjects of the Sultanate nor a distinct component of the Muslim nation as an 
individual ethnic and racial group. The Kurds had been the ummet of the Sultan in an 
Islamic Empire, but were redefined as „prospective Turks‟ that could be assimilated 
into the Turkish nation in the new republic period (Yegen, 2006:3). The Kemalist 




differences; and any such actions implying a Kurdish identity was forbidden and 
persecuted (Gurbey, 1990: 10).  In 1967 it was declared:  
 
“It is illegal and forbidden to introduce to, or distribute in, the 
country, materials in the Kurdish language of foreign origin in any 
form published, recorded, taped or material in similar form” (Official 
Gazette, no. 1Z577 of 14 February 1967).  
 
According to Hirschler‟s Kurdish historiography of Turkey, while the succeeding 
period referred to the pre- and early era of the Republic, the second period occurred 
from the 1940s–1950s, and a period of inactivity followed in the Kurdish movement 
until the end of the 1960s (2001: 146). The transition to a multi-party system and the 
coming to power of the Democrat Party after 1950 brought relative comfort to the 
Kurdish region due to policies aimed to de-escalate the secularist policies. The 
efforts of the government to create a „local bourgeoisie‟ around the country was 
another development from which the Kurds benefited, and in the same period, 
hundreds of thousands of Kurds emigrated to western cities where jobs could more 
easily be found (McDowall, 2004: 403). McDowall asserts that the disruption of 
pastoralism in the region in the course of the revolts during the 1930s was another 
reason for this emigration (2004: 403).  
 
In parallel with the global political transformations of the 1970s, Turkey also 
witnessed a rapid proliferation of left-wing groups. Hirschler asserts that during the 
1960s and 1970s, the Kurdish movement was motivated by class struggle that was 
articulated by the other Marxist movements in Turkey (Hirschler, 2001: 146), 
although this does not mean that all Kurds supported leftist politics. As McDowall 
(2004) asserts, while the Kurds were marked as hostile to right-wing groups, 
considerable numbers joined far right groups such as „“Idealists” (Ulkuculer), also 
known as “Grey Wolves”, (Bozkurtlar), who were associated with the National 
Action Party‟ (2004: 413).  
 
The existing political climate provided political space for workers, public servants, 
students and minority groups, and many leftist and rightist groups crystallised within 




problem. A number of young groups on the political left, and the Grey Wolves and 
the fundamentalists on the right, fought for control of the political arena. Towns, 
districts and neighbourhoods became political zones linked to particular factions of 
leftist and nationalist groups. In other words, society became split between leftists 
and nationalists. Besides the split that took place within society, as Yegen states, the 
„others‟ of „Turkish nationalism were not the Kurds, but rather non-Muslimhood, 
communism and Alevis‟ (2007: 135). 
 
1.3. Turning Point: 1980s and 1990s 
 
During the 1980s, attempts were made to suppress political activity and to transform 
what had become a highly politicised society into a non-political one. Both leftist and 
nationalist groups (although not equally) were purged from the political sphere in a 
third coup d'état
14
 on 12 September 1980.  
 
The 12 September coup, the third military coup staged in Turkey, was the one which 
made the most devastating impact on Turkish society. After the coup was staged, 
hundreds of thousands of people were arrested, imprisoned and forced to become 
refugees if they were lucky enough to escape the torture and maltreatment which 
prevailed in prisons. The Coup was actually a step taken towards Turkey's neo-
liberalisation. The statist economic policy was replaced by an export-promoting, free 
market economy. On the political side, the Turkish-Islam synthesis became the 
central ideological point of reference. Left-wing politics and the labour movement 
were harshly oppressed as they were thought to threaten the neo-liberal 
transformation. The 12 September is probably the most significant event in Turkey's 
near history and one that made the deepest mark upon the country's economic, 
political and social structure
15
. 
                                                 
14 There have been three military coups in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The first was staged 
by a group of Turkish army officers against the democratically elected government of the Democratic 
Party on 27 May 1960, which ended with the execution of the prime minister and two deputy prime 
ministers. The second was in 1971, when the government had become weakened by defections and 
seemed to have become paralysed, leading the Chief of General Staff on 12 March 1971 to hand the 
prime minister a memorandum that was effectively an ultimatum from the armed forces (Zurcher, 
2004: 258).  
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 For a detailed discussion on 12 September coup see Boratav (1991),Demirel (2003), Bora and Can 




Besides the collective trauma that the coup created, the 1980s was a period in which 
economic, social and political realms were redefined in Turkey. Understanding the 
characteristics of recent political and social trends is possible only by looking at the 
1980 coup and the 1980s in general. After the 1980 coup, new right-wing politics 
were constructed through the articulation of the idea of „synthesis of Turk-Islam‟, 
which was accompanied by the dominant discourse of Ozal and the Anavatan Party 
(Motherland Party). Nationalism, Conservatism, and Islamism were the three main 
inclinations of Turkish right-wing politics, along with Kemalism as the indicator of 
an official ideology. This was unprecedented. As Kadioglu states: 
 
“The political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and the early 1990s 
has opened the Kemalist Pandora‟s box, out of which emerged 
multiple identities of Islam and the Kurds” (Kadioglu, 1996: 192). 
 
The Coup of 1980 can be regarded as an effort to demolish the leftist and radical 
nationalist political movements from the political arena, because of the supposed 
separatist intentions of these political ideologies. However, as Kadioglu states, by the 
policies executed through the Coup period came the creation of a new political 
atmosphere for the new identities based on religion, ethnicity, gender and so forth. 
The scope of the socio-political movements of the society shifted from a class based 
formation to identity politics.  The Kurdish movement is also transformed from a 
class based movement into a movement based on an identity politics by and just after 
the Coup period.  
 
It is evident that the empowerment of nationalist discourse and nationalism has been 
on the rise since the 1980s and 1990s, though gradually (Bora, 1994 and 2006). In 
addition to the growth of self-confidence on which such discourses as the great and 
powerful Turkey and the notion that the 21st century would be the Turkish one 
developed, the post-1980 period saw the popularisation of neo-liberal politics via the 
media. The Gulf War was also influential in this, as a turning point towards an 
atmosphere of self-confidence and optimism, rather than one rife with anxiety and 
threat. This development coincided with a wave of nationalism in the Post-Soviet 
Turkic Republics that inspired the dream of unification of the Turkic states and 




Within this Coup atmosphere, Kurds are signed as the „other‟ by the state. Kenan 
Evren, 7
th
 President of Turkey, from 1982–1989, led the third coup of the Turkish 
Republic on 12 September 1980, claiming that the „Kurds are a subgroup of Turks 
living up in the snow-covered mountains and the word “Kurd” comes from the sound 
“kart kurt”, which is made while walking on the snow.‟ This approach steered the 
perception of the general public towards the Kurds and formed the basic elements of 
the official discourse of the Kurdish Question after the 1980s. It was interpreted in 
popular discourse that since there is no Kurdish nation, there can be no Kurdish 
Question. The strategy of denial held its place in political discourse for many years, 
but the dynamics changed after the 1990s. As Updegraff summarises: 
 
“Turkish state policy towards the Kurds… has been evolved from 
denial and mandatory assimilation to cultural recognition to 
acknowledgement of the Kurds‟ contested status as a political problem 
demanding political solutions” (2012: 119). 
 
These socio-economic and international changes played a key role in the 
dissemination of the nationalist movement during the 1980s. Besides the increasing 
trend of self-awareness of ethnic identities, „economic deprivation, social injustice 
and physical displacement combined in the late 1970s to create the conditions for 
revolt‟ (McDowall, 2004: 404). The torture and ill-treatment that Kurds faced in 
Diyarbakır Prison during the coup regime also provided a legitimate and concrete 
reason for the establishment of the Kurdish movement. Diyarbakir Prison was a 
„specially designed' place by the 12 September coup for intimidating the members of 
the Kurdish-left wing organisations. It is widely known that torture and maltreatment 
prevailed in all prisons throughout the coup years, but Diyarbakir Prison deserves 
special mention as the violent practice towards its detainees was unprecedented and 
unparalleled. The treatment of the detainees went far beyond humanity and human 
dignity. Besides tens of 'specifically thought' torture methods, the detainees here 
were forced to eat faeces and soak in sewages. These experiences of the Kurdish left-
wing individuals are usually regarded as one of the triggers for the consolidation of 





Within this political atmosphere, the neo-Marxist PKK was founded by Ankara 
University student Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. The stated objective at its founding was 
„the establishment of a socialist Kurdish state in the south-east of the country‟ 
(Zurcher, 2004: 264). In 1984, the PKK launched an armed struggle against the 
Turkish Army that would see several attacks and clashes taking place over the 
following decade. This became the longest armed Kurdish rebellion in the history of 
the Turkish Republic. By the mid-1990s, the declared aim of the Kurdish movement 
was a more flexible mandate of „possible solutions within a democratic Turkey‟ after 
violent clashes between the Turkish army and Kurdish guerrillas (Pusane, 2014: 83). 
 
Turkish nationalism presented the Kurdish Question as the most important „other‟ 
when defining itself. With regard to the situation of the Kurds, the coup 
administration‟s ethnic nationalism was as crude as it had been in the 1930s and 
1940s, with a dominant Kemalist hegemony, along with novel articulations related to 
Islamism and nationalism. The aggressive and destructive nationalist actions of the 
state caused the growth of the Kurdish movement. Following the coup period, 
speaking, writing and broadcasting in the Kurdish language was prohibited, and 
anybody caught referring to the Kurds as a distinct group was arrested (Kirisci and 
Winrow, 1997: 111). While the ban was lifted in 1991, „everything published in 
Kurdish remains under close official scrutiny‟ (Ergil, 2000: 126). 
 
These dynamics characterised the political atmosphere of the 1990s, when the 
Kurdish Question became a permanent item on the agenda in Turkey. Certain trends 
had a decisive impact on Turkish politics, and these include the social atmosphere 
after the signing of the Customs Union Pact; the economic crisis; the strategies of the 
General Staff related to the Kurdish Question: the „28 February crisis‟, or so-called 
„Post Modern Military Intervention‟ carried out by the General Staff against the 
government in 1997: the internal war between the Turkish military and the PKK: and 
the arrest of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. These events provoked the rise 
of a nationalist conservative ideology in 1980, and all can be considered breaking 
points that spurred the formation of a new structure in which nationalism was 




were the subject of an emergency decree, a regionally specific legal system, state 
military control and, at the same time, economic neglect‟ (Gurbey, 1990: 13). 
 
Until the 1990s, use the word of „Kurd‟ was taboo in both political and public 
spheres. The word 'Kurd' was first pronounced by the eighth president of Turkey, 
Turgut Ozal, in  February 1991, who introduced a draft bill into the Assembly to 
repeal Law 2932 in order to lift the ban of use of Kurdish except in broadcasts, 
publications and education (McDowwall, 2004: 431). Ozal launched discussions 
about a possible federal system, and in „initiated secret dialogue with the Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders and arranged indirect meetings with the PKK leader Ocalan‟ 
(Pusane, 2014: 83). His death in 1993 is still considered to be an assassination in 
response to his plan to address the Kurdish Question
16
.   
 
From the mid-1920s until the end of the 1980s, the Turkish state 'assumed' that there 
was no Kurdish element on Turkish territory (Yegen, 1996: 216). The intention in 
this regard was not to exclude the Kurds from Turkish society systematically, on 
either an ethnic or racial basis, but rather „to assimilate and integrate them into a 
glorified “Turkish” nation‟ (Saracoglu, 2010: 92). The Turkish state continued to 
employ its traditional assimilationist strategy when dealing with the PKK throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. „In accordance with its traditional discourse, the state denied 
the “Kurdish” dimension of the PKK problem and reduced it to a problem of 
“economic underdevelopment”, “terrorism”, and “the external interventions of 
enemy countries”‟ (Saracoglu, 2010: 95).  
 
In 1999, Turkey started to be more responsive regarding its assimilationist strategy 
when it became a candidate for European Union membership. The European Union 
integration process forced the Turkish state to reform its constitutional and political 
system, according to which the Kurds gained some cultural rights, such as the right 
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to open private institutions for the teaching of Kurdish, and to broadcast in their 
mother tongue. Although positive steps, these legal regulations did not constitute a 
fundamental transformation in the approach of the state, nor did they lead to a 
change in the general perception of Kurds in Turkish society. As Kurban states, „for 
the Turkish mind set, granting Kurds a few rights was a concession worth making in 
the name of being accepted into the club of developed nations‟ (Kurban, 2013: 2). In 
addition, the clause stated in the European Court of Human Rights preventing the 
death penalty for Ocalan, who was captured in 1999, created widespread 
disappointment in Turkish society. However, a truce between the PKK and the 
Turkish state was declared just after Ocalan‟s capture, which provided an 
opportunity to resolve the Kurdish Question politically rather than militarily.  
 
1.3.1. 1.3.1 Migrations and Forced Migration: A Possibility for Daily 
Encounters between Kurds and Turks  
 
Besides the losses on both sides, the forced migration of the Kurds from their 
homelands to urban areas, and especially to the western part of the country, added 
another layer to the problem. Any social researcher attempting to understand the 
relationship between Kurds and Turks and everyday life in Turkey cannot overlook 
the subject of migration, which provided the opportunity for Turkish and Kurdish 
groups to encounter each other physically. The western and southern cities became 
the scene of various interactions between Kurdish and Turkish people, which 
allowed them to experience cohabitation and to make inferences about each other. 
Most of the time this migration was one sided, involving the massive movement of 
the Kurdish population from the eastern province to the western and southern 
provinces.  
 
The resettlement of the Kurds was not only a phenomenon of the late 1980s and after 
in Turkey. As Ergil states, as a result of the mounting casualties in the east of the 
country, the state put in place evacuation policies (2000: 125). After the Sheikh Said 




forced the leading families/tribes involved in the rebellion to settle in Western 
Anatolia (Yegen, 1999:561). This was the first compulsory migration of Kurdish 
people in the history of the Turkish Republic. McDowall suggests that the disruption 
of pastoralism by the state in the course of the revolts of 1930s brought about mass 
migration (2004: 403).  
 
Besides the forced migration after the Sheikh Said rebellion, it is necessary to 
explain the two other significant migrations that determined the recent political and 
social structure of Turkey‟s larger cities. The migration wave of the 1960s and 1970s 
was a voluntary, economically-motivated rural–urban migration (Saracoglu, 2010: 
189–190) from underdeveloped regions of the country to more industrialised 
settlements. Besides these economically motivated migrations, thousands of rural 
Kurdish communities were forcibly displaced in the 1980s and 1990s, by the army 
and the PKK. Much of the countryside in the south-east was depopulated as Kurdish 
civilians moved to more defensible centres in eastern cities, as well as to the cities of 
western Turkey and Western Europe. „By the mid-1990s, more than 3,000 villages 
had been virtually wiped from the map, and, according to official figures, 378,335 
Kurdish villagers had been displaced and left homeless‟
17
. According to Koc et al. 
(2008) a significantly high percentage of the Kurdish population now lives in the 
west region – in 1965, the Kurdish speaking population constituted less than 1 
percent of the population in the western provinces and 5 percent in the southern 
provinces, but by 2003 there had been a sevenfold increase of Kurds in the west 
(2008: 450).  
 
Besides the changing nature of, and motivations for migration, the general profile of 
migrants also changed. With the arrival of new migrant groups in the western and 
southern cities, the perception of Kurdishness, along with other political factors, 
changed. Unlike the first migration, the second was sudden, and the migrants had no 
time to arrange anything before moving out. Nor did they get any social or economic 
assistance from the state in the process. As Ciplak (2012) states: 
 
                                                 




“... after moving to the cities, they [second immigrant group] found 
themselves uneducated, unskilled and poor, making them very prone 
to victimization. … They experienced a wide range of problems such 
as joblessness and housing” (2012: 26-27).  
 
Under these conditions, the Kurds began the joining of, and establishing of organised 
crime networks, engaged in selling drugs, prostitution, begging, etc. These informal 
networks, which were generally managed by the Kurdish mafia, provided sufficient 
ground for the Turks to develop negative ideas about Kurds and make generalisations 
about the entire Kurdish community. In anti-Kurdish discourse, people ignore the 
poverty and class aspect of the situation. Many Turkish people believe that Kurdish 
people take part in these criminal activities not because of poverty, but because they 
are naturally inclined towards laziness, criminality and disloyalty (Saracoglu, 2009: 
652). All Kurdish people are seen as terrorists, bent on separating the Turkish State, 
or potential terrorists who already have sympathy towards the PKK. On the other 
hand, one aggressive nationalist reaction created counter-nationalist movements, and 
unsurprisingly, Kurdish people started to feel pressure, believing that Turkish people 
wanted to destroy them. They therefore feel the need to protect themselves and to be 
prepared for any possible attacks. It is obvious that cultural conflict is not sufficient 
to explain this rising hatred and prejudice between people.  
 
Antipathy towards Kurdish people living in Western cities is argued in academic 
circles for a decade by the concepts of “pop(ular) nationalism” and 
“nationalism/racism” in Turkey. In this limited literature
18
, the most important 
contribution has been made by Saracoglu (2009), through his conception of 
“exclusive recognition”, which discusses the antipathy towards Kurdish immigrant 
living in Izmir. By his conceptualization of the everyday aspect of the conflict 
between Kurds and Turks, this is accentuated and analysed through the theoretical 
themes of neoliberalism, migration and negative perceptions about “experienced 
Other [Kurds]”. Saracoglu states that 
 
 “…the concept of exclusive recognition helps to see  the rising anti-
migrant discourse imposed by the state or other political organization 
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is not an ideology but a historically specific ethnicization process that 
takes place in the everyday life  cities in Turkey” (2009: 640). 
 
While there are several points which can be criticised, this research brought a new 
perspective to the understanding of the ways in which the Kurdish migrants have 
been identified in the middle-class discourse by certain pejorative labels and 
stereotypes. Unlike the work of Saracoglu, two sides of the interaction, both Kurds 
and Turks, are questioned in this research.  While there are similarities between this 
research and Saracoglu's in terms of the theoretical perspectives of nationalism, the 
difference between the fields of the research provides some changes between the 
results of the two researches studies. As Saracoglu`s study demonstrates, (2009, 
2010) any research on everyday life and the individuals are highly influenced by 
physical surrounding, context and interactional forms. 
 
Until the army forced the migration of Kurds towards the West, the opportunities for 
Turks and Kurds to interact were very limited. Furthermore, until the 1990s, it was 
easy for the Turks to deny the existence of Kurds as an ethnic category. The 
collective memory was systematically restructured and reproduced in mainstream 
media during the late 1980s and 1990s through references to „traumatic moments‟ in 
Turkey‟s history. Turks have been exposed to such distorted and restricted messages 
in the mainstream media; the majority had a very limited notion of what was really 
happening in the Kurdish „region‟. Kurds, however, experienced the bloodshed first-
hand, or at least heard the experiences of their relatives and friends. By the 1990s, 
the civil war could no longer be covered up, especially after the increasing number 
of bodies of "martyrs" returning to their neighbourhoods. 
 
1.4. Paradigmatic Change: 2000s 
 
In the 2000s, with the transformation of the political landscape in the form of the 
deconstruction of the official state ideology by the Islamist conservative 
government, the Kurdish Question was carried to another level. In order to 
understand the 2000s in Turkey it is necessary to consider the Islamic focus that 




communities had become visible through the support of the state since the 1980 
coup. Among nationalist discourses, a form of nationalism was employed by Islamist 
parties as the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). 
These were „ornamented with progressivism emphases in which Turkey is 
designated as the potential leader of the Islamic World and confederation‟ (Insel, 
2002; Bora, 1994; Sarıbay, 1985). The Justice and Development Party (JDP) [Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi], founded in 2001, won the 2002 General Elections, initiating an 
administration which continues at the time of writing. For  Somer‟s the  JDP, 
 
 “… is a pro-EU and pro-democracy party rooted in a moderate 
Islamist ideology and type of Turkish-Muslim nationalism which may 
prove to be more liberal and more respectful of ethnic diversity than 
defensive Turkish nationalism” (2008:221). 
 
The JDP initiated a reform process that made allowances for the cultural rights of 
Kurds. Emphasis on Islam provided room for bringing together Kurds and Turks, 
referring to an alleged Islamic brotherhood in Ottoman terms. In this regard the JDP 
was quite flexible in its first term in terms of cultural demands and human rights. 
The PKK‟s decision to end the ceasefire in 2004 changed this relatively positive 
situation
19
, and before the General Election of 2007 a nationalist tendency was clear 
in both the political atmosphere and in the election campaigns.  
 
The political moves made by this new „conservative democratic‟ party were intended 
to challenge the secularist and militarist Kemalist ideology, and new approaches to 
the Kurdish Question during the JDP government‟s term in office were motivated by 
the deconstruction of that ideology. The Ergenokon
20
 case, the largest legal case in 
the history of the Turkish state, showed clearly the government‟s aim to challenge 
Kemalism and the role of the army in Turkish politics. Although known widely as 
the „Ergenekon case‟, the official name is the „Case against the infringement of 
Article 313 of the Turkish Penal Code: the establishment of a criminal organisation‟ 
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 Retrieved from http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_pkkkadek-ateskese-fiilen-son-verdi_54788.html. 
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 Ergenekon refers to a valley in Central Asia that features in Turkic folklore as a place of sacred and 
mythical meaning. According to legend, a Turkic clan was guided to a safe haven ın the valley by a 




(Unver, 2009: 2). The case concerns an alleged ultra-nationalist organisation, known 
as „the deep-state‟, composed of around 100 suspects from the armed forces and civil 
society organisations. While the roots of the organisation can be traced back to the 
late Ottoman era, since the mid-1990s it has referred to „a deep-state organisation 
aiming to „defend the regime against Islamist and anti-Kemalist movements‟
21
 (Balci 
and Jacoby: 2012: 137).  Challenging the army and the deep-rooted administrative 
patterns of the state transformed the Turkish political narrative. The decreasing 
credibility of the army left room for criticisms of its activities in the Kurdish region 
over the past three decades, and revealed paramilitary operations in the region. While 
the army‟s activities did not come to an end, and seem unlikely to do so in the near 
future, the challenge to the army made it possible and legitimate to publically express 
the collective and personal experiences of the Kurds. 
 
Although the Turkish state is taking „historical‟ steps towards recognising certain 
political and cultural rights of the Kurds, a rising antagonistic discourse is becoming 
visible towards the Kurdish people in Turkish society. During the first term of the 
JDP government, Kurds were granted rights that they had long been denied. Prime 
Minister Erdogan announced that there were different ethnic sub-identities in Turkey, 
and that the common bond between the different ethnic groups was that they were all 
„citizens of Turkey‟. Recognising different ethnic elements was, in itself, a 
significant step away from the hegemonic Kemalist nationalist ideology. It also 
reflected an intention to change both the role of the military in politics and to change 
the official nationalist policy of the Turkish state. Here two processes must be 
explained if one is to understand the recent wave of nationalism. The first is the 
emergence of the JDP‟s aims to regulate the cultural and political rights of Kurds, 
described as the „Kurdish/Democratic Expansion‟. This began in 2009 with the 
launch of TRT
22
 Ses, a Kurdish-language radio and television service. The 
government claimed that this project provided democratic rights to Kurds in Turkey, 
and expected it to lead to the disarmament of the PKK and agreement on a peaceful 
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 Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) Association is a state-owned public broadcasting service with 




solution to the Kurdish Question. Furthermore, the government has put in place 
regulations related to the right to education and broadcasting in the mother tongue, 
offers of remission to some members of the PKK, and so forth. The second process 
was a referendum on a number of changes to the Constitution held on 12 September 
2010. As Kalaycioglu states the referendum made visible the “main cultural 
cleavages between the more socio-cultural liberal and secular coastal provinces and 
the more religious conservative hinterland” (2012: 1). While the JDP and some other 
parties supported the “yes” vote, the biggest opposition party the Republican People 
Party, supported a “no” vote.  The Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) [Baris 
ve Demokrasi Partisi] boycotted the referendum. Despite this boycott and the no 
notes, the results showed that the majority supported the constitutional amendments, 
with 58 percent for and 42 percent against.  
 
Although the JDP had intended to take decisive steps to resolve the Kurdish 
Question, they instead spurred conflict between conservative Islamist groups and 
secularist republican military elements. The conflicting ideologies held by such 
groups were articulated with nationalism and its different forms, meaning that 
nationalism is defined and followed on different sides of the political field. The 
presidential election of 2007 was a prime example of this „Secularist/Kemalist-
Islamist‟ division in society. A series of „Republican Meetings‟
23
 held before the 
presidential elections of July 22, 2007, were hosted by non-governmental 
organisations
24
 and intended to encourage a nationalist, Kemalist pulse in society. 
Millions joined the meetings to show how Kemalist, secularist, modernist and 
nationalist they were (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2007:119). In this political atmosphere, the 
liberal-Islamist wing presented a more democratic and liberal nationalist perspective, 
while the Kemalist-Secularist wing became more ethnicist and discriminatory. In 
other words, the old-established divisions between conservatism, Kemalism and 
nationalism no longer held true.  
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The government‟s step towards recognising the Kurdish Question did not 
automatically yield democratic developments, as the Kurdish Question is still 
perceived as a „terrorism problem‟ that can only be resolved by military means. The 
acceptance of the Kurdish Question by Erdogan and his party did not lead to a 
substantial change in political practices. Conservative and nationalist wings within 
the current government have prevented more significant transformations that may 
have contributed towards the resolution of the issue. Internal JDP conflicts 
undermined the Kurdish Expansion project, and a lack of consensus in Parliament. 
As a result, the Kurdish Expansion process failed to receive wide public support. 
The intended transformation was not accepted by Kemalist and nationalist elements, 
and the process was not considered promising, either by the Kurds or by leftist and 
socialist groups. Academicians, students and journalists are still being persecuted 
simply for recognising and conducting research on the Kurdish Question, with 
accusations that they support a terrorist organisation.  
 
Although a vital transformation has occurred in the political discourse over the 
Kurdish Question, the hegemonic conservative discourse remains. „One nation, one 
flag, and one state‟, thus maintains the perspective of the Kemalist ideology and its 
assimilationist policies. While the Kemalists denied that the Kurds constituted a 
distinct ethnic group, recent state policies have tended to ignore ethnic differences 
and the political demands of the Kurds. As Erdogan stated, „there is no Kurdish 




Likely previous government, Kurdish Question is regarded as an economic 
underdevelopment and terror problem in JDP‟s rule period as well. However only 
the economic policies that JDP developed about the Kurdish region is different from 
the policies of previous governments‟. Economic investments in the Kurdish region 
were seen as the only fundamental solution of the Question. An example was the 
project called The Project of South-Eastern Anatolia (GAP) [Guneydogu Anadolu 
Projesi] before JDP rule period.  GAP, which is a counterinsurgency project, 







basically aimed to raise income levels and living standards by overcoming the 
structural difficulties in the region by agricultural production. (Yoruk and Ozsoy, 
2013: 155). It was planned in the 1970s and still incomplete. Yoruk and Ozsoy state 
that there was a shift in state economic policies after the 2000s;  
 
“JDP government has been withdrawing from its larger project of the 
economic development of the Kurdish region- a project that has served 
the state discourse to de-Kurdify the Kurdish conflict by reducing it to 
a techno-political issue of economic regulation rendering its ethno-
political dimensions invisible” (2013:155). 
 
Yoruk  and Ozsoy‟s study has a great importance in terms of the ethnic perspective 
they employed in order to analyse the economic policies of the recent government. 
They assert that by the new strategy of the JDP government rather than developing 
gigantic economic projects, social assistance,  projects targeting poor Kurdish 
individuals are developed such as free health care, conditional cash transfers, food 
stamps, housing, education and disability aid for the poor (2013:155). This argument 
reveals that social assistance programs are designed in an ethnic based structure and 
basically target poor Kurds. According to their research, both Kurds living in the 
Kurdish region and Kurds settled down in the urban centres of the western part of the 
country have benefitted from these aids and “Kurds are almost twice as likely as 
non-Kurds to receive free health care cards” (2013: 156). Yoruk and Ozsoy state that 
these social assistance programs force poor Kurds to ignore their ethnic identities 
and prioritise their economic poverty. In this way, the government wants to achieve 
the erosion of the Kurdishness of the poor Kurds by making the poor Kurds merely 
poor (2013: 157).  
 
Throughout the 2000s, Kurds demanded the right to education in their mother 
tongue, and the right to change the Turkified names of places and to include the 
letters q, x, and w which do not exist in the Turkish alphabet. While they sought to 
gain such rights through participation in parliamentary politics, because of the 10 
percent electoral threshold, Kurdish candidates joined the elections independent of 





The most prominent step towards appeasement taken by the government was to 
allow eight PKK militants from Iraqi Kurdistan to return to Turkey via the Habur 
border gate on 19
 
October 2009. While this was just the first step in a long-term 
„return‟ project, the welcoming of the Kurdish groups by Kurdish people living on 
the Turkish side of the border provoked nationalist anger in Turkish society. The 
guerrilla clothes worn by the militants and their lack of remorse for their previous 
acts triggered a nationalist backlash in both the nationalist and conservative sections 
of society (Pusane, 2014: 86).  The government was accused of „giving in to 
terrorism‟ and allowing the PDP to „propagate terrorism‟, pushing the JDP to take a 
step back, and thus the Kurdish Expansion project lost its support. The most 
important pledge of the Kurdish Expansion project had been for the drawing up of a 
new civilian constitution that made a new definition of citizenship and granted 




As Liu and Laszlo state, „Collective memories of war are refreshed by new conflicts‟ 
(2006: 92). The traumatic memories of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire have 
been revived again and again over the years with every new casualty. The trauma has 
remained the same, but the enemy has changed and has brought new threats. While 
before the establishment of the Republic the enemy were the European forces and 
non-Muslim elements living in the Empire, after the collapse of the Empire in the 
1930s the enemies were Islamists and Kurds. Throughout the 1970s the enemy were 
leftist terrorist groups. Both secularist and nationalist policies have attempted to 
define an „ideal Turkish‟ citizen, and in doing so, have pushed significant portions of 
the population into a secondary status. „Kurds, conservative Muslims and non-
Muslims are the most prominent examples of the identities that the Turkish state has 
rendered as secondary‟ throughout the last three decades (Kaya, 2012: 150). 
 
The conflict between the state and the PKK, and the various policies put in place 
within republican history, have polarised society in terms of ethnic identity, and 




Kurd could be unaware of what was happening‟ (2004: 426-7). While most of the 
Turkish population has been kept uninformed or misinformed by the state-led media, 
first-hand experiences of violence and discrimination over the last three decades have 
created a distinct form of self-awareness in the daily lives of Kurds. Besides the 
PKK-centred movement, the proliferation of the narratives of democratisation and 
human rights, and the opportunities provided by various communication channels 
have contributed to the political evolution of the Kurds (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 5). 
Although there is little conflict between ordinary Kurds and Turks in daily life, even 
after thirty years of bitter war, the general picture that has been drawn in republican 
history is wholly summarised in one sentence by Barkey and Fuller:  
 
“Kurds and Turks are coming to live in their own psychological 
worlds – working jointly in society but increasingly nourishing 
suspicions about each other‟s intentions and identifying with different 
things” (1998: 17). 
 
The strategy of denial has its roots in a much longer history of Kurdish identity, 
stretching throughout the twentieth century until the 1990s. While the Kurdish 
uprising made visible the Kurdish Question and the demands of the Kurdish 
movement, the issue is still denied in the narratives of both political elites and 
ordinary people. While perceptions of Kurds have been presented in dichotomies 
such as bad-good, patriotic-separatist and the terrorist-loyal citizen in the Turkish 
nationalist narratives, it is vital to acknowledge that personal encounters between 
Turks and Kurds often challenge these dichotomies.  Denying the Kurds and the 
Kurdish Question, however, and defining the Kurds because of the existence of the 
Question seems a paradoxical aspect of the State narrative. This perspective also has 
its reflections in the personal perceptions of the Question and has also become more 
visible in the personal accounts of individuals.  
 
This chapter has painted a general picture of the history of Turkish politics from the 
perspective of the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism. A rough summary has 
been provided of certain periods and significant events to highlight particular forms 
of nationalism and the conditions under which they emerged. To capture the 




to explain the general structure of the current political atmosphere and the backdrop 
of encounters/interactions between Kurdish and Turkish people. This short historical 
account of Turkish nationalism and the recent political picture presents the various 
forms that were experienced in different periods. The goal of this research is to 
provide an insight into how people perceive collective memory, and how nationalist 
narratives are produced, how they become pervasive and to what end they serve. As 
mentioned above, it is essential to understand  the content of the encounters and their 
importance in creating narratives about the „self‟ and the „other‟ in order to grasp 



























2. Conceptualising Nationalism  
 
In the words of Benedict Anderson (1991), „Nation-ness is the most universally 
legitimate value in the political life of our times (1991: 3), although it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to come up with a grand theory that explains every aspect of 
nationalism. As cultural, historical and political structures vary, it is not possible to 
establish a universal definition of nationalism that encompasses all of its possible 
meanings and aspects. Conversi (1995) claims that the reason for the lack of a 
universally accepted definition of nationalism stems from the fact that „the nation is a 
means of definition‟ (Conversi, 1995: 77), meaning that it is not possible to 
conceptualise a notion of nationalism abstractly without a context. 
 
According to Jaffrelot (2003), nationalism theories are usually divided into two 
broad categories.
26
 The first of these regards nationalism as an „ism‟, being a product 
of large social transformations based on the process of modernisation; while the 
second regards the nation as a continuation of pre-existing ethnic characteristics. 
Jaffrelot asserts that the distinction between modernist and perennialist perspectives 
has been made by scholars whose focus is on theories of ethnicity (2003: 42). This 
review indicates that scholars examining the macro theories of nationalism have 
tended to focus on the emergence and appearance of nation/alism in the modern era, 
the meaning of the nation, the relationship between the nation and nationalism, the 
tools that enable nationhood, and the main functions of nations and nationalism(s) 
within a social construction. Due to the macro phenomena that these theories follow 
are categorised as macro nationalism theories within this research. 
 
As Bourdieu (1999) argues, “one cannot understand one‟s position in the macro 
social order without reference to the directly experienced effects of social interaction 
within different social microcosm” (cited in Mann and Fenton, 2009: 520).Macro 
approaches aim to grasp nationalism through such broad parameters as 
modernisation, capitalism, and industrialisation, power and so forth and overlook the 
micro forms of nationalism at the level of everyday life. From this perspective I 
                                                 
26




suggest that nationalism is an endemic ideology embedded in the micro-formations 
of everyday life: in relationships between minorities and hegemonic groups, in 
affairs among children, men and women, in places of work, in schools, in the streets, 
and on our bodies. Accordingly, it is not possible to understand nationalism by 
looking only at the official ideological formations of state politics, at the level of 
institutions, etc. Theories that focus on the notion of ethnicity, such as perennialist 
and ethno-symbolist approaches, ignore and make invisible the distinctive features of 
nationhood and the ways of ethnic identification. That said, employing a micro and 
bottom-up perspective does not ignore the macro argumentations of nationalism, in 
that any research focusing on the daily appearances of the nationalism from a 
bottom-up perspective cannot provide a comprehensive evaluation of nationalism 
without visiting the macro argumentations.  
 
From this perspective, this research aims to make visible the some „daily‟, „ordinary‟ 
and „personal‟ appearances of nationalism through personal narratives. As stated 
above, while macro theories of nationalism are seen as the foundation, the micro 
appearances and the production and ways of practising nationalism are 
conceptualised. To produce a reasonable theoretical path: 
 
i. The macro theories of nationalism, Gellner‟s and Hobsbawm‟s perspectives, 
see nationalism as a modern phenomenon, Breuilly‟s perspective on centring 
„politics‟, Anderson‟s focuses on print media, are visited.  
ii. Departing from the critiques of the macro theories of nationalism, some 
prominent concepts such as the concept of everyday nationhood and popular 
nationalism are discussed. In order to develop more extensive evaluation of 
the narratives of respondents, the concepts are; ethnicity, prejudice and 
discrimination are also included into this discussion. 
 
2.1. „Modernisation‟ as the Starting Point of Nationalism  
 
According to the modernist perspective, as advanced by Kohn in his pioneering study 
Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (1965), the roots of nationalism date back no 




product of modernisation share common grounds, they are composed of quite 
different perspectives, such as Gellner‟s (1964, 1983, 1997) economistic theories of 
modernisation, the social communication theories of Deutsch (1953) and Anderson 
(1983), the economistic theory of Nairn inspired by Marxism (1977), and the 
politico-ideological theories of Breuilly (1982), Giddens (1981) and Mann (1992), in 
which different historical perspectives on the concepts of nation and nationalism are 
developed. Puri (2004) asserts that the main questions discussed in modernist 
theories of nationalism are:  
 
“How do nationalism(s) and national states anchor the institutions, 
socioeconomic networks, beliefs and practices of modernity, and in 
what ways are nationalisms and states perceived as the outcome of 
modernity and its ill effects?” (2004: 58) 
 
Gellner (1964), one of the most quoted of all modernist theorists, makes a strong 
claim that nationalism has its roots in the new industrial order. In the Gellnerian 
approach, nationalism may not be regarded as recognition of the self-ethnicity of 
nations, but rather that nationalism is the thing „which invents nations where they do 
not exist‟ (Gellner, 1964: 168). Gellner‟s main contribution was in defining 
nationalism as a phenomenon that depends not only on state formation processes and 
the industrial society, but also on such cultural changes as population explosions, 
rapid urbanisation, labour migration, state-driven education, mobility and 
communication between individuals. For Gellner, „… a high culture pervades the 
whole of society, defines it and needs to be sustained by that polity‟ (1983: 18). He 
goes on to assert that nationalism is quite far from being natural or universal.  
 
“Men do not become nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality, 
atavistic or not, well-based or myth-founded: they become nationalists 
through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely 
recognized”(Gellner, 1964: 160).   
 
Hobsbawm‟s (1990) theory of nationalism regards nationalism as a modern 
phenomenon. Hobsbawm emphasises the role of nationalism in the creation of 
industrial economies and the transition from local to national economic systems 




assumptions regard nationalism as a product of nationalist elites that contribute to the 
building of nation states.   
 
While some nationalist movements can be explained in reference to modernisation 
and the political, economic and social transformations that are the outcome of the 
modernisation process, these factors cannot be construed as constituting a general 
explanation of nationalism (Breuilly, 1994:1). Breuilly states that by focusing on 
identity, modernisation or class, intellectuals overlook the basic motive of 
nationalism: power. As he puts it, „… nationalism refers to the political movements 
seeking or exercising power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments‟ 
(1994:2).  
  
Another aspect of nationalism related to creation of nationhood and the 
dissemination of nationalism is discussed in Anderson‟s, Imagined Communities 
(1991), in which it is stated that the convergence of capitalism and print media 
enabled „rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and relate 
themselves with others, in profoundly new ways‟ (1991: 90). This transformation 
triggered the creation of imagined communities, in which members of the nation 
would never know all their fellow members.  
 
At this point it needs to be underlined that there are different perspectives on the 
processes and means of nation-building and the notion of nationalism. Pakkasvirta 
claims that while Anderson‟s work describes perfectly the preconditions likely to 
make possible a sense of national belonging, it may not give a clear explanation of 
the nature of nationalism (2013: 86). In Jaffrellot‟s classification of nationalism 
theories, Gellner and Anderson can be classified under the „nation-building school‟ 
(2003: 2). Both Anderson‟s and Gellner‟s theories are concerned with nation-making 
and nationhood rather than nationalism per se. In the light of these critiques, it can be 
concluded that macro nationalism theories aim to bring answers to the questions of 
how nations are built, while clarifying what the effects of modernisation processes 





The question of when the nation came into being has a prominent role in the 
contemporary theoretical debate on nationalism, as highlighted by Ozkırımlı (2010: 
199). In contrast to modernist theories of nationalism, the primordialist approach 
considers ethnic communities to be a central part of human history, and „regards 
ethnicity as a given, a prior, constraining, and overriding social bond‟ (Smith, 2001: 
84). Smith adds that although nationalism is a modern phenomenon, nations have 
existed throughout history, broadly rejecting arguments that „nations are inventions 
of modern times‟ and the argument that nationalism is „a construct of elites‟.  
Critiquing Gellner‟s approach, Smith claims that modernism tells only half the story, 
nations and nationalism came to exist in the modern world, but overlooks what those 
nations will be, where they will emerge or why so many people are prepared to die 
for them (Smith, 2003: 195). In this regard, Smith proposes an approach that 
explores not only the processes and requirements of modernity, but also the 
genealogies of nations. This method points to the ethnic bonds that are regarded to 
have existed before the emergence of nationalism, and have been employed by the 
elites in the course of the production of myths and symbols, and articulated in 
memories, values and traditions. In primordialist-perennialist approaches, the 
continuities between modern nations and their pre-modern predecessors are stressed. 
However as Gellner stated in Warwick Debates, even there are the cultural and 
symbolic continuities between the ethnies and modern nations “…the cultural 
continuity is contingent and inessential” (2008: 370). While the continuity of the 
ethnies within modern nation-state formations is proved, in this perspective far from 
provides comprehensive answers to the questions of „what is nationalism?‟ and „how 
is it practiced and reproduced through the ordinary members of a nation?‟ 
 
2.1.1. From Critiques of Elite-Based Perspectives of Nationalism to 
an Everyday Perspective of Nationalism 
 
As discussed above, the macro-approaches to nationalism, and the questions they ask 
do not fit the points that are sought out in this study. Such research, in which the 




the personal narratives of individuals, necessitates a „bottom-up‟ perspective, as 
Hobsbawm (1990) suggests. His criticism of Gellner‟s theory is the most important 
theoretical point of departure in this research, specifically, that Gellner‟s account 
does not pay adequate attention to the view from below, and he asserts that „official 
ideologies of states and movements are not reliable guides as to what ordinary 
people, even the most loyal citizens think„ (1990: 10-11). From this perspective, 
Hobsbawm states: 
 
“While [nationalism]… is constructed essentially from above, [it] … 
cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms 
of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary 
people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist” 
(1990: 10). 
 
This research follows Hobsbawm‟s suggested „from below‟ perspective, taking this 
as the starting point so as to deepen the discussion and situate the study within the 
nationalism literature.  
 
In this respect, it is necessary to look at the basic critiques of modernist approaches, 
but before moving on to these, it is necessary to state that examining nationalism 
from a quotidian, bottom-up perspective does not mean ignoring the general political 
discussions and transformations that occur in the macro political sphere. Indeed these 
two perspectives should be regarded rather as two sides of the same coin. That said 
the various ways in which ethnicity and nationalism are practiced and experienced in 
everyday life are not simple reflections of macro political transformations. As an 
ideology that is embedded in all aspects of society, nationalism cannot be fully 
understood from just one aspect.  
 
One of the aspects of modernist approaches that is often criticised is its elite-based 
evaluation of the processes involved in the „emergence of nation states and the 
ideology of nationalism‟, and the forms of reproduction of nationalism. This critique 
is prominent in terms of its ability to make visible the ignorance of „ordinary‟, 
„everyday‟ and „personal‟ aspects of nationalism within literature. Though not all 




differ in their opinion of the ways in which the elites are instrumental in mobilising 
nationalism and consolidating the power of the nation state (Puri, 2004: 58). Such 
critiques of the elite-based perspective of modernist theories of nationalism make a 
special contribution in seeking to understand the „quotidian‟ and „ordinary people‟ of 
nationalism. As Deloye states, if we are seeking to understand nationalism from the 
aspect of everyday life, it is inappropriate to focus only on the political nation-
builders, such as the education system, the military, the state or the actions of 
nationalist intellectuals (2013: 615). 
 
Anderson also criticises elite-based perspectives, and refers to the „quotidian‟ as an 
appropriate field through which one can see the experience of the nation (1983: 36). 
The main concern of these critiques is their lack of interest in and understanding of 
the links between nationalism and encounters between ordinary people in everyday 
life. Though the power of political institutions are overstated within literature, the 
question of how nationalism is rooted in the unequal relations between the self and 
other is ignored. 
 
Departing from these critiques raises the question: „If we shift emphasis away from 
the role of the elites, how is it possible to explain the production and reproduction of 
different forms of nationalism(s) within a nation-state?‟
27
 This question makes it 
necessary to trace the ways in which nationhood is practiced, the types of narratives 
that they articulate and the reproduction of ethnic identification in everyday life.  
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 At this point, stressing the definition of such ambiguous concepts as state, nation, nation state and 
nationalism within the context of multi-ethnic states such as Turkey is important. However the focus 
of this research is not the political meanings of these conceptions, although the multi-ethnic structures 
of the recent nation-states emerge as a prominent issue. Connor states that while defining the concept 
of state in a political manner as „… the subdivision of the globe‟ is relatively easy, the concept of 
nation refers to an ambiguous meaning frame (Connor, 1978:379-380). When the concept of nation is 
defined in a non-political sense, the question of „How does one differentiate the nation from other 
human collectives?‟ such as religious groups, clans etc. is raised (1978:380). From this perspective in 
a multi-ethnic state, notions of „nation‟ and the political manner of the „nation state‟ become a 
challenging issue. It is not possible to claim a nation state that is composed of ethnically and racially 
homogenous inhabitants. The multi-ethnic structure of recent nation states is not exceptional. Within 
the related literature, cases of Kurds in Turkey, Flems in Belgium, Welsh and Scots in the United 
Kingdom and so forth is discussed in the conception of multi-ethnic states and the definitions of the 






2.2. Nationalism in Everyday Life  
 
With these contributions, the theoretical debate on nationalism was seen to have 
reached a new stage at the end of the 1980s, although in order to understand the 
emergence and proliferation of studies of ethnicity and nationalism, it is necessary to 
consider developments in cultural theory. Eley and Suny (1996) listed four 
contributions that cultural studies have provided to our understanding of nation, 
ethnicity and nationalism. The first of these is the cultural studies perspective, which 
locates culture at the centre of nation-forming without connecting it to a primordial 
meaning (1996: 21). The second refers to the anthropological perspective of cultural 
studies, which makes possible a quotidian perspective of nationalism, in which 
culture is defined as an informal, practical and unconscious territory of everydayness 
in one anthropological sense (1996: 21). Placing culture at the centre of the analytical 
framework highlights the dynamics in the production of ethnicity that „arises in the 
interaction between groups‟ (1996: 21). The third contribution that cultural studies 
made to nationalism studies concerns Habermas‟ concept of the „public sphere‟. 
Furthermore, Eley and Suny highlight the centrality of cultural publics in nation the  
building processes (1996: 23), which draws attention to everyday encounters 
neighbourhoods, streets, workplaces, schools, etc., which are of crucial importance to 
this research. The fourth contribution is the set of questions that constitute the key 
themes in cultural studies: „How is the nation represented? How are its aspirations 
authorized? And how are its origins and claims narrated?‟ (1996: 24). This body of 
work makes it possible to analysis the products of popular culture, such as film, 
photography, television and video, rather than national literature (1996: 24). 
 
Ozkirimli states that the departure point of the new approaches questions the 
fundamental assumptions of nationalism literature and „takes a step by highlighting 
the ignored issues of their predecessors‟ (2010: 169). Bhabha (1990) points out that 
the nation is often read from a functionalist perspective, and is regarded as the 
ideological means of state power in nationalism literature. For Bhabha, the other 
form that nation and nationalism takes is the „national-popular‟ sentiment conversed 




also points to another means by which „alternative constituencies of peoples and 
oppositional analytic capacities may emerge‟, being through the everyday new 
„ethnicities‟ and so forth (1990:3). 
 
Skey (2011) and Klein, (2001) assert that „everyday life‟ stands as an ignored 
parameter within nationalism literature; however the problem with „everyday life‟ is 
that, as David Chaney has observed, it is taken for granted by scholars, despite the 
fact that it is „generally the bedrock of social reality‟ (2002: 4). Jenkins also 
underlines that: 
 
“If we wish to understand how the macro patterns that are to be found 
in large-scale quantitative data are produced and reproduced, how 
they are made and changed, there is no substitute for exploring in 
detail the lives of real people, from whose real behaviour those data 
are abstraction” (2011: 15). 
 
It is necessary to understand how and why identities are lived and made meaningful 
by concentrating of the flow of everyday life, ordinary practices, and the perceptions 
and roles of ordinary people in the process of the reproduction of nationalism (Skey, 
2009: 334). Cohen asserts that „the individual is highly specific, and is distinguished 
from other individuals in innumerable and very particular ways‟ (1996: 802). 
Therefore it is required to understand how individuals perceive themselves and how 
they perceive their nations, and to differentiate between the official representations 
of the regimes and perceptions of individuals (Cohen, 1996: 803). This 
transformative and dynamic process of reproduction of nationalism at the everyday 
level and the related official ideology of nationalism makes discussions of the 
personal experiences and dynamic perceptions and practices of ordinary people a 
matter of great interest. This way of thinking is reminiscent of Anthony Cohen‟s 
conception of „personal nationalism‟. In his words: 
 
“We watch these rites and, as individuals, in interpreting them we 
remake them in the sense that we are able to make of them. In just the 
same way, we listen to our leaders‟ vacuous rhetoric and render it 
meaningful by attributing our own sense to it, so that the sense we 




voices but listen to ourselves. This is what I mean by „personal 
nationalism” (Cohen, 1996: 807). 
 
To Harrison, everyday life is always open to „new possibilities‟ (2000: 498), and this 
feature of everyday life means that it is always „open ended, fluid and generative‟, 
being more related to „becoming‟ than to „being‟. Accordingly, we sensually 
experience and understand what is „constantly attaching, weaving and disconnecting; 
constantly mutating and creating‟ (quoted in Edensor, 2002:23). In this respect, in the 
fluid structure of everyday life the notions of nation, national identity and 
nationalism(s) should also be regarded as dynamic structures. By this definition, 
people cannot be defined only as consumers of national meaning, in that they are 
„simultaneously their contingent producers‟ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 546).   
 
There is now a broad body of research with a focus on everyday nationalism, from 
fields as diverse as social psychology, social anthropology, social linguistics, 
sociology, politics, media studies, education and cultural studies. However, these 
studies focus on different aspects of the concept of nationalism and use different 
theoretical and methodological tools, with a common focus being on how the 
nation/national identity is constructed in social life.  
 
It is possible to categorise research on everyday nationalism into two streams: the 
first concentrates on institutions such as media, education and the state that produce 
and disseminate national(ist), messages and tend to comprehend how the nation is 
produced through these mechanisms. Examples of this approach include Edensor‟s 
(2002) National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life, Miller-Idriss‟ (2004) 
research on citizenship, Fox and Miller-Idriss‟ (2008) work on everyday nationhood, 
and Palmer‟s (1998) study on experiencing the nation in the context of food, body 
and landscape. These studies look for common symbols (emblems, icons, images, 
flags and monuments), special national days, media texts and news to make sense of 
the narrative of the nation, the national and nationalism. Although these works aim to 
show how people perceive these messages and how they produce and reproduce 
nationalism through everyday practices, they do not situate „personal 




everyday nationalism is based on people‟s experiences, narratives about their 
perceptions, personal practices and forms of interactions. Cohen‟s (1996) concept of 
„personal nationalism‟, Jean-Klein‟s (2001) study of nationalism and resistance in 
everyday life in Palestine, and Brubaker et al.‟s (2004) study of everyday ethnicity in 
Cluj are examples of this kind of research. Similar to the first kind of research, they 
investigate national symbols, special national events and media texts through the 
narratives of people, and aim to follow the traces of these symbols through the 
perceptions and experiences of ordinary people. Their focus is on the strategies that 
produce national identities and everyday practices that make people members of the 
nation.  
 
2.2.1. Ethnicity in Everyday Life  
 
The discussion above serves as a path for studying the ways in which ethnicity, race 
and nationalism are produced and performed at the level of identity and everyday 
life. Nationalism as a meta-narrative plays a key role in the means of ethnic 
identification of individuals in society. Within the borders constructed by the meta-
narrative of nationalism, ethnic identities are produced and reproduced at a personal 
level. Ethnicity becomes a concept that needs to be explained “within the social and 
personal context in which ethnic identities and sentiments are created and enacted” 
(Mann and Fenton, 2009: 517). In Benton‟s view, while the concept of race leads to a 
negative categorisation of society, ethnicity refers generally to a positive group 
identification. As Benton states, “ethnicity is generally more concerned with the 
identification of „us‟, while racism is more oriented to the categorization of „them‟” 
(Benton, 1983: 106, cited in Eriksen, 2010: 6-7). The term “ethnicity” “refers to 
relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive and 
these groups are often ranked hierarchically within a society” (Eriksen, 2010: 10). 
 
In order to understand the dynamic means of production and reproduction of Turkish 
and Kurdish identities, which are based mostly on macro political moments and 




involved in developing and maintaining ethnic boundaries (1969; 21-22). Barth 
defines ethnicity as a „social organization of cultural difference‟ and points at the 
necessity of focusing on the process that makes possible the reproduction of ethnic 
groups (1969: 10). He asserts that ethnic distinctions are not based on a lack of social 
interaction, but that interaction is the foundation of the social system that makes it 
possible to identify the group (1969: 10). Within this conceptualization „ethnicity is 
constituted by identification on the basis of membership of collectives that are 
differentiated from each other by shared “ways of life” or “culture” (Jenkins, 2011: 
3). 
 
Barth‟s theory provides the conceptual tools with which to think about the interaction 
between ethnic groups and the means of ethnic identification, while also facilitating 
an understanding of the ways in which individuals narrate nationalism. Conceptions 
of the dynamic forms of interaction and the boundaries that are defined and redefined 
by individuals make it possible to see „ethnicity‟ as a cultural form that is produced 
in everyday life. 
 
Brubaker suggests that ethnicity should be conceptualised in „relational, processual, 
dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms‟ rather than as a substance and entity 
(2002:167). The influential 2006 Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a 
Transylvanian Town by Brubaker et al. present an alternative to the substantialist 
understanding of ethnic groups and nations, as bounded entities, collective 
individuals and self-conscious actors. They argue that these are not social idioms of 
individual choice, but rather a relational, processual and dynamic understanding of 
ethnicity and nation. To advance this argument they focus on identifications, 
languages, networks and interactions, without assuming that each everyday 
experience is organised pervasively by strong ethnic identities.  
 
In applying their theoretical approach, Brubaker et al. (2006) focus on such 
particular categories as occupation, ethnicity, religion, language, institutions 
(schools, churches, workplaces, media) and patterns of migration, and evaluate all of 




asymmetry in social forms and means of interaction that must be considered in any 
assessment of nationalism, and their sample included a broad range of people, such 
as university students, teenagers, retired teachers, firemen, housewives, women and 
men with varying degrees of education, and so on. It should be noted that this 
approach does not take into account institutional discourses and the extent to which 
they may affect the parameters of the social environment. As Skey asserts, Brubaker 
et al. „make us acutely aware of the manifold ways in which different groups are 
addressed (or ignored) and respond to, challenge or ignore such discourses‟ (2009: 
342). 
 
From this perspective, Brubaker et al. (2006) underline the necessity of developing 
„an analytical vocabulary for talking about ethnicity without talking about ethnic 
groups‟ (emphasis mine) (2006: 8), and their concern is how ethnicity works within 
everyday experience rather than to what extent ethnicity matters are discussed (2006: 
364). They see ethnicity as a „modality of experience‟ and an intermittent 
phenomenon for ordinary people (2006: 207-8), and from this perspective, ethnicity 
is not regarded as a thing or a substance, but rather „an interpretive prism, a way of 
making sense of the social world‟ (2006: 7), and it is always only one among of 
many such interpretive frames. Ethnicity emerges in the course of interethnic 
encounters among neighbours, friends, etc. (2006: 362) in the context of everyday 
life, which means that we must think of ethnicity, race and the nation in terms of 
„practical categories, common-sense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, 
mental maps, interactional cues, discursive frames, organisational routines, social 
networks and institutional forms‟ (2002: 167). 
 
 Brubaker et al. (2006) aim to uncover the everyday practices of nationalism, and the 
various ways nationalism appears in the context of everyday life. They do this by 
examining everyday embodiments and expressions as a way of addressing the basic 
questions related to ethnicity: where it is, when it matters and how it works. In their 
words: 
 
“Ethnicity, race and nationhood include ethnicized ways of seeing 




misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting). These include 
ethnically oriented frames, schemas and narratives and the situational 
cues that activate them … They include systems of classification, 
categorization and identification, formal and informal. And they 
include the tacit, taken-for-granted background knowledge, embodied 
in persons and embedded in institutionalized routines and practices, 
through which people recognize and experience objects, places, 
persons, actions or situations as ethnically, racially or nationally 
marked and  meaningful” (Brubaker, et al., 2006: 174-175). 
 
By focusing on the asymmetries among different ethnic groups that become visible 
in the course of daily encounters, Brubaker offers an appropriate tool for the present 
research, which focuses on the narratives of ethnic minority and majority group 
members. As he underlines, research examining the different ethnic practices of 
individuals from different ethnicities must not assume the existence of only one type 
of nationalism in one ethnic group. Furthermore, the ways ordinary people think 
about and practice their ethnic identities cannot be regarded simply as an outcome of 
a common strong ethnic identity that is taken for granted in society. The importance 
of ethnicity depends on the types of encounters that people experience in everyday 
life, and so these approaches facilitate an understanding of the ruptures and clashes 
that appear as a result of the ethnic practices of individuals within everyday life.  
  
2.2.2. Nation and Nationhood in Everyday Life   
 
Fox and Miller Idriss (2008) aimed to „shed light on some of the ways in which 
ordinary people are active participants in the quotidian productions and 
reproductions of the nation‟ (2008: 538). To this end, they developed a means of 
examining the actual practices of ordinary people in which they produce and 
reproduce the nation and nationalism. From this perspective, neither the concepts of 
nationalism and nationhood nor the people are passive actors. When people practice 
the nation, they give shape to their understanding, and they are also practiced and 
reshaped by these concepts (2008: 538-9). Drawing on Hobsbawm (1990), Fox and 
Miller Idriss (2008) underline the necessity of studying nationalism from below. For 




simultaneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine 
activities‟ (2008: 537).  
 
Their approach to analysing „everyday nationhood‟ looks at the four ways in which 
nationalism and nationhood are produced and reproduced. The first is „talking the 
nation‟, which refers to talking practices on nationhood and nationalism. Talking in 
terms of „us‟ and „them‟, and referring to nationhood in everyday discussions is an 
active practice that allows people to define nationhood and reproduce themselves 
within these discourses. The second is termed „choosing the nation‟, and refers to the 
ways in which nationhood frames the choices people make. The third, „performing 
the nation‟, concerns the meanings and references given to the nation through the use 
of the national symbols; and finally, the fourth is termed „consuming the nation‟, and 
captures the differences between nations in the mundane tastes and preferences of 
ordinary people (2008: 537-8). 
 
Of these four practices „talking the nation‟ is the most instructive concept for this 
research. It is not that the other three practices are less important in understanding 
everyday nationhood, however „talking about the nation‟ and „talking with the 
nation‟ fits most closely into the subject of this research, being the narratives of 
nationhood and nationalism articulated by ordinary people.  
 
2.2.2.1. Talking about the Nation‟ and „Talking with the Nation‟ 
 
According to the concept of „everyday nationhood‟, the discussions that ordinary 
people engage in about nationhood and nationalism constitutes a way of practicing 
nationhood. Fox and Miller Idriss (2008) distinguish between „talking in nation‟ and 
„talking about nation‟. As with other scholars of everyday nationalism and 
nationhood, they do not see ordinary people as the passive recipients of a stylised 
discourse developed by the elites. Rather, they see ordinary people as active agents, 
particularly in the practice of talking about nation. As they state, „nation is not 
something ordinary people talk about; rather, it‟s something they talk with‟ (2008: 




about the national order of things that intermittently informs talk‟ (2008: 540). They 
argue that the content of the taken-for-granted understanding of the nation is 
discursively shaped by ordinary people through the practice of „talking about the 
nation‟ (2008: 539). In addition to an interactional process which makes possible the 
production of ordinary people and the concept of „nationhood‟, „talking with nation‟ 
refers to another form of reconstruction that emerges through the talk of ordinary 
people. Fox and Miller Idriss state that „nation is not only a topic of talk, but also a 
culturally available schema that can be discursively deployed to make sense of other 
topics of talk, explain predicaments and order social difference‟ (2008: 540). In other 
words, as people talk about such quotidian topics as jobs, workplaces, daily 
encounters, media texts and relationships, their speech is framed by their sense of 
ethnicity.   
 
The approach developed by Fox and Miller Idriss contributes to and supports the 
theoretical stance of this research in terms of the active role of ordinary people and 
the importance of „talking in and about nationhood‟ as a reproductive process. This 
research, which centres on the personal narratives of ethnicity and nationalism 
articulated by ordinary people, also regards talking as a re-framing practice for both 
people themselves and the concepts they talk about. 
 
While the concept of „everyday nationhood‟ provides a useful means of examining 
the practice of ethnicity in everyday life, the prominent role Fox and Miller Idriss 
assign to ethnicity/nationhood within the identification process seems exaggerated. 
Besides ethnic forms of identification, non-ethnic forms of identification should also 
be taken into account in research design, as highlighted by Dawson (2012). 
Dawson‟s research is based on Fox and Miller Idriss‟ conception of „everyday 
nationhood‟, and aims to provide a methodological toolkit for the study of ethnicity 
and nationhood. His study was conducted in a multi-ethnic town called 
Kircaali/Kurdzhali in Southern Bulgaria, where the Bulgarian majority live alongside 
a Turkish minority. He states that while the approach of „everyday nationhood‟ does 
not concern directly non-ethnic forms of identification, in his research a rural-urban 




identification could have been predicted and built into the research design‟ (2012: 
474). He criticises the approach of „everyday nationhood‟, due to the limiting 
perspective it provides on other forms of identification, and offers the alternative 
approach of „everyday identification‟, which includes non-ethnic forms of 
identification. His argument that other forms of identification are always available 
and must be analysed alongside ethnic-identification is relevant to the present 
research, which focuses on the modes of reproduction of national identification at the 
level of everyday life.  
 
Jenkins‟ (2011) approach to the ways in which ordinary people practice national 
identity is also helpful in understanding the specific case of Kurds and Turks in 
Turkey. He proposes two types of identification: „nominal‟ and „virtual‟. Nominal 
identification refers to being Danish in the context of his research; while virtual 
identification implies „the experience of being identified, by the self and others, as 
Danish‟ (2011: 5). He also states that while the nominal classification refers to a 
historical notion, virtual classification is a matter of diversity: „Nominal 
identification may endure over time, but the virtualities of identification change‟ 
(2011: 5). In his words, „identification builds a bridge between individuality and 
collectivity, giving every one of us a name and a place in which to stand on each side 
of that divide‟ (2011: 17). The link he constructs between the narrative and 
experience also sheds light on the theoretical framework of this study, in that he 
defines everyday nationalism as the local narratives and perspectives that people 
employ to make sense of complicated and changing experiences (2011: 17).  
 
2.3. Conclusion  
 
The importance of the everyday perspective in nationalism studies for this research 
has been touched upon throughout the chapter. Personal experiences and encounters 
occur within the routines of everyday life, and the narratives based on these 
encounters are regarded as a primary way in which ethnicity and nationalism are 
practiced. Research that questions how ordinary people narrate ethnicity and 
nationalism may be situated within an everyday perspective, and may be legitimised 




Regarding ethnicity as a dynamic and unstable process of production based on 
context, the concept of „everyday nationhood‟ makes it possible to look at personal 
narratives as a means of ethnic identification. „Everyday nationhood‟ alerts us to the 
importance of examining ways of talking about nation and talking with nation, the 
choices people make within their sense of nationhood, and the ways nationhood is 
consumed within the routines of everyday life. Brubaker et al.‟s research in Cluj is 
an excellent example of an empirical study that questions the practices of ordinary 
people from different ethnicities. Although the present research does not replicate the 
aforementioned studies, it does follow some of their methodological patterns and, 
moreover, employs certain theoretical concepts that they developed in its research 
design. The rich heritage of literature on nationalism provides sufficient perspectives 
to disentangle the meanings and modes of production of nationalism, to question the 
ways in which the ethnic „us‟ and „other‟ are practiced and to examine the extent to 
which the practices of ethnicity cohere with meta-narratives. That said, the role of 
personal narratives remains an aspect that requires further investigation, and this is 


















3. Theoretical Discussion on Narrative  
 
“Narrative…begins with the very history of mankind and 
 there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative”  
(Roland Barthes, 1997: 79).  
 
Politics is not only practiced by politicians in Parliament and the elite in state 
institutions, as its effects are not only felt, but also influenced in both the public and 
private spheres. Everyday life is a distinct space in which politics is produced and 
reproduced. As Negt and Kluge (1988) state, “the private is political”. The personal 
lives and experiences of individuals are not separate from politics. “The political (…) 
is hidden in the everyday, exactly where it is most obvious: in the contradictions of 
lived experience, in the most banal and repetitive gestures of everyday life” (Fogg, 
2009: xiv). While regarding everyday life as a fluid and dynamic praxis that is open 
to various potentialities (Edensor, 2002:3), it is possible to focus on politics as a 
scene in which various encounters are made within the frame of ethnicity and 
national identity. As Ozkirimli states, “national identity is produced, reproduced and 
contested in the taken-for-granted details of social interaction, the habits and routines 
of everyday life” (2005: 191). Taking this perspective as a starting point, this 
research presents the narratives of individuals related to the ethnicity and ethnic 
identities that are produced in the flow of everyday life.   
 
This research is inspired both by the personal stories related to ethnic identity that I 
heard throughout the course of the study, and by my own personal experiences as a 
Turkish person with a relationships with the Kurds, who are often considered the 
“other” of Turkish nationalism. I recognized the power of personal accounts in the 
ways that people formulated self-political identities through their accounts. As 
Bakhtin states narratives are one powerful means of communicating models of 
identity, through the “voices” assigned to characters and through narrators‟ 
positioning with respect to these voices (cited in Wortham, Lee, & Mortimer, 2011; 
57). Antagonists in both the Kurdish and Turkish camps produce political narratives 




provide a crucial source of information for reflection and discussions of politics. I 
have observed that people with no interest in politics tend to speak about the issue of 
ethnicity when they have personal experiences with ethnic “others”. They do not 
employ a political language when describing such encounters, nor do they 
conceptualize their ideas or experiences using such political terms as “nationalism”, 
“prejudice” or “discrimination”. Rather, they adopt another political language to 
relate their personal experiences with the “other”. For them, some encounters, such 
those with Kurdish/Turkish neighbors, or an annoying encounter with a Kurdish 
salesman in the bazaar, or the exclusionary attitudes of a friend in the workplace, or 
an emotional memory of a Kurdish laborer who worked for them in their hazelnut 
grove are not regarded as politics, but as personal/anecdotal. That said, I believe that 
these kinds of “daily” encounters are political, and through these simple daily 
encounters and the way in which they are explained, people become political actors. 
“Turkish nationalism” is a common narrative among the elites, political parties, 
army, constitutions, media and historiography, and is reproduced through people‟s 
collective and personal stories. Counter-nationalist narratives, on the other hand, tend 
to concentrate on the alternative aspects of the story in an effort to produce another 
narrative. Following the approach of Molly Andrews (2007) in her book Shaping 
History: Narratives of Political Change, I employ the term “political” with a small 
“p”, as this captures my interest in terms of the relationships between people‟s lives 
and the social and political frameworks in which they are active. As Andrews points 
out, it is important to find out “how people view the struggles in which they have 
participated”, and also to see “how they locate themselves in a wider political 
process” (2007: 2). Politics in everyday life is practiced in a variety of ways and with 
different motives. The daily encounters and narratives of personal experiences in this 
study are articulated through narratives of individuals, and in this way, challenging 
the exposed political meta-narratives and diverse means of identification among 
individuals becomes possible.  
 
Studies that are based on macro perspectives tend to shed light on the collective 
identities of ethnicity, sense of belonging and nationalism; while a study of personal 




positioning and social conceptions of individuals. As Ricoeur (2004) states, 
narratives serve as “a lens or window through which we can best study social life”, 
and by following this approach, this thesis examines the personal accounts and 
stories of individuals to present different forms of interaction in everyday life. In 
doing so, it aims to provide an understanding of the nationalist beliefs, perceptions 
and practices of the individuals, based on the various forms of social encounters in 
which they are engaged. As Yuval-Davis (2006) states, “Identities are narratives, 
stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not)” 
(2006: 202). From this departure point, it is claimed in this study that in nationalism 
studies, following a perspective that focuses on the personal stories and everyday 
experiences of individuals may provide a good understanding of how ordinary people 
see ethnic conflict and the ways they posit the “self” and “others” in their narratives.  
 
This chapter discusses the ways in which narratives may be defined, how macro 
social and political issues may be discussed through narrative inquiry, and the 
relationship between personal narratives, the production of self-political identities 
and the relationship between personal narratives, along with the potential for 
resistance.  
 
3.1. Discussions on the Concept of the Narrative 
 
The existence of one argument stating that the “narrative is dead” and another 
asserting that “everything is narrative”
28
 is evidence of the chasm between different 
positions in debates on narrative, and also the breadth of narrative literature. The 
most common feature of these debates is the acceptance of a “narrative turn” in 
social sciences, which has resulted over the last two decades in the development of 
corresponding literature on narrative analysis. Rather than attempting to summarise 
this vast body of literature, I will attempt instead to understand and conceptualise the 
term “narrative” based on the arguments outlined in this thesis. 
 
                                                 
28
 See R. H. Brown (1980) for a discussion on the death of the traditional narrative; and see K. 




Hayden White points out that the word “narrate” comes from the Sanskrit word 
“gna”, meaning “to know”, and this etymology points to the fact that narratives 
enable us to translate knowing into telling (White, 1981:1). The relationship between 
knowing and narrating, and the functions of narratives in the comprehension of the 
world, are crucial subjects in this vast body of literature. As Hinchman and 
Hinchman (1997) state, a “narrative somehow mediates between self and world, 
either evoking or simply creating order and meaning” (1997: xvi).  
 
Literature frequently points to the difficulty of categorizing the definitions and 
applications of narrative research in different fields. Distinctions can be drawn 
between content/context-centered approaches, small/big stories, individually/socially 
oriented narratives, thematic/structural narratives, performative/visual narratives, 
first order/second order narratives, ontological/representational narratives, and so 
forth. All of these classifications are derived from such questions as: What is 
narrative? How should we study it? And why is it important as a material, method or 
route to understanding psychological and/or social phenomena? Different research 
areas come up with different answers to these questions, epistemological approaches 
and theoretical perspectives, and different methodologies are suggested for dealing 
with each particular conception. Stanley and Temple (2008) assert that the meaning 
of narratives and approaches to them are still based on a few shared core concerns 
(2008: 267), and as such, narrative is neither disciplinary nor interdisciplinary. 
Stanley (2010) summarizes the main approaches to narratives that can be found in 
literature: 
 
“First, [narrative] is sometimes so taken for granted that it is not 
explicitly spelled out or defined…Second, narrative is often defined in 
terms of what story is ... and a third approach sees narrative in terms 
of inquiry or analysis, as what the researcher does, methodologically 
and analytically – thus Clandinin and Connelly (2000: 4) describe 
their approach as „under the heading of narrative inquiry with a 
rough sense of narrative as both phenomena under study and method 




takes as its object of investigation the story itself…” (Stanley, 
2010:1).29 
 
Polkinghorne (2005) suggests classifying narrative studies based on Jerome Bruner‟s 
(1985) conception of paradigmatic and narrative reasoning, while focusing 
specifically on narratives as a story and the use of stories in qualitative research. 
Bruner underlines the two modes of cognitive functioning – the two modes of 
thought that each suggest a distinctive ordering of experience and the construction of 
a reality that cannot be reduced to one another (1985: 97). Polkinghorne (2005) 
departs from this configuration of narratives as knowing, offering instead an 
interpretation of narrative inquiry. He suggests that there are two different ways of 
analysing narrative inquiry, both of which are concerned with stories, yet differ 
greatly in their mode of operation. In the first group, analysis of narrative, 
researchers collect stories as data and analyse them through paradigmatic processes. 
Through paradigmatic cognition, humans classify a specific instance as belonging to 
a category or concept, and thus constitute their experience as ordered (2005: 76). 
Paradigmatic reasoning “produces cognitive networks of concepts that allow people 
to construct experiences as familiar by emphasizing the common elements that 
appear over and over” (2005: 78). In the second type of narrative inquiry, narrative 
analysis, researchers collect descriptions of events and happenings, and synthesise or 
configure them by means of a plot into a story. In this way, an “analysis of narratives 
moves from stories to common elements, and narrative analysis moves from 
elements to stories” (2005: 80).  
 
Polkinghorne‟s conceptualisation suggests two different ways of working with 
narratives: (1) using narratives to understand wider social issues as data, and (2) 
producing and revealing narratives through the diverse elements of a particular 
subject. According to Polkinghorne‟s classification, this research belongs to the first 
group of narrative inquiry, in which personal narratives are employed as data for the 
understanding of a wider social and political concept. While Polkinghorne does not 
                                                 
29 For different classifications of work on narrative, see: Brockheimer and Carbough (2001), De 
Fina and Georgakopoulou (2008), Lieblich et al. (1998). See Polkinghorne (2005) for another 
classification of narratives based on the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure (1966), Ludwig 




categorise the two different ways a narrative may be employed in terms of the scale 
of the research, his work still provokes Liz Stanley‟s observation that there is an 
“…unacknowledged associated assumption that narrative inquiry = small-scale 
qualitative research” (2008: 435). Stanley goes on: 
 
“Narrative inquiry provides a methodology, a set of broad procedural 
ideas and concepts, rather than a pre-set method or specified 
technique, and it encourages responsiveness to the dynamics of the 
research context” (2008: 436).  
 
“...it is a type of inquiry, an analytical process in which researchers 
engage, rather than being a kind of data” (Stanley, 2010:1). 
 
Stanley suggests that narrative inquiry creates a meta-narrative as a result of the 
interpretational overview of the researcher, based on small-scale stories (2008: 436). 
She states that “methodological problematics are masked by the keep it small, work 
on just one case approach that many narrative inquiries are designed around” (2008: 
436). Her definition of “narrative inquiry” refers to similar types of narrative works 
according to Polkinghorne‟s “narrative analysis” conception, which aims to move 
“from elements to stories”. Using narratives as data and using other elements to 
create a meta-narrative emerges as a factor in distinguishing narrative works. 
 
Placing this research within Stanley‟s framed conceptualisation of narrative inquiry 
reveals two factors: (1) employing small-personal stories in order to (2) understand 
the meta-narrative of a large-scale social issue. As stated previously, the primary 
empirical data on which this research is based includes the personal narratives of 
individuals and observations of the interactions between two groups made during the 
fieldwork. Complex genres of narratives, such as visuals and narratives created by 
the media were not taken into account. This does not mean that meta-narrative forms, 
such as media narratives, official political narratives, visual narratives and narratives 
of the bodily practices of individuals, are ignored, but rather as Charles Tilly asserts, 
“…narratives do entail not only claim to reasonably reliable knowledge of actors, 
motives, ideas, actions and consequences but also postulation of actors and 




sense, the aim is to discuss a large social and political notion from the perspective of 
small-scale individual narratives.  
 
3.2. Stories and Political Narrative  
 
A study of stories in an attempt to understand social notions and social change 
cannot be carried out without referencing Charles Tilly‟s contribution to this area. 
While his early writings were based mainly on a comparative historical approach, in 
later years his “preference was studies based on a relational epistemology” (Stanley, 
2009: 2). In the introduction to his book Stories, Identities and Political Change, he 
highlights the need to rediscover the importance of social transactions, ties and 
relations to social processes in order to examine the connections between social 
relations (2002: 5). He explains: 
 
“To the extent that politics actually consists not of big structures and 
prescribed roles but of dynamic, contingent interaction among 
persons, households, and small groups, political ethnography provides 
privileged access to its processes, causes and effects. It makes little 
difference in this regard whether we take politics in the extremely 
broad sense of all interactions involving the exercise of power or in 
the narrower, more manageable sense, I prefer: interactions in which 
at least one government participates as actor, object, and/or 
influential third party. In either the broad or narrow sense, political 
ethnography brings field workers into direct contact with political 
processes instead of filtering that knowledge through other people‟s 
testimony, written records, and artefacts of political interaction” 
(2007: 248).  
 
In the preface to Stories, Identities and Political Change (2002), Tilly emphasizes 
the importance of stories in social research, noting that “Analysts must learn enough 
about the production of stories to construct both what happened and how the 
prevailing accounts came to prevail” (2002: xi). While remaining skeptical about 
stories of social analysts, he states that stories offer the opportunity “to build 
systematic explanations of storytelling into more general accounts of social process” 
(2002: x). His emphasis on “superior stories”, based on the Marxist-populist drive to 
construct “a history from below”, aims to “introduce the vivified voices of ordinary 




follows this aspect, with two points made by Tilly in particular being essential for 
this research: first, his emphasis on the importance of stories, as explained above; 
and second, his specific interest in the relationship between political stories and 
political identities at both collective and individual levels.  
 
In Tilly‟s way of thinking, stories are regarded as a combination of several social, 
political and cultural elements that allow us to examine the larger political and social 
processes. He claims that stories offer great potential to the researcher, in that 
“people package arguments in stories, replies to queries by means of stories, 
challenge each other‟s stories, modify or amplify their stories as the flow of 
conversation dictates…” (2002: 9). While stories are identified, produced and 
transformed by individuals, the transformation of the individual within the stories 
cannot be ignored. In other words, while, in Tilly‟s terms, “superior” and “standard” 
stories are modified and amplified by individuals, the identities of those individuals 
are transformed. Although Tilly does not state this argument in such explicit terms, 
he does say that “Identities are social arrangements reinforced by socially 
constructed and continuously renegotiated stories” (2002: xiii). In his opinion, 
identities presented in stories are a combination of the attributes, experiences and 
consciousness shared by many individuals (2002: 10). 
 
Besides Tilly‟s contribution, narrative research in general, and personal narratives in 
particular, have also been used as an analytical tool in political science. Patterson and 
Monroe‟s study Narrative in Political Science (1998) presents an overview of the 
place of narratives in political science and the necessity of employing techniques of 
narrative analysis in studies of political public narratives. For them, “narrative 
becomes an invaluable tool for political scientists concerned with how such issues as 
identity group or individual influence behavior” (1998: 317). Bacon‟s analysis of the 
public political narrative of the Putin-Medvedev regime in Russia is another example 
of a narrative work in political science. To reveal the motivations, the world view 
and the inconsistencies in public political narratives, Bacon presented how the 




(Bacon, 2012: 769). Dienstag‟s study Dancing in Chains (1997) also discusses the 
role of the narrative in relation to memory in the perception of history and identity.  
 
Another work influencing the definition and perception of narratives and the political 
identity building processes in this thesis is Molly Andrews‟ (2007) book about the 
relationship between the stories people tell about their lives and the political frames 
that form the context of those stories. Andrews states that “when we relate stories of 
our lives, we implicitly communicate to others something of our political world-
views” (2007: 2). The way in which individuals articulate their personal narratives to 
meta narratives is a political practice in itself. When producing our stories, we relate 
the facts that we believe to be true, signal the groups to which we feel we belong, and 
specify the things that annoy us. As such, narratives are always political, in that they 
indicate the positionality of the narrator, even when they are apparently personal 
narratives (2007: 9). Riessman (2008) concurs that narratives do political work: “The 
social role of stories - how they are connected to the flow of power in the wider 
world - is an important facet of narrative theory” (2008: 8). Andrews highlights 
further the embedded feature of narratives in the cultural and social stock of society. 
The link between the narrative and the way in which political identities are 
constructed has great importance in this research, in which it is argued that through 
the stories that people tell about themselves and others, they create their political 
identities. Individuals recognise their own personal political positions within the 
narratives they produce, and are also reproduced within this process. 
 
 The popularity of narrative research in political psychology is stressed by Hammack 
and Pilecki (2012). While their interest is in history, political science and 
psychology, which is completely different to the epistemological and methodological 
assumptions of this research, their approach to political identity and political 
narratives is eye-opening. They argue that the narrative approach is well-positioned 
to answer questions of how social organisations influence thought, feeling and 
action, and how individuals resist and attempt to reinvent social order through story-
making at multiple levels. Their interest in narratives at the levels of nation-state, 




categories, collective memory, social representations of history and collective 
identity, offer an efficient means of seeing political identity in a wider political, 
social and historical context (2012: 77–78). They note that “the process of story-
making and narrative engagement does not present passive endeavours” (2012: 79). 
Their political psychology approach, which refers to the mutually constitutive 
relationship between language, thought and social structure, highlights the mediating 
potential of individual narratives. In their own words, “we engage with a storied 
social ecology as we engage in social practice, and our relationship to that practice is 
mediated by narrative” (2012: 79). In addition to the mutual influence between 
identities and stories, it should also be stated at this point that narrative impacts upon 
the perception of political structures in the minds of individuals. Patterson and 
Monroe (1998) assert that,  
 
“Insofar as narrative affects our perceptions of political reality, which 
in turn affects our actions in response to or in anticipation of political 
events, narrative plays a critical role in the construction of political 
behaviour” (1998: 315–16). 
 
Literature relating to the topic of narratives also discusses the impact of “big stories” 
on individual perceptions of the world and the process of constructing political 
identities. The interaction between big stories and political identities cannot be 
ignored, but it is also necessary to look at individual stories, which may challenge the 
meta-narratives. In this study, I claim that Turkish nationalism is already a “superior 
story” produced by the state, army and individuals, but not a static entity, in that it 
only includes the same types of practices that aim to contribute to the big narrative. 
Personal stories about ethnic identity, based on the perceptions and daily encounters 
of individuals, are the other side of the process in the production of nationalism, and 
these stories require specific scholarly attention. In other words, the personal stories 
of individuals should be taken into account in any attempt to understand the common 
patterns and rupture points of the narratives of nationalism. As Patterson and Monroe 
state, the use of personal narratives can be be read as an attempt to capture the world 
(Patterson & Monroe, 1998: 328), and “nowhere is this more starkly and politically 





It is apparent that although political narratives change dramatically, the perceptions 
and practices of the individual and the cultural aspects of nationalism do not undergo 
a parallel transformation at an equivalent speed. By focusing on the micro level of 
the ethnic identity stories of Kurdish and Turkish individuals, it becomes possible to 
gain insight into personal experiences, the knowledge that people develop from such 
experiences and the process by which personal stories are produced. 
 
3.3. Talking Politics, Conversational Resources and Personal 
Experience  
 
In this research, the personal accounts of the respondents are analysed with reference 
to the specific historical and political context within which they are situated. Their 
narratives present a significant opportunity to observe the ways in which people 
order their experiences within their own political constructions. While talking about 
politics, individuals reveal their positions, ordering their accounts around the 
“concept of self” that they build for themselves. As Gamson notes, “A variety of 
larger collective identities are, in fact, brought into play as they talk about politics” 
(1992: 115). Providing an account of a particular subject, such as ethnicity or 
nationalism, creates an opportunity for the re-interpretation of past lived experiences. 
In the act of providing an account of the personal experiences, individuals also 
reconceptualise their self-identity. This raises the following questions: What 
conversational resources are employed by the respondents in their accounts? Where 
does personal experience stand within the hierarchy of other sources of knowledge?  
 
Political issues and developments occurring in the political arena mean little to 
ordinary people. Talking about politics emerges as an efficient way of understanding 
and making points about political issues. People create or narrate stories in order to 
situate themselves within these stories; such stories may be about themselves, or 
about someone else that they had heard or observed. People need knowledge stocks 
if they are to engage in daily political discussions. In other words, people draw from 
different knowledge stocks in order to understand and frame events, and transform 




It is apparent that media discourse is the most common source of information on 
political issues among ordinary people. That said, as Gamson points out, media 
discourse cannot be regarded as the only such source, in that “popular wisdom” and 
“personal experience” also play a significant role in people‟s understanding and 
narration of political issues (1992: xi). In his study, which aims to understand the 
process behind the construction of meaning, Gamson claims that media discourse, 
popular wisdom and personal experiences are employed together by individuals to 
different degrees, depending on the content of the political issue. He goes on to state 
that people combine these resources in order to make sense of a political issue (1992: 
117). In accordance with the main themes of this research, Gamson claims that; 
“People are not so passive, people are not so dumb and people negotiate with media 
messages in complicated ways that vary from issue to issue.” (1992: 4).  
 
The second conversational resource that Gamson notes is “popular wisdom”, being 
the shared knowledge that “everyone” holds. Although personal experience is 
unique, “the greater the degree of homogeneity of life experiences among a group of 
people, the greater the popular wisdom available to them as a resource” (Gamson, 
1992: 123-124). In this regard, popular wisdom can be defined as a combination of 
personal and cultural beliefs. One‟s experiences gain meaning by linking to these 
cultural resources. The existence of similar experiences among a diverse group of 
people provides a link between the personal, cultural and collective (Gamson, 1992: 
126). 
 
In addition to these conversational resources, experience has a great importance in 
order to understand the ways of accounting of respondents on the ethnic conflict and 
ethnic identities. The notion of experience emerges as a broad area in literature of 
narrative. Narrative encompasses experience. As Lieblich and Josselson (1995) indicate, 
the ultimate aim of the narrative investigation of human life is the interpretation of 
experience (1995: ix). Analysis in narrative studies makes possible to see thee ways of 
telling about experience (Riessman, 1993:3-4). Connelly and Clandinin state that 
“Narrative is a way of characterizing the phenomena of human experience and its 
study, which is appropriate to many social science fields” (Connelly & Clandinin, 




plots (Polkinghorne, 1988: 1). In relation to these arguments, Somers and Gibson 
(1994) note that “...stories guide action; that people construct identities, by locating 
themselves or being located with a repertoire of emplotted stories” (1994: 38). 
Within all these approaches, experience is seen as a thing that is constituted through 
narrative, and that allows people to make sense of events and encounters. Somers and 
Gibson go one step further, claiming that through these experience-based narratives, 
“people are guided to act in certain ways” (1994: 38). 
 
The role of personal experiences in the ways in which people construct and perform 
narratives is an important aspect of this research. However, as Scott (1991) argues, 
experience cannot be seen as a starting point that requires the development of 
explanations. In this regard, experience cannot be accepted as the only factor 
determining the power in the construction of identities and the ways of practicing 
ethnicity. As Gamson states: 
 
“Sometimes the story is not about oneself but about oneself but about 
one‟s spouse, partner, or child. At the other extreme, people tell 
stories about friends of friends or about someone they once knew at 
work. It is difficult to know exactly where to draw the line at which 
experiential knowledge is so vicarious that it hardly seems personal at 
all (Gamson, 1992: 123). 
 
Scott (1991) also points to the need to consider experience in a historical context, 
claiming that without contextualising it, experience means nothing. In this regard, 
personal experience can be understood as an element within the process of identity 
construction, and is influenced by the historical context and within other wider 
narratives. For Scott, experience functions within an ideological construction, and 
experience represents not only a starting point for the knowledge that individuals 
develop, but also “naturalizes categories such as man, woman, black, w 
hite, heterosexual, homosexual by treating them as given characteristics of 
individuals” (1991: 782).  
 
Within the discussions on narratives and experience, the point often stressed is the 




individuals take an active role in the processes of experiencing and interpreting 
within a meta-narrative, which emerge as parts of the teller‟s “concept of self”, while 
“subjects are also constituted through experience” (Scott, 1991: 779).  
 
Although personal experience is regarded as one of the crucial elements affecting 
perceptions, ideas and emotions, it should not be considered as the only source of 
knowledge, but rather provides the grounds for the explanation of what kind of 
knowledge is produced. Scott stresses the unmediated features of experiences, which 
are also discussed by Polkinghorne; “What we experience is a consequence of the 
action of our organizing schemes of the components of our involvement with the 
world” (Polkinghorne: 1988:13). 
 
Experience, then, is defined as the foundation of the narrative that is both interpreted 
and needs to be interpreted. Narrative is regarded as a way of ordering experience 
into a meaningful entity. Through the perceptions that derive from experiences, 
people develop ideas and articulate them within the specific social and historical 
context. As Whitebrook states, 
 
 “...our sense of our own identity originates in appropriations of the 
structure of public discourse between particular and singular persons 
for the ordering of private experience and the expression of our 
personal identities as singularities in public space” (2001:9). 
 
3.4. Resistance through Narrative 
 
In everyday life we never stop telling stories, because that is how we make sense of 
our place in the world, what came before, where we are now and where we are 
headed. Hinchman and Hinchman (1997) state that the narrative approach begins and 
ends with everyday life, as the experiences, speech, purposes and expectations of 
agents as they express them in their stories about themselves (1997: xvi). Narratives 
are “the real social experiences of human beings, produced in everday life” (Negt & 
Kluge, 1988: 60). Likely everyday life is not composed only of continuities, a 
narrative functions not only as an articulation with meta-narratives, as counter-





Besides building connections between personal and social dimensions,  a second 
important feature of personal narratives for the researcher is their ability to reveal the 
power relations – hegemonic and counter positions – at every level of society. 
Patterson and Monroe (1998) suggest that when the teller speaks about the common 
or everyday, the narrative functions as a tool for highlighting and calling into 
question what we take for granted in our daily lives (1998: 321). As such, “it 
provides a way to see from a new perspective what we otherwise overlook” (1998: 
321). 
 
The potential of resistance provided by narratives generally and personal narratives 
in particular are another discussion point in literature. Brockmeier and Carbaugh 
(2001) state that “story telling becomes for its supporter an act of resistance against a 
dominant „Cartesian‟ paradigm of rationality” (2001: 9). Somers and Gibson (1994) 
characterize narratives as the “epistemological other” of sociology. As Borisenkova 
(2009) asserts; 
  
“Narrative inquiry assumes that the context, the sequence in which 
social phenomena occur and are then described, and the time 
characteristics of the investigation made, have a substantial impact on 
a sociological research enterprise. These insights ease an escape from 
the idea of sociology as a discipline developing nomological 
knowledge. A narrative approach does not propose a radical 
alternative to science, but aims to challenge sociological pretentious 
claims to provide universal explanations of phenomena, and reminds 
us of the great potential of language” (2009:1). 
 
Narratives provide the opportunity for individuals to challenge meta-narratives. We 
all create our own narratives using the toolkit that is culturally available to us 
(Bruner, 1987: 15). Practicing ways of ethnicity in everyday life and the ways of 
talking on and with ethnic identities includes interwoven relations with „power‟ in 
itself. Personal narratives tend to contribute to meta-narratives and articulate with 
hegemonic narrative forms. Andrews (2004) argues that master narratives are 
powerful structures that allow people to identify what is assumed to be a normative 




we become stories we know and a master narrative is reproduced ... When our own 
experiences do not match the master narratives with which we are familiar, or we 
come to question the foundations of those, dominant tales, we are confronted with a 
challenge” (2004:1).  
 
It is for this reason that people position themselves differently in relation to meta 
narratives. On the other hand, narratives present a powerful resource for the 
challenging of preveiling ideas and provide insights into the particulars of the lived 
experience (Patterson & Munroe 1998: 318). Plummer (2009) argues that narratives 
resist larger social and cultural patterns:  
 
“Many stories of lives are counter stories – they start to break down 
any claims for grand theories about lives. At their best, they challenge 
and redirect our thinking. At their worst, they tell us the same old 
story and utter it in cliché form” (2009: 6).  
 
Hinchman and Hinchman (1997) stress the resistance function of narratives, which is 
used against the mainstream and approved version of reality by marginal and out 
groups (1997: xiv). Researchers who use narrative methodologies tend to focus 
specifically on the members of marginalized and subordinated groups in society, who 
are able to provide the most useful kind of data for making visible the power 
differentials that exist within society (Elliot, 2008: 145). For Delgado (2001), 
narratives provide a language that bridges the gaps in the imagination that reinforce the 
notion of difference: “Narrative reduces alienation for members of excluded groups, 
while offering opportunities for members of the majority group to meet them halfway” 
(2001: 44). 
 
While narratives offer a great opportunity for marginalized and subordinated groups to 
voice their concerns, perspectives and ideologies, this research does not focus 
exclusively on minority group members. The group that wanted to be heard included 
ordinary people from both Kurdish and Turkish ethnic groups, specifically those who do 
not actively participate in politics in their everyday lives, and most probably do not even 




narratives and to learn the common and conflicting patterns of their narratives on 
nationalism.  
 
The conflicting relationships between meta-narratives and counter-political 
narratives that exist within institutions, political groups, political parties and 
individuals, should be seen also as a particular sphere in which individual identities, 
perceptions and political ideas are constructed. Ewick and Silbey (1995) argue that a 
relationship exists between narrative identity and power relations through the 
concepts of “hegemonic tales” and “subversive stories”. They state that stories, on 
the whole, are more likely to articulate and reproduce existing, mainstream and 
sanctioned relations of power and inequality (1995: 212). When the narrative 
emphasizes a particular situation or subject, it erases the links between the particular and 
the general. On the other hand, the act of narration makes connections between 
individual experiences and subjectivities (1995: 200). The employment of personal 
narratives within a social and historical context has the potential to allow subordinated 
groups to make their voices heard by a researcher. Besides the role of researcher, the one 




This chapter touches upon the meaning of narratives, and the ways of defining and 
using narratives, within various disciplines. It discusses the relationship between 
narrative/personal narratives and different conversational resources in order to 
understand the contextual aspects of the political accounts of the research 
respondents. The importance of personal experience within these conversational 
resources is discussed with reference to the literature on political narrative and 
identity. As argued in this research, personal narratives have great potential to follow 
how ethnic identities are constructed. Furthermore, taking accounting of experiences 
related to ethnic identity and nationalism creates room for explanations of the self 
and facing up to contradictions through such accounts. This was evident not only for 
the researcher, but also for those relating their experiences, who all faced at least one 




and thus recreate themselves again. They heard their own voices while narrating and 
re-created their positions and sought to legitimise their accounts. In this regard, the 
most important thing that should be stressed upon related to the personal narrative is 































4. On Fieldwork Process  
 
Previous chapters built a conceptual framework for the thesis by providing the 
background of the Turkish context, and outlining and critically reviewing the 
existing literature and theoretical approaches with regard to concepts of nationalism 
and ethnicity in everyday life and narrative inquiry.   
 
This chapter focuses on the fieldwork process, before moving onto an analysis of 
data in the subsequent chapters. In addition to providing details of the fieldwork I 
conducted in Ankara between March and November 2011, I will outline the sampling 
framework and piloting methods utilised, the recruitment of participants, the phase of 
conducting qualitative interviews, ethical considerations, self-reflexivity and 
positioning, and limitations of the data.  
 




, the capital city of Turkey, is home to 5.1 million people
31
 and is the second 
most populous province of the country after Istanbul.
32
 During the fieldwork period, 
five pilot interviews were conducted in Ankara, and after deciding upon the sampling 
framework, a further 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Kurdish and 
Turkish men and women, aged 17–70 (see Table 1). 
 
The main reason for conducting this research in Ankara was my interest in the daily 
and less radicalised types of narrative forms and the interaction between Kurdish and 
Turkish individuals. My knowledge of the social and political context of Ankara is 
                                                 
30
 See Figure I and Figure II for „Map of Ankara‟. 
31 According to 2013 census results (retrieved from 
http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_turkiye_ilce_
koy_sehir.RDF&p_il1=6&p_kod=1&p_yil=2012&p_dil=1&desformat=html). 
32 The province has 25 districts, and the interviews and fieldwork observations were conducted in 
seven urban districts that represent the urban characteristics of the city: Cankaya, Altındag, Mamak, 
Yenimahalle, Etimesgut, Sincan and Kecioren. Cankaya is known as the home of Kemalist people, 
Altındag is a suburban area at the centre of the city, Etimesgut and Sincan are popular among the 
lower class, religious groups and conservative people, and Kecioren and Yenimahalle are increasingly 




based on my experience of having lived there, in various places, for 10 years. 
Besides attending university in Ankara, I also worked in various jobs in the city, both 
during my studies and after graduation, and this had given me access to a wide range 
of networks that would allow me to access my participants easily. Besides these 
facilitating factors, the political atmosphere in the city does not see the violent 
conflicts or traumatic encounters like those seen in the Kurdish territory, and so 
seemed more appropriate for a research of quotidian and ordinary encounters and 
narrative forms. Ankara represents a relatively “normal” political atmosphere when 
compared with many other places in Turkey, such as in eastern Kurdish cities like 
Diyarbakır, where violent conflicts are common, and in western and southern cities 
including Mersin, Izmir, Antalya and Istanbul, where the massive and sudden forced 
migration of Kurds had a marked impact on the encounters and narrative forms of the 
Kurdish and Turkish respondents.  
 
While these two factors made the selection of the fieldwork site easier, deciding 
upon a specific sampling criterion was not so straightforward, and it evolved over the 
course of the fieldwork. Initially, prior to the pilot phase, the sampling criterion was 
based on the different districts and neighbourhoods of urban Ankara, which I 
believed corresponded to different political orientations to a certain extent. It was on 
this basis that I believed Ankara would provide a good sampling frame for the 
exploration of ethnic identities, practices and perceptions of nationalism; however, 
after starting to conduct the pilot interviews I realised that this was not the case. For 
instance, none of the first five participants spoke about their own neighbourhoods. 
When prompted to talk about the relationships within their neighbourhoods, they 
stated that they knew little about their neighbours. As one person put it, “I am 
working very long hours, and so I do not have time to stay at home and get to know 
my neighbours. I do not even know my next-door neighbour.” When urged to talk 
about their personal experiences of their living places, they opted rather to tell stories 
about their hometowns, where they had lived many years earlier. Inasmuch as this 
research focuses on the personal encounters of Kurdish and Turkish people in 
Ankara, the participants‟ personal stories of their past lives in their hometown would 




criteria. I realised that the concept of “encounter” was not applied by the participants 
to the encounters that occur in their living spaces, as it is possible to have encounters 
with “other” members of society in different spheres such as in public areas, schools, 
workplaces, streets, etc. The personal “encounters” that I experienced during the 
pilot phase helped me to reconceptualise the sampling criteria and to make a final 
decision on a concrete research site.  
 
In the first week of fieldwork I took a dolmus, minibus from Kızılay, the most central 
part of Ankara, to go to my flat. In this mode of public transport, passengers help 
each other by delivering the fare from the back of the minibus to the driver. This is 
part of the cultural code in Ankara practiced in everyday life. I was sitting at the back 
and, along with those seated around me, gave the fare to the person who was sitting 
just in front of me. After a while I noticed that a woman who was sitting in the 
middle of the dolmus was refusing to pass the money forward, and a heated 
discussion broke out. The woman was talking in a different accent, apparently 
Russian, and said: “I do not have to give your money. Stand up and give it to the 
driver yourself like I did.” The woman who had asked her to pass the money forward 
yelled back: “You have to, because you live in this country, you eat our bread. You 
are not even Turkish. You live here and earn your money from this land, but you 
refuse to obey the rules.” The Russian woman started to cry and said, “I work hard to 
earn my money, why would I eat your bread?” I listened for a while, but apart from 
these two women, nobody talked. When the Turkish woman launched into a 
nationalist tirade, I got annoyed and intervened, saying: “You cannot force anybody 
to obey your cultural rules. If she does not want to pass your money, you cannot 
force her.” The woman then turned her anger towards me and started to yell at me. 
Her exact words were: “I am a real Turk, not a fake one like you. If you were a loyal 
and true citizen you would not defend this foreign woman from me.” I replied: 
“What do you want to do? Do you want to lynch this woman? Are you waiting for 
support from us?” She answered “I am a nationalist person. Do you understand? If I 
needed help, everyone in this dolmus would help me, except you. There are just two 





This was quite a traumatic experience, just before starting to conduct the interviews 
for my study. At first I did not know how I should behave; whether I should get 
involved or just observe the situation; but after seeing the situation escalate in favour 
of the Turkish woman, I felt that someone had to help the Russian woman. This was 
exactly the kind of situation that I had set out to study – the experiences and 
encounters of ordinary people in their daily lives. While the situation and the actors 
involved were not same as the subject of my research, the sentiment that I witnessed 
and the argument in which I became involved were exactly what I wanted to observe 
during my fieldwork. I knew that such nationalist reactions had the potential to 
transform into something more serious, and this experience showed that encounters 
could happen anywhere and at any time.  When it came to the interviews, the 
participants were most likely to tell stories about their encounters with “others” in 
their workplaces, schools and different public spaces. Rather than limiting the 
research to just one space that may be encountered in the flow of everyday life, it 
was deemed more appropriate to move the “personal experiences” of the participants 
with each other to the centre of the research as a sampling criterion. Within this huge 
geographical area I decided to put occupations at the centre of the study, and to 
follow the forms of encounters and the ways nationalist narratives are produced in 
the workplace. It seemed most appropriate to concentrate on different occupation 
types, such as hairdressers, market traders, shopkeepers, students, housewives etc., in 
order to access as wide a variety of forms of encounter possible in the different 
spaces within which everyday life occurs. In this regard, I aimed to recruit 
participants of different ages, economic status and academic attainment as much as 
possible.  
 
4.2. Accessing Participants 
 
Sourcing individual participants for the study was achieved based on “snowballing” 
through both acquaintances and the participants themselves. Arranging interviews 
took some time, even after using personal contacts such as friends, relatives, 
neighbours, etc., and gaining access to working people was especially difficult, in 
that they were relatively mobile and spent much of their time outside the home. After 




personal references, and so after each interview I asked the participant to speak to 
people they knew about me in order to arrange further interviews. I used my personal 
contacts to reach people from different occupation groups. To begin with, I asked my 
hairdresser, whom I had known for 10 years, if he would be willing to be 
interviewed, and he became my first participant. Thereafter, I discerned that small 
business owners could be considered an appropriate profile for the research due to 
their vast experience in the workplace with both tradesmen and customers. In the 
course of the interviews with Turks, the dominance of Kurds in the marketplace was 
frequently underlined by the Turkish respondents, so I then looked also for sellers in 
marketplaces. Finally, as Ankara is known as a city of civil servants and students, I 
endeavoured to include these groups from a variety of different areas in the study, as 
well as one housewife and one unemployed person.  
 
Conducting an interview with a researcher on such a sensitive collective issue was a 
tough experience for both the Kurdish and Turkish respondents. Although the signs 
of conflict are more firmly embedded in the collective memory of Kurdish people, 
they were more enthusiastic to take part in the research. After gaining their trust, it 
was easier to reach Kurdish interviewees thanks to their close-knit community 
networks, although gaining trust in this context was almost impossible without a 
contact person. Most of the Kurdish participants stressed that without a reliable 
contact person, it would be impossible for me to interview Kurds. While the contact 
person was therefore quite important in building a relationship of trust with the 
respondents, they nevertheless continually stated their suspicion about my identity. 
As Nazım said: 
 
 “I have no idea about your political view or your identity. You may be 
a police officer. You are interviewing me here, and I am telling you 
everything I believe and I experienced, but I am not afraid of you 
because of my political ideology” (Nazım, Kurdish, male, 36).  
 
Being suspicious about the research and the researcher did not prevent such people 
from taking part in the study, and many were keen to talk about their general political 




the respondents may have been reluctant to relate certain aspects of their experiences, 
or they may have chosen to soften the tone of their narratives.  
 
4.3. Interviews  
4.3.1. Interview Questions  
 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, an interview schedule, which included 
an introduction to the research and list of interview questions, was prepared prior to 
the interview phase. The introductory speech was as follows: “I am conducting 
research on the conflict between Kurds and Turks in Turkey. Besides the internal war 
between the PKK and the Turkish State, I want to hear your opinions of this conflict. 
What do you think about the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism? What do 
you think about the Kurds/Turks around you?” Before I could finish this brief 
introduction, the Turkish respondents started to give me their account of the Kurdish 
Question, making use of the arguments of Turkish nationalism. When constructing 
an account referencing the inclusive features of Turkish nationalism, the Turkish 
respondents tended to accuse Kurdish society of Kurdish nationalism, while the 
Kurdish respondents spoke mostly about the Kurdish Question in order to support or 
challenge the arguments of Turkish nationalism about Kurds and the Kurdish ethnic 
identity. In this regard, all of the personal accounts given by both the Kurdish and 
Turkish respondents were based on the notion of nationalism, although from 
different perspectives.  
 
Once the respondents started to build their accounts, as a researcher I intervened only 
to remind them of the focus of the interview. The questions that I asked throughout 
the interviews aimed only to prompt the respondents to provide more personal 
accounts, for example:  
 
 Do you have any relationships with Kurds/Turks in your personal life?  
 What do you think about the Kurdish/Turkish friends, relatives, neighbours 




 Have you had any negative experiences with them?  
Through these three questions I attempted to gain information about their personal 
experiences rather than simple repetitions of media discourse, and other than these 
prompts, I did not need to ask any further questions. In fact, the respondents did not 
need to be asked questions about the topic of the research.  
 
4.3.2.  Duration and Location of the Interviews  
 
Each interview lasted between one and one-and-a-half hours on average, and all 
interviews were tape recorded. Interview notes were written up and personal field 
observations were made on the same day of the interview to avoid problems 
associated with recall. One interview, conducted with Pelin, a 23 year-old Turkish 
woman from a quite wealthy family, was exceptionally short. At the time of the 
interview, which lasted only 15 minutes, she had just graduated from a private 
university in Ankara and was in the process of looking for a job. Her interview 
consisted of her repeating that she had never been interested in politics, and that she 
was scared of answering my questions. The interview practically came to an end with 
her first answer: “I have never met a Kurdish person,” and I could not persuade her 
to talk about her personal experiences and observations of Kurdish people. She also 
refused to talk about the Kurdish Question, not because of her political stance or 
security concerns but because she believed that she was not well enough versed 
about political issues to comment on the subject. Furthermore, she was also reluctant 
to talk about personal experiences unrelated to political issues, and in the end I felt as 
though I was forcing her to be interviewed, when she had actually volunteered to 
take part.  
 
The interviews were generally conducted in the participants‟ homes or workplaces, 
or in public spaces like cafes. Prior to the pilot phase I had thought it would be most 
appropriate to meet the participants in public places in order to preserve a reasonable 
distance between myself as a researcher and the participant. However, some of the 
interviews conducted in public places, such as in cafes, were so affected by the noise 




when female participants invited me to their own homes, I accepted willingly, and at 
such times I was usually offered the best of what people could provide as a guest, 
and observed that they seemed very comfortable in this environment. For reasons of 
personal security and the need to follow common cultural codes as a member of 
Turkish society, I did not meet male participants in their own homes.  
 
Some of the participants preferred to meet at their places of work due to their busy 
schedules, but after two frustrating experiences for the participants, I avoided 
arranging workplace interviews thereafter. The first of these arose during an 
interview with Aliye, who worked as a secretary for an NGO in the health sector. Her 
office was open plan, in which there were some chairs and desks for visitors. I went 
to her office during her lunch break, but just as we started to talk, a member of staff 
in the office, Recep, who was responsible for cleaning and serving tea and coffee, 
came into the Aliye‟s office to bring tea for us. After welcoming me, Recep initiated 
a conversation on an issue on which they had argued previously in a sarcastic tone. 
Aliye, as a Kurdish woman, used her surname in Kurdish in her work e-mail account, 
which in an official place was considered to be inappropriate by Recep and some of 
her other colleagues. Furthermore Aliye‟s choice to translate her surname in Kurdish 
was completely “unnecessary” for Recep. The conversation continued as follows:  
 
Recep: What is Roj? What is the meaning of “roj”?  
Aliye: It means “day”[gün] in Turkish which is my surname. “Day”. 
Do you understand?  
Recep: Who uses this word?  
Aliye: We use it. It means “day” in Kurdish. 
Recep: If you know the word for “day” in Turkish, why do you use 
“roj”? Why don't you write Aliye Gun [“day” in Turkish], rather than 
Aliye Roj? 
Aliye: It is my choice. (Becoming agitated and starting to defend 
herself) 
Recep: How is this choice? Don't do this again! (Laughing) 
Aliye: Please leave us.  
 
After this conversation, Recep left the room and Aliye provided me with the 
background of the issue: “Everyone can use any word in their e-mail addresses. They 




used an English word in my address it won't be a problem. The problem is Kurdish.” 
After she said this, Recep returned to the office, accompanied by another male staff 
member, and they sat at another desk, and tried to listen to our conversation. Their 
presence in the room annoyed Aliye and I finished the interview to protect her from 
any further potential inconvenience. Before I left the office we arranged a new place 
and time to meet, during which she explained that we had experienced: 
 
“That day after you left I talked with Recep. I asked “why do you do 
this to me? Why do you wonder what we do, what we speak about?” I 
said “Look!  She was my guest. She is conducting research. She 
wanted to ask me some questions like “how do you feel about being 
Kurdish?” Something like that. I just wanted to help her. That is why 
she came. I am very angry with you. You will never call me a Kurd 
again. I have a name. You will never call me Kurd” (Aliye, Kurdish, 
female, 43). 
 
Aliye‟s story shows how Kurdish people, as members of a minority group, come 
under pressure when talking about the Kurdish Question in public areas, such as the 
workplace. Explicit references to their ethnic identity, such as talking about the 
Kurdish issue, are usually regarded as “boluculuk" [separatism], and causes tension 
between them and the Turkish people around them. In contrast, the Kurdish Question 
is a normal and obvious part of daily conversation among Turks. While my 
participants anticipated that it would not be a problem for them to give an interview 
about Kurdish issues in a public place, some unpredictable situations arose, and the 
situation Aliye and I found ourselves in made me think about the responsibility of the 
researcher in providing a secure research environment for the participants. 
 
Another interview experience, this time with a Turkish participant, highlighted that 
this is not a one-sided issue. Adem is a 42-year old salesman who works in several 
fruit and vegetable markets in Ankara, which are dominated by Kurdish traders. As 
Adem had no off day, we arranged to conduct the interview at his workplace. The 
dominance of Kurdish stallholders at the market was obvious, and when we started to 
talk, the owners of the other stalls wondered – most probably because of my gender – 
who I was and what we were doing. It was out of the ordinary for them to see a 




further questions, Adem told them that I was a relative who had come to visit him. 
While this response was sufficient to explain my presence and satisfy the other men‟s 
curiosity, Adem was visibly uncomfortable when speaking about “Kurds” and “the 
Kurdish Question” during the interview. As I did not want to pressure him into 
speaking, I suggested that we finish the interview, but when I was leaving he stated 
that if we conducted the interview in another place it would be better. This shows 
that being the member of a minority or majority group does not determine the default 
position of the participants. It is not easy for a Turkish person to express his views 
openly while surrounded by Kurdish people, and the setting in which the interview 
takes place may also be significant in determining the power relations. As a 
researcher I had to adapt to the changeable and unsettled structure of power while 
conducting the interviews.  
 
Only one person refused to take part in an interview, a Kurdish man whom I knew 
from the university where I worked. He was reluctant to talk about such sensitive 
issues due to the bitter experiences of his family related to the Kurdish Question, and 
emphasised a desire to stay away from such things, openly expressing his fear of 
talking about the Kurdish Question due to his position as a civil servant.  
 
4.3.3. Group Interviews 
 
The interviews were intended to be individual face-to face-meetings, but despite 
endeavouring to arrange individual meetings, it was not possible all the time. Friends 
and neighbours of the participants would say hello to them in cafes or in their houses, 
and would sometimes contribute to the questions I asked. Sometimes the interview 
spontaneously became a group interview, which is more difficult to control due to 
many people giving answers at the same time. Nevertheless, these spontaneous 
situations provided an opportunity to observe changes in people‟s accounts when 
others are involved. During my interview with Sahin (Kurdish, male, 50), some of 
his neighbours dropped in for coffee. While talking about the Kurdish movement, 




experiences. When his neighbours, who were Turkish, joined the discussion, they 
quickly dominated the discourse of the interview, and after their arrival, Sahin 
completely changed his perspective, stressing how Kurdish people pushed the limits 
by making inappropriate demands. After they left, Sahin said to me;  
 
“Can you see the pressure on us? I like these people, but if I do not 
behave like this we cannot maintain friendships with these people. I 
have to do it. I have to hide my real political beliefs. Anyway, it is not 
so important for me. Politics is not as important as my neighbours.” 
(Sahin, Kurdish, male, 50). 
 
 On occasion I had to intervene in the conversations when it seemed likely that 
clashes could break out between the participants those who had joined in, as I did not 
want to cause problems for my participants. 
 
The participants did not always limit the content of their accounts during these 
spontaneous group discussions. During one particular interview, held in a coffee 
shop, Nazım, a 30-year old Kurdish man, was prompted to tell more about his 
personal experiences. What started out as a one-to-one interview changed after we 
were joined by one of his friends (Mahmut, Kurdish, male, 40). Nazım was giving 
his political opinion on the legitimacy of the Kurdish movement and the ways in 
which he supported it, while Mahmut just listened. However, when I asked a 
question aiming to prompt Nazım to talk about his personal experiences, Mahmut 
began talking about one of his own personal experiences, and reminded Nazım of 
events that had occurred when they had lived together. At this point, Nazım also 
started to provide an account that was dominated by personal experiences, spurring 
him to give an account of his own ideas and feelings about the Kurdish Question and 
its effects on his own life.  
 
4.4. Talking About Politics from Macro to Micro Perspectives 
and Story-worthiness  
 
During the interviews, discussions of politics as a practice and the means of 




for many of the interviewees and for me as a researcher. As a semi-experienced 
researcher in the field, initiating interviews and encouraging interviewees to talk 
more about their personal experiences were tough obstacles for me to handle. Most 
of the participants were not used to discussing politics, and many found it strange 
being encouraged to talk about personal experiences relating to a political concept. 
The majority of respondents did not understand why I wanted to learn about their 
personal experiences rather than their general political ideas. As Chase asserts, 
“interviewees often speak in generalities rather than specifics, even when talking 
about their experiences, in that they assume that researchers are interested in what is 
general rather than particular about their experience” (Chase, 2005: 661). Even 
during the pilot stage of the research it was evident that there was a risk that 
participants would make only general comments on the issue, without reference to 
their own concrete experiences. Both Turkish and Kurdish interviewees tended to 
talk about the Kurdish Question, which was considered to be an abstract political 
matter, in a general sense. The Turkish respondents in particular rarely engaged with 
the subject of the research in their accounts, in that they comprehended the issue to 
be a macro and abstract “political” matter that had very little influence in their 
everyday lives and activities. In this regard, my efforts to encourage them to talk at a 
personal and everyday level were seen as “unnecessary”. While the Kurdish 
participants tended to begin the interview with a general statement of their political 
ideas, they were more able to transform their accounts from a general narrative to a 
personal one. For the first three interviews I thought that the tendency to speak in 
general rather than in personal terms was my mistake, but I soon realised that even 
when I tried to guide the participants at the beginning of the interview, they followed 
the same general path when giving their accounts.  
 
It could be said that the Turkish participants began their accounts with a 
contradiction: denying the Kurdish Question at a macro-political level, but being 
quite enthusiastic to talk about Kurds with reference to their daily experiences. As 
will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections, while the Turkish respondents 
talked about Kurds rather than the Kurdish Question, they tended to refer to 




Inasmuch as quite similar stories and themes were underlined through the narratives 
of the Turkish respondents, it can be said that there is a common repertoire of 
feelings and ideas about Kurds in the collective account of the Turkish respondents. 
For most of the Turkish respondents it could be observed that their involvement in 
this research was seen an opportunity to voice their discontent about Kurds, and they 
sought to legitimise their political stances by reflecting on the daily struggles they 
face that they think it is because of Kurds.  
 
It can be said that the interviews tended to be composed of two distinct parts: 
political speeches and political stories. Although this partition was not designed, 
either by me or the respondents, in the pilot process it was these two distinct themes 
that formed the structure of the accounts. The first parts, “speaking politically”, were 
composed of more vague political speeches based on media coverage of the Kurdish 
Question; while the second section, “telling stories”, was based on the everyday 
experiences of participants themselves. The summaries of the Kurdish Question 
made the first part of the interviews more superficial than the second, which tended 
to include detailed evaluations. General political speeches functioned as tools by 
which to frame the issue, specifying the political ideas of the individual by evoking 
dominant political clichés, slogans and common-sense references. In other words, the 
first part of the interviews was devoted to general political talk in daily language, and 
functioned as a means of framing the issue within the borders of the meta-narrative. 
The interviewees‟ general responses provided insight into how they perceived 
arguments of the meta-narrative, which over the years has become structured, 
transformed and modified.  
 
As discussed above, the Kurdish Question in particular was seen by the Turkish 
respondents as a macro-political issue that does not affect the everyday lives of 
“ordinary people”. This may be considered true, to some extent, as the war between 
Kurdish guerrillas and Turkish army took place within a certain geographical area. 
Accordingly, for those who did not fulfil their military service in Kurdish territory or 
those who do not reside in places that received migrants from Kurdish territory, their 




times. It is more likely for these people to refer to official ideologies or media 
coverage while reflecting on the Kurdish Question. In this sense, I chose not to start 
the interviews directly addressing the Kurdish Question, but rather with the question, 
“Where are you from originally?” This is part of the prominent cultural code that is 
followed when initiating a relationship in Turkey by people of all economic and 
cultural classes. Although in highly-populated Turkish cities, a large proportion of 
the population has migrated from other parts of the country, their hometown is still of 
great importance as an element of identity. Thus, for a local person, the question 
“where are you from?” is understood as a first step to starting a conversation, and by 
using this familiar question I aimed to create a friendly, relaxed atmosphere for the 
interviewee. As an additional advantage, the question presented a great opportunity 
steer the discussion towards the subject of ethnic identity and related personal 
experiences. After the introductory section, the question “Do you know any 
Kurdish/Turkish people around you?” elicited a free narrative on the Kurdish 
Question, which then linked to personal narratives on aspects of the experiences of 
the interviewee. Even though at the beginning of the fieldwork it looked like it would 
be impossible to encourage people to talk about the micro aspects of the issue, 
speaking generally on politics increasingly appeared as a means by which the 
personal, historical and socio-political framework of the narratives was constructed. 
As a sign of the politicised nature of the daily lives of “ordinary people”, speaking 
about political issues is an observable daily routine and a prominent way of 
socialising, especially for men, regardless of background, in Turkey. People can be 
observed chatting about the politics in workplaces, schools, shops, taxis, bus stops, 
and so on, and it does not matter whether the people know each other or not. “What 
will happen to this country” (Nolacak bu memleketin hali) is a particular type of 
conversation in Turkish cultural account, similar to the inquiry “Where are you 
from?” Controversially, the second indicates an inquiry of distinguished identity 
according to territorial or cultural distinctions, while the first defines those involved 
in the conversation as “national subjects”. This practice, which provides a chance to 
hear different ideas about daily political issues, also makes people more spirited and 
enthusiastic about taking part in any political discussion. Familiarity with discussions 




contemporary political topics as they are covered in the media, rather than thinking 
about how these political matters affect their daily lives and the possible effects on 
their perceptions. This tendency was problematic in the interview phase of the 
research, as for most of the participants, politics was seen as a serious issue that was 
worthy of discussion, yet personal experiences were not seen as story-worthy. It 
became obvious that there is an approved hierarchy between types of accounts, from 
“less worthy of telling” to “more worthy of telling”, with personal stories at the 
bottom. News from any source is seen as more credible than a participant‟s own 
account, although at this point it is necessary to state that this attitude was observed 
less among the Kurdish respondents. As the Kurdish participants had witnessed a 
wider variety of political experiences in their daily lives due to their ethnic identity, 
and because they listen to different stories about “being a Kurd” in society, they have 
a remarkable awareness about the “importance of the daily, private and ordinary” in 
political affairs. However, it was obvious that this kind of awareness was in direct 
relation to being political and having a political identity.  
 
4.5. Some Particularities of Women Participants 
 
It is necessary to underline a key difference between male and female participants 
related to their perception of the “story-worthiness” of their accounts. Although a 
comparison of men and women in terms of narratives, political perspectives and 
perceptions was not a focus of this research, gendered differences emerged as a 
prominent element in the themes that appeared in my observation notes due to my 
identity as a woman. Interest in and talking about politics are considered “masculine” 
traits in Turkey, where men are able to talk freely about politics, regardless of their 
socio-economic background or level of education. In contrast, a woman`s interest in 
politics is usually only regarded as legitimate when the woman is educated. This 
social norm makes women think that they are not sufficiently informed to talk about 
politics.  
 
Female participants voiced their concerns about not being sufficiently educated or 




the aim of the interview was to learn about their experiences regardless of their level 
of education or specific interest in politics. Those who were not convinced tried to 
arrange another participant for me who they regarded as more educated and aware of 
such issues, thinking that this would be more helpful to me. Some of the participants 
became relaxed after my explanation, although others remained nervous about 
talking on such issues. As Gulsum said, “I do not know much about these issues; I 
may say something wrong. I do not believe that talking to me will help you” 
(Gulsum, Turkish, female, 49). Besides this apprehension, the other key issue for the 
women participants was their tendency to talk more about their personal experiences 
than their male counterparts, who regarded personal experiences as not worth 
discussing. While this tendency can be considered a result of the common perception 
that “politics is a masculine area”, even educated and activist women were apt to talk 
personally and to give accounts that were dominated by their own stories. In contrast, 
the men‟s narratives were based mostly on normative political knowledge.  
 
4.6. Emotional Moments  
 
Some interviews were more difficult to conduct than others, as people were 
compelled to recall sad memories or experiences. During her interview, Dilan 
(Kurdish, female, 18) cried, and we had to pause the interview three times to allow 
her to compose herself. The interview questions brought back bitter memories of her 
father‟s trial as a member of the PKK during which he was tortured in prison. She 
spoke of how she lost her father just after his release by the court pending a trial nine 
years ago. I suggested finishing the interview several times, but she insisted on 
telling her story. When the interview was over, Dilan said that she was not ashamed 
of telling her story:  
 
“Those responsible for my father‟s death are the ones that should be 
ashamed. I want to tell the story to everyone, as everyone should learn 
about the cruelty of this state and how it took the life of my father. I 
will never forgive them for this. I feel more relaxed after talking to 
you; it has been like sharing these things with a close friend” (Dilan, 





Similar to Dilan‟s relief after telling her personal story, other participants also 
expressed positive feelings following their interviews, and some even thanked to me 
for giving them the opportunity to talk about politics and for being the first person to 
ever ask them about their ideas on these issues. Furthermore, some complained about 
not being able to discuss these issues with anyone before, and said that they had 
enjoyed taking part in the research. As Narin said; 
 
 “I didn‟t even realise that I had an idea about politics. I always 
thought of it as a male issue and something in which I do not need to 
be involved. Following this interview, I recognise that politics is not 
just the news we watch on TV. It is in our lives. Even my personal 
experiences are part of political issues.” (Kurdish, female, 31) 
 
 Although it was no surprise to learn that the women were unfamiliar with talking 
about politics, Yavuz‟s (Kurdish, male, 26) statement after his interview highlights 
the limitations in how men talk about politics: “In the many years that I have talked 
about these political issues with many men, nobody wanted to learn about my own 
experiences and how I lived. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to express my 
real feelings” (Yavuz, Kurdish, male, 26). 
 
4.7. Positionality, “Self-Reflexivity” and the Multiple Positions 
of the Researcher 
 
Discussions in research literature of “insiderness” and “outsiderness” capture the 
unstable position of the researcher throughout the fieldwork period, and it is quite 
hard to determine my position as both an insider and outsider in this research. This 
research aims to explore and evaluate the differences, similarities, ruptures and 
relationality that emerge through the personal accounts of both Kurdish and Turkish 
individuals. In this respect, the factors that make me an insider in the field, that is, 
being Turkish, and acknowledging the cultural codes and political language of the 
Turkish group transform simultaneously my position into that of an outsider among 





The insider perspective may question the ability of the outsider scholar to understand 
the experiences of minority groups, and may lead to the belief that an outsider may 
not necessarily have an empathetic understanding of the cultural values of the group 
they study (Merton, 1972). As a researcher who has lived in Ankara for the last 10 
years, I had an idea about the social and cultural atmosphere and was aware of the 
potential political sensibilities of the participants. As an insider, these factors proved 
to be advantageous in building a rapport with the participants. In addition to this, my 
general knowledge of Ankara as a Turkish researcher in the field means that it can be 
presupposed that I hold an insider position in my relationship with Turks and an 
outsider position in regards to the Kurdish participants. The lack of stability I felt 
throughout the fieldwork with regard to my position is consistent with the point made 
by Merton about the situational nature of the insider and outsider positions of the 
researcher (Merton, 1972: 41): “Differences of religion or age or class or occupation 
work to divide what similarities of race, sex or nationality work to unite” (Merton, 
1972: 23–24). Factors such as age, occupation and class did not affect my position in 
the field, while those based on the ethnic group to which I belonged and my identity 
as a woman were certainly influential.   
 
As a Turkish researcher, I assumed initially that my insider status would give me 
fairly instant access to the Turkish participants, and indeed it was not particularly 
hard to source Turkish participants due to my networks of Turkish friends and 
relatives living in Ankara. Although I took no comfort from being a Turkish 
researcher when recruiting the Turkish participants, I was aware of the inquiries that 
may have emerged had I been a Kurdish researcher, as people would have been more 
likely to be suspicious about the intentions of the research. I knew that because of my 
ethnic identity, Turks would assume that my political stance would be against the 
Kurdish movement, and that they would therefore accept me without question. It 
would be fair to say that my ethnic identity and assumed political stance made Turks 
feel comfortable in agreeing to take part in the research through interviews. In actual 






My insider position was accepted by default due to my ethnic identity, however, if 
my political perspective was revealed, my position could easily be transformed into 
that of an outsider. As mentioned above, the fieldwork started with a personal 
experience in a mini-bus (dolmus) involving a confrontation between two women, 
and what makes this discussion special is the ethnic assault of the Turkish woman 
against the foreign (Russian) one. The language used by the Turkish woman and the 
arguments she used to defend herself were a prime example of ethnic humiliation and 
hate speech. In this situation I tried to stay calm and not to intervene, but the ultimate 
silence of the other people on the bus annoyed me to the point that I felt compelled to 
get involved. Because of my support of the foreign woman, all of the anger of the 
Turkish woman was redirected towards me. She completely forgot about the foreign 
woman and kept yelling at me. She was extremely angry about my chosen position, 
and reflected her disappointment and anger at me, repeating the sentence “we are in 
this position because of people like you”, and by “you”, she was referring to Turkish 
people who are not committed to members of their own ethnic group. This situation 
led me to think about the position of the researcher as a person with a political 
identity and personal sensitivities as well. Ethnic identity prohibits easy access to 
participants who are members of the researcher‟s own ethnic group, as ethnicity and 
knowledge of cultural codes and gender can be points of conflict, and can end up 
being challenged through the research.  
 
My insider position in terms of my ethnicity was challenged on occasion and raised 
suspicion due to the topic of the research. The Kurdish participants in particular 
found it difficult to understand why a Turkish citizen would be interested in the 
Kurdish Question, and often asked me directly “Why are you doing this research?” 
Some of the Turkish participants, such as Ufuk (Kurdish, male, 39), were annoyed 
with my choice of subject. During the interview, Ufuk said on three occasions: 
“Studying these issues as a Turkish citizen provokes Kurds. They will justify their 
attitudes on the strength of your research. We should not do these kinds of things. 





Conducting research on the Kurdish Question was seen as an unnecessary and ill-
intended action by most of the Turkish respondents, who expressed their ideas on the 
subject of the research referring to the general argument that it was unnecessary. The 
general political definition of the Kurdish Question by the Turkish participants, 
essentially a “denial of the Kurdish Question”, emerged as a means of resistance in 
the process of recruiting participants. While none of the Turks I approached refused 
to take in part in the research based on the subject matter, most underlined their 
views, implied a lack of need for research into the Kurdish Question and denied the 
existence of a conflict between Kurds and Turks in Turkey.   
 
Another issue that made me an insider for one group but an outsider for another was 
my choice of university for my PhD. Some Turkish respondents perceived my 
university and PhD programme in a positive light, as a sign of my success in 
education, and my position as a student also made it easier to recruit some 
participants. For the rest, it was read suspiciously, as it implied that I had 
international connections, particularly with European institutions. This stirred 
people‟s anxieties about the existence of external enemies, such as in some European 
countries, the United States and Israel, which support the Kurdish movement. They 
believed that a PhD student with a scholarship would be vulnerable, and susceptible 
to manipulation by malevolent external forces who are seeking internal political 
information about Turkey. The possibility of me passing information about my 
country to external bodies, in other words, being a spy, was considered not very 
unlikely. During the interviews a number of participants either implied or stated 
explicitly that I was being, or could be compelled or deceived to study this issue by 
my supervisors, who may have harmful and separatist ideas about Turkey. For this 
reason, I stressed rather my civil-servant position in a Turkish University and the 
scholarship that I received from Turkish Government to overcome this suspicion.  
However the same factor made me an insider for Kurdish participants. Being a 
researcher-student in a university in Europe provided more credibility to the 
research, and most Kurdish participants stated that they would feel uncomfortable if I 
was attached to a university in Turkey. This suggested that it would not be possible 




university as a Turkish researcher, as my ideas would be open to manipulation by my 
supervisor and the evaluation board.  
 
At this point it is necessary to state that while my ethnicity caused some suspicions in 
the minds of the Kurds, I did not feel like an outsider because of my ethnicity during 
the phases of recruiting and interviewing the Kurdish participants. While I was aware 
of the argument that the Kurdish Question cannot be understood and evaluated 
objectively by a Turkish researcher, I did not experience this argument being made 
during the fieldwork. Some Kurds were suspicious of my identity, and on a few 
occasions made inquiries about whether I was a police officer or whether I was 
working for the state, but this suspicion did not prevent them from participating in an 
interview.   
 
The times at which I felt most like an outsider were due to my gender and lack of 
knowledge regarding the gender codes in Kurdish culture. Although there are 
generally few significant differences between the Kurdish and Turkish cultures, due 
to the different religious practices between the Kurdish groups and Turks, I had to be 
attentive during the course of interview. One such example of this was related to the 
practices of ablution. According to Shaffi belief, touching a woman, whether 
intentionally or not, makes a man canonically unclean, and so shaking hands was 
inappropriate behaviour with the Kurdish male participants. As it was not possible to 
predict the sect to which a male participant belonged, in our first encounter I avoided 
shaking hands, and waited for them to initiate a greeting.  
 
In addition to encounters with Kurdish male participants, my status as an “outsider” 
was also evident with both the Turkish and Kurdish female participants. My 
situation, as a highly educated Turkish woman living in the United Kingdom, was 
perceived as awkward and “Western”. People were curious about my life, my family 
and my marital status, and wanted to know whether I was living alone in the United 
Kingdom, or in Ankara, and to learn how I dared to put myself in such situations 




However, this reaction was rare, and there were no noteworthy differences between 
the reactions of the Kurdish and Turkish women.  
 
The final point about my positionality in the fieldwork is related to my political 
stance on the Kurdish Question. As mentioned above, while any suspicion about my 
leftist and anti-nationalist political affiliation made me an outsider in the Turkish 
group, in contrast, this factor was the determinant of my insider status among the 
Kurdish participants. Even those who did not support the Kurdish Movement felt 
comfortable when they learnt about my political leanings, as they realised that they 
would not face problems because of their accounts and, more importantly, that their 
accounts would not be evaluated according to a nationalist perspective.  In the words 
of Chase: 
 
“All narrative researchers attend to the research relationship, but 
those whose studies are based on in-depth interviews aim specifically 
at transforming the interviewer-interviewee relationship into one of 
narrator and listener. This involves a shift in understanding the nature 
of interview questions and answers” (Chase, 2005: 660).  
 
The shift referred to by Chase led to some initial operational problems while 
conducting the interviews. For example, trying to encourage participants to speak 
more about a particular issue so as to specify or generalise the frame of their 
narrative made them feel like they were in an exam, etc. Most of the participants 
broke through my structure by offering different stories to conceptualise their own 
narratives. Although after the pilot phase I felt that these kinds of problems could be 
easily overcome, I soon realised that it was not possible to impose a particular 
structure on the narratives and the flow of accounts. 
 
In my fieldwork experience, it was not possible to overcome all of the obstacles 
between the researcher and participant. In an encounter between two people, as an 
interviewee and interviewer, who are probably from different backgrounds, have 
different cultural, financial and educational statuses, and different ages and genders, 
there will always be some distance. When I started the fieldwork, I felt this distance 




and improving my interview technique, the distance between the two agents‟ 
remained. Despite handling the initial interactions well (a connection is made with 
the interviewee, s/he agrees to take part in the research, a meeting time and place is 
arranged), arranging the physical aspects (agreeing to a meeting that is suitable both 
for the researcher and participant, where both parties feel calm and comfortable and 
are able to interact) and establishing a good level of rapport with the interviewee, the 
issue of positionality will still impact upon the kind of data gathered. That simply to 
say that the gathered data was influenced by a range of factors that were particular to 
my research subjects, my participants and my identity. 
 
4.8. Ethical Considerations  
 
This research was conducted in a responsible, open and transparent way. All 
participants and contacts were given an outline of the purposes and goals of the 
research and were assured of complete anonymity. The procedures adopted by the 
Research and Ethics Committee of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
University of Edinburgh, were followed, all the collected data was kept in a secure 
private file, and all the participants were given pseudonyms.  
 
I informed all of the interviewees about the content and the purpose of the research 
and stressed the confidentiality and anonymity. I did not make an audio recording of 
the demographic information received from the respondents at the beginning of the 
interviews, and used the pseudonyms while taking notes during the interviews. In the 
pilot stage, I presented the participants with a consent form and explained its 
purpose, however, all participants declined to sign it. One woman expressed concern 
about signing a document, and added that if this was a requirement, she would refuse 
to take part in the research, even though she was keen to participate. Reactions to the 
consent form were similar for both Kurdish and Turkish participants, and seem 
unrelated to any perceived minority/majority position. According to cultural codes, a 
signature transforms a document into an official contract that places a burden on the 
subject, usually in economic affairs, and opting to not sign a document is seen as a 




difficult for the female participants to sign a consent form. Both single and married 
women were quite relaxed about making their own decision to take part in the 
research, signing a document would not have been so easy for them. For these 
reason, after the pilot phase I did not give the participants a written consent form, 
accepting that a verbal promise was more culturally appropriate for this research. 
 
To have gain verbal consent, I informed them about the confidential nature of the 
study, after introducing myself as a student. To most of the participants, being a PhD 
student would mean little to them, and so to make the research more intelligible I 
introduced it as a report that I needed to prepare in order to get my degree. I showed 
my university card as proof of my academic status at the University of Edinburgh 
and as a member of staff at Hacettepe University, and provided my e-mail addresses 
and telephone number if they requested contact details. I underlined that the research 
had no link to any governmental institution, NGO or media company. After 
explaining the content and purpose of the study, I asked the participants again 
whether or not they were willing to talk to me. After asking their permission to be 
interviewed, they did not expect me to ask for permission to record it. One Kurdish 
man and one Turkish man did not allow me to record their accounts, and asked me 
not to take their photographs, even though I made no such request. The reason given 
by these two participants was the same – they did not want an audio recording of 
their accounts on the Kurdish issue to be made due to security concerns. While they 
emphasised their trust in me, they were anxious about the possibility that the 
recordings may change hands against my will and be used against them.  
 
The participants were not approached after the interviews for their views on the 
interview transcripts or the use of data in the final text, as most did not want further 
involvement or information about the project. The interviewees who were high 
school or university students asked me to send them a copy of the completed thesis.  
 
As a Turkish woman researcher in the field, I felt a deep responsibility to the Kurdish 
participants to protect them from any possible repercussions they may face due to 




during the interviews with the Turkish respondents. I felt in danger of being abused 
due to my personal political stance on the Kurdish Question, particularly as some 
Turkish respondents seemed keen to know how I stood on the issue. At some points, 
when giving their own accounts, they sought my confirmation through such 
questions as “Don‟t you think so?”, “Am I wrong in thinking…?”, or through direct, 
often threatening, expressions, such as “no Turkish person can think differently”. For 
this reason, I attempted to maintain a distance between myself and participants, such 
as by kindly refusing the invitation to be friends on Facebook, where I regularly post 
political messages. 
 
I employed some small strategies in order to ensure the security of both myself and 
my participants during the fieldwork. Talking quietly when using the words “Kurd”, 
“Kurdish” and “PKK” was an automatic reflex for all of the participants, and even 
when conducting the interview in a safe place, such as in the home of the respondent, 
they tended to speak more quietly. I recognised that I too developed this reflex, and 
became more cautious when using these words in a public place in order to keep both 
the participant and myself safe, being aware that the subject of discussion may bring 
reactions from the people around us.  
 
As a result of these precautions during the fieldwork, neither my participants nor I 
were subjected to any serious security issues; however, I realized that the Kurdish 
respondents already have their own strategies to keep themselves safe in their daily 
routines, such as avoiding expressing their political ideas publicly without a contact 
person and speaking quietly in some public places when discussing this sensitive 
issue. The only thing that I need to be careful about was my own security in this 
process. 
 
Hiding my political position was another precaution I made, both to avoid 
manipulating the narratives of the participants and for security reasons. However, it 
would not have been possible to disclose my own political perspective when 
interviewing Dogan (Turkish, male, 40), who insisted that I share my political stance 




finish the interview. While I did not feel insecure in my position, I perceived his 
attitude to be a psychological attack against me. As this was one of the pilot 
interviews, I had not yet understood the importance of concealing my political 
stance, and after this experience I was careful to avoid revealing my own political 
stance throughout all the other interviews.  
 
The strategy of defining oneself within a political ideology, which is highly 
acceptable in mainstream politics in Turkey, is a kind of precaution against possible 
troubles that one may face in the future after having taken part in an interview with a 
foreigner who they do not know. After declaring their political identity, especially 
when this took a nationalist stance, the interviewees often wanted me to approve 
their position, and also to declare my own, and the precautions that I had established 
during the interview process evoked threatening reactions from some participants, 
who were extremely interested in whether I was a nationalist or not. As I was a 
researcher asking questions about a sensitive issue, they wanted to be assured of their 
safety, and if I was not one of “them”, it could create problems for them, as their 
narratives could be used against them by separatist groups. Interview in particular, 
culminated in Berk threatening me in the following way:  
 
“If I hear any word of this speech from a Kurd or in a separatist 
journal or website, I will read it and you can be sure that I will find 
you. Ok?”(Berk, male, 24) 
 
After this reaction I managed to keep calm and kept to conduct interview. In order to 
persuade him to be interviewed I remind the complete anonymity of the research.  
 
4.9. Data Limitations 
 
The data collected in this research was subject to certain limitations. The selected 
research area, Ankara, may have limited variety in the types of encounters between 
Kurdish and Turkish individuals. One of the main purposes of this research was to 
understand the forms of daily encounters between Kurdish and Turkish individuals, 
and to explore the main motives and themes pertaining to nationalism that appeared 




access data on the more ordinary daily encounters, but with an awareness that the 
resultant data would be different to that collected in another city, where the forms of 
encounters and narratives would be completely different, such as in Diyarbakır, 
Mersin, Istanbul or İzmir.  In such places, violent and traumatic encounters are more 
common, but rather than the more radical accounts, I was aiming to access more 
everyday and relatively “normal” encounters, and to follow the personal narratives of 
less radically politicised individuals.  
 
Another limitation of this research is the lack of a sect perspective. While the 
Kurdish participants were mostly Shaffi and the Turks were Sunni, just four 
interviews were conducted with Alevis. While interviews were conducted with three 
Alevi Kurds and one Alevi Turk in the piloting process, I tended to avoid 
interviewing members of such religious minority groups, in that these interviews 
tended to raise issues that lay outside the scope of the present study. During the 
interviews with the Alevi Kurds, as a minority in a Sunni-Islamic country, the main 
subject of discussion was not related with ethnicity. The narratives produced by both 
the Turk and Kurd Alevis were dominated rather with stories of the state oppression 
that they had faced due to their religious affiliation since the Ottoman Era. I thus 
acknowledged that identification ways of Alevis is based on completely different 
parameters that fall outside the scope of this research.  
 
Another limitation may be attributed my ethnicity and gender, specifically in relation 
to my encounters with the male and Kurdish participants. While my ethnic identity or 
gender resulted in no serious issue, an equivalent research conducted by a male 
researcher may have produced a slightly different type of data. Talking politics with 
a woman is still an unfamiliar practice in both the Turkish and Kurdish cultures, and 
the feeling of surprise the individuals felt and the effort they put into adapting to this 
usual situation may have had an effect on the data I collected. My ethnic identity in 
the field also brought some limitations to the research. If I was a Kurdish it would be 
possible to gather more detailed data in the interviews with Kurdish participants; 
however it would be harder to recruit Turkish respondents into this research. Also, 




content, and it would not have been possible to witness the self-criticisms, and the 
criticisms of state policies, that were made during the interviews by the respondents.  
 
4.10. Conclusion  
 
Conducting a research on such a sensitive issue in Turkey with members of the two 
groups was not easy due to my ethnic identity and challenging political ideas, 
however the gathered data provided an opportunity to analyse the roots and effects of 
ethnicity and nationalism in the lives of ordinary Kurds and Turks. The following 
chapters, in which the gathered data is analysed, shed light on the questions raised 
























5. Unchanged Strategy: Denying the Kurdish Question 
 
As stated above, the aim of this research is to understand how ordinary people see 
the ethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks, how they define the “self” and the 
“other”, and how they define their relationship with the ethnic other within this 
excessively nationalist-driven political atmosphere. The intention in this chapter is to 
address the first of these issues by focusing on the founding narrative strategy that 
frames the personal accounts of ordinary people. The most important narrative 
strategy employed by the respondents in their accounts was the denial of the 
existence of a Kurdish ethnic identity and the Kurdish Question. Although this 
strategy of denial does not provide an understanding of the main arguments put 
forward by the Kurdish respondents in their accounts, it stands as the founding 
narrative strategy in all accounts.   
 
The denial of the status of Kurds as an ethnic minority group has been a permanent 
feature of the official ideology of the Turkish state, dating back even to the pre-
establishment of the Republic. The strategy of denial has been practiced by the state 
through constitutional amendments and policies, such as banning the Kurdish 
language, and punishing people for speaking Kurdish in public and defining 
themselves as Kurdish citizens rather than Turkish. The narrative used by political 
leaders expressing that „Turkey is only for Turks‟ supports the idea of Turkey as a 
country with „one nation, one state, one flag
33
‟. While the roots of the Kurdish 
Question date back to late Ottoman Era, it was in the 1980s that the issue became a 
permanent item on the agenda following the establishment of the PKK. With the first 
armed attack by the PKK in 1984, the issue developed into a systematic conflict 
between the armed forces of the Turkish state and the PKK. Despite the declared 
ceasefires and the “Kurdish Expansion
34
” efforts to resolve the issue through political 
means, the violence continued.  
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 This is a slogan that was voiced by the leaders of both the Justice and Development Party and the 
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This thirty-year conflict brought about a transformation in the perceptions of 
ordinary Kurds and Turks on both the issue and each other. The forced migration 
policy of the state throughout the 1990s carried the issue to another level, lowering 
the living standards of Kurds, which were already quite low. The increasing support 
for the PKK among the Kurdish citizens living in the Kurdish cities and in the west 
of the country compelled the Turkish State to apply even harsher and more violent 
policies. These increased the self-awareness of the Kurdish ethnicity of Kurdish 
society, leading to a rapid growth of the Kurdish movement. 
 
Within this political atmosphere, the mass migration of the 1990s created the 
opportunity for Kurdish and Turkish people to encounter each other.  This was not 
the first time ordinary Kurds and Turks had met. The two cultures had been living 
together for years in cities in both the east and west of the country; however this 
encounter of highly politicised Kurdish and Turkish individuals had a negative 
impact on the perceptions of both sides about each other. While the newcomers to the 
cities were perceived as criminal and an uncivilised, the Turks were considered as 
discriminating and racist by the Kurds. 
 
By this time, many Turks already had a negative view of Kurds, based on their 
portrayal in the media throughout the 1990s as criminals, backward and separatist. 
There are also challenging and alternative ways of perceptions in society. With the 
changes that arose in the meta-narrative concerning the Kurdish Question, the 
perceptions of ordinary Kurds and Turks about each other created an opportunity to 
challenge the a strategy of denial. Unsurprisingly, the great power of the official 
ideology, which was disseminated through the education system and the narratives of 
the mainstream media, had a significant impact on the ways in which ethnic identity 
was constructed. Personal encounters also provided a potential for the different ways 
of ethnic identification. In other words, the encounter of the Turks with the Kurds 
challenged the idea that Turks, that “there is no Kurd or Kurdish Question in 
Turkey”. After this point, the Kurdish Question could no longer be regarded only as 




encounter, it was not possible to ignore the existence of the Kurds, regardless of 
whether they supported the Kurdish movement or not.   
 
 In short, living together and the macro-political changes made possible to 
“humanise” the Question in terms of embodiment of the actors. As practicing their 
ethnic identity, they were forced to refer to their own personal experiences and to 
“real people” they encountered. All narratives related to the Question and to each 
other highlighted concrete moments of encounters with an individual. The personal 
experiences of ordinary Kurds and Turks have become an inseparable component of 
the process of ethnic identification. In other words, personal encounters were 
articulated into perceptions of the self and the other, and there appeared a new way 
of politicising the Question through a humanised perspective. The tendency to 
“humanize” the conflict and the Kurdish identity emerges as a conflicting and 
challenging perception in society.  
 
Despite the political transformations over the last decade and the impact of the 
escalation of potential encounters, the strategy of denial related to the Kurds still 
prevails, being the common approach on both the Turkish and Kurdish sides. That 
said, it is not regarded as a simple continuation and reproduction of the meta-
narrative of the state. The applied strategies of denial to address the various 
motivations emerged in the accounts of the participants, making visible the different 
perceptions of the Question. To address this issue, this chapter examines the 
narratives related to the denial of Kurds and the Kurdish Question that appear in the 
accounts of the participants of this research: 
 
(i) How do Kurdish and Turkish people frame the conflict?  
(ii) In what ways does the strategy of denial appear in personal accounts?  
(iii) How does the strategy of denial function within the whole produced 
narrative?  
(iv) To which historical moments do the participants refer?  





5.1. A Dilemma: Denial of the Kurds or of the Kurdish 
Question? 
 
Before introducing the forms of denial, it is necessary to state a shared point that 
emerged within the narratives of the participants related to this political issue. When 
the Turkish and Kurdish participants spoke about the conflict, they draw inevitably 
from the wide spectrum of general political arguments. The introductory parts of the 
interviews were structured according to the general accounts of the participants of 
the conflict, with no reference made to any personal experiences. Summaries and 
superficial evaluations of the Question made the first part of the interviews more 
superficial than the other parts, which were based on personal experiences and called 
for detailed evaluations. General political speeches function as a framing tool, from 
which the personal political ideas of each respondent can be understood through their 
evoking of dominant political clichés, slogans and popular references to the issue. 
The denial of the Kurds and the Kurdish Question emerged as an argument in this 
initial part of the accounts, in which general political ideas were put forward in daily 
language.  
 
The strategy of denial emerges as a point of departure in the accounts of the Kurdish 
and Turkish participants, and is presented in a two-layered form. While it functions 
as a means of framing the issue within the borders of the meta-narrative, it also 
serves as a starting point for criticisms of the official policy of the state. In other 
words, the denial of the Kurdish Question as a narrative strategy is framed by two 
main arguments when discussing such topics as the originality of the Kurdish 
language and the ownership of territory, referring to Anatolia: 
 
(i) Denial of the existence of Kurds as a distinct ethnic group and denial the Kurdish 
language 






5.1.1. There are no Kurds, no Kurdish Question 
 
5.1.1.1. Kurdish: Genuine or Fake  
 
Denial of the Kurdish language has been one of the components of the meta-narrative 
concerning the denial of the Kurds, and has taken the form of a ban on the speaking 
of the Kurdish language in public. As a component of the meta-narrative, the denial 
of the Kurdish language emerges as a supporting narrative strategy that legitimises 
the narrative of denial of the Kurds. Umut, a Turkish participant, presents a pertinent 
example of the narrative strategy of denial in his account. As a postgraduate student 
who holds a high position in a government ministry, it was striking to hear these old 
arguments, as representative of the official discourse, from him. Umut has a master 
degree in history, focusing on the pre-Ottoman history of the Turks, but his 
scientific/academic interests did not prevent him from holding biased views. He 
argued that: 
 
“I don't want to say something wrong. I support their endeavours to 
gain their educational rights, but I do not think they [Kurds] even 
have a proper alphabet yet. Yes maybe there is a language called 
Kurdish, but it is so disconnected. There are different dialects in 
Kurdish. Kurds do not understand the other dialects of this language. 
Or when you transform the language into written form, there appear 
funny things. They use the letter „X‟ to voice the 'H'. When you say 'X', 
does it sound like 'H'? (laughing) I really wonder. When one is 
speaking it does not sound like that. Of course I am not sure but I 
believe that it is a kind of fake language.” (Umut, Turkish, male, 28) 
 
According to Umut, the Kurdish language does not exist, and rather than simply 
denying the existence of the Kurdish, he discredits their originality. This supports the 
general argument that there is no naturally-occurring Kurdish nation. It is just 
fabricated. Likewise, there is no Kurdish language, as it has also been fabricated 
since their nationalist revival. While it is possible to follow the transformation of 
general thinking related to the Kurdish Question through the participants‟ accounts, 
the idea of the “artificiality” of the Kurdish identity and the Kurdish Question 
remains alive in people‟s minds. As discussed in primordialist perspective in 




prominent factor in naming the Kurds as distinct ethnic group. However the thing is 
ignored at this point is all the nations are to some extent fabricated (Gellner, 2008).  
 
The Kurdish participants, especially those who define themselves as Kurdish rather 
than Turkish, are aware of the narrative strategy of denial that is embedded in the 
collective memory of Turks. The addressee of the accounts of the Kurdish 
participants is not ordinary “Turks”, but the Turkish state, in that they know full well 
that they are not recognised as a national entity within the hegemonic ideology of the 
state. This is evident in the account of Nazim, a Kurdish shopkeeper working in 
various marketplaces in Ankara who defines himself as a “political Kurdish citizen” 
who “devotes himself to the resolution of the Kurdish Question”. He states that: 
 
“Everyone should know that we will keep resisting at any cost. I don‟t 
need to mention the Turks, in that they do not believe in the existence 
of a nation called Kurdistan. All they do is deny us. In this respect, 
how can it be possible to give rights to an unrecognised group? So 
many people believe that I fabricated the language I speak. Let‟s say I 
fabricated it! Do 25 million Kurdish-speaking people speak in eggy 
peggy?” (Nazim, Kurdish, male, 36) 
 
5.1.1.2. Who came first?  
 
In response to the tendency to supress the Kurds by discrediting the Kurdish 
language, Kurdish participants raised the argument that an ethnic group exists called 
Kurds. Proving the existence of the Kurds in Anatolia even before the Turks was a 
striking point that emerged in the interviews. 
 
“Turkish people do not know where they came from originally. They 
don‟t know anything about Turkishness. They just read their history 
and rely on the argument that Turks came from Mesopotamia, which 
was already a part of the Ottoman territory. They don‟t know where 
they come from. As far as I am concerned there was no Turkish entity 
in the Ottoman territory. Was there? We were already here [in this 
territory] by the time the Turks [arrived].” (Omer, Kurdish, male, 35) 
 
“I ask my mum „are you Kurdish and where did you come from?‟ You 
know, Turks say that this land is theirs, so I just want to check this 




came from Mesopotamia. Initially we lived in those lands and then we 
came here [Anatolia]. We were here before the Battle of Manzikert 
[1071] – the Turks did not win that war, we won it‟. I actually know 
that they did not win. We won that war.” (Cevat, Kurdish, male, 34) 
 
The counter-narrative of the Kurds against the denial strategy challenges the Turkish 
nationalist discourse and functions as a cross-check for the argument that nationalism 
creates its own counter-nationalisms. The age-old myth that the Turks came from 
Asia Minor through Anatolia and fought for the land is a part of the official history 
of the Turkish state. A nationalist language is employed by both the Turkish and 
Kurdish group members when stating the legitimacy of their argument that they are 
„the landlord of the Anatolian territory‟. Instead of challenging assertions of 
„ownership‟, there appears a Kurdish nationalist language that echoes the arguments 
of Turkish nationalism. The idea that a group can claim ownership of a territory by 
being the first to arrive there is a pure nationalist argument which refers to 
discussions on settler nationalism. Encounters of indigenous and settler groups 
appears as prominent part of nationalist discourse. This argument is repeated by the 
Kurdish participants during the interviews. They claim that Kurds were already 
settled in Asia Minor when the Turks arrive. According to some Kurdish participants 
Turks see “the land as an empty space waiting to be filled” (Maron, 2002: 1016). 
However in this case answer of the question of who are the settlers and who are the 
indigenous is ambivalent. 
 
The denial of the Kurdish Question emerged as an approved argument for Kurds as 
well, which functions as a strategy that allows them to situate themselves in a secure 
area by assuming an apolitical identity. Those Kurdish participants who denied the 
existence of the Kurdish Question tended to underline that not all Kurds are terrorist. 
As stated by Onur: “As a Kurdish citizen, I do not believe that there is a Kurdish 
Question. Only some of the Kurds are related with this issue.” (Onur, Kurdish, male, 
55) 
 
Bearing witness to influential assimilation policies applied for some eighty years 
towards all minorities by the Turkish state, most of the Kurds involved in this 




lack of a Kurdish Question. As can be observed through their accounts, some Kurds 
define themselves as ethnically Kurdish, although most underline their commitment 
to their Turkish identity, as demanded by official discourse.  
 
5.1.2.  Denial through Threats 
 
While the strategy of denial stands out as an obvious factor, in some interviews, 
modified forms of structures were employed by through different narrative strategies, 
such as “denying through threats”. Although exceptional, some Kurdish participants 
denied the existence of the Kurdish Question, but referred to it when making a 
warning. As Nazım stated: 
 
“There is no Kurdish Question between the two groups in everyday 
life, but if there was, they [Turks] would not live in such a peaceful 
environment” (Nazim, Kurdish, Male, 36).  
 
One Turkish nationalist participant, Mehmet, who had been active in the nationalist 
movement since the 1990s and now defined himself as „an ordinary citizen without 
any political engagement‟, emphasised that there was no problem between two 
groups: 
 
“If there was, I would never accept the Kurdish soldiers in my shop. I 
would never serve them in this shop. If we (Turks) had problems with 
them they would not live as safely as they do now. We would behave 
like them and kill Kurds living here, Istanbul and Izmir” (Mehmet, 
Turkish, male, 32). 
 
While Mehmet was giving this account a customer was in the shop who from his 
physical appearance, could be understood to be Kurdish. I asked him whether he was 
Kurdish as I felt very bad on his behalf to have heard Mehmet making such open 
threats against the Kurds. I noted that Mehmet showed no sign of shame or regret as 
a result of this encounter. In contrast, he said; “You see. If there was a problem I 




annoyed after his ethic identity was declared, and five minutes later he left. After he 
had gone, the participant said; 
 
 “I knew he was Kurdish. That is why I talked in that aggressive tone. 
We need to act this way towards them; otherwise they will abuse our 
humanity and kindness” (Mehmet, Turkish, male, 32).  
 
Mehmet was quite firm in his political ideas, which were based on the idea that 
Turkey belongs to the Turks, as he stated at the end of the interview. It was a striking 
encounter for me to see the interaction between these two people and to observe the 
differences between them when they were together and after the Kurdish man had 
left. This encounter can be seen as a concretisation of the denial at an inter-personal 
level. Mehmet knew that his customer was Kurdish, and while did not refer to him 
specifically in his account, he wanted to give a message to him. In other words, his 
account had a subject at that moment, and he did not miss out on the chance to 
demonstrate his power as a Turkish nationalist.  
 
In contrast Mehmet‟s customer who left the shop, Guliz did not react when she 
encountered such a concrete and inter-personal level of denial. Guliz‟s family had 
been forced to migrate in the 1990s moving to Ankara before she was born. She was 
aware of the conflict through the stories of her family. As a quite politicised Kurdish 
individual, but prefers to challenge the narrative strategy of denial through her 
everyday life.  
 
 “I have so much trouble about this issue in school. We have so many 
arguments, but I can say that I have changed completely the 
perceptions of the whole class. They cannot mention this issue when I 
am in the group. I have a refractory personality. The first time I 
argued with my teacher I was when I was in the second class in high 
school. Everyone was shocked due to my reaction to the teacher. The 
teacher said that there was no Kurdish problem, so it does not require 
a solution. I could not control myself, I was so angry. I had seen 
something that made me so sad the day before about Kurdish children 
who could not go to school due to poverty. It is a problem for me that I 
can go to school in the west while they cannot. I just said this. After 
this day he [the teacher] started to take an interest in me specifically. 
He increased my grades in the lessons to gain my trust and attention 




political views about the Kurdish Question.” (Guliz, Kurdish, female, 
17) 
 
5.2. Arguments of Denial 
 
As can be seen, the strategy of denial did not emerge as a single layered argument 
throughout the interviews. As a narrative strategy, denial is accompanied by different 
expressions to achieve the legitimisation of the basic argument, such as: “there is no 
reason for conflict between the Kurds and the Turks” and the Kurdish Question is 
therefore “a fake clash, fabricated by invisible or external forces”. 
 
5.2.1. There is no Reason for Conflict between Kurds and Turks 
 
Both Kurdish and Turkish participants put forward several arguments to support the 
idea that no conflict exists between the two groups. While the participants denied the 
Kurdish Question, they were aware of the need to bring to an end the animosity 
between the two groups by emphasising in particular the common history of the two. 
The narrative of denial gained legitimacy through the official narrative of the 
“Independence War”, which stated that “while all other ethnic and religious 
minorities accompanied the European forces, the Kurds stayed and fought together 
with the „Turks‟ against the occupying forces. Victory was attained due to the 
cooperation of these two nations –the Turks and Kurds. This victory was a respectful 
and sacred moment in Turkish history, and these two ethnic groups were the most 
important components of the cooperation. This historical commonality was brought 
up by Gulsum in her account: 
 
“There is no Kurdish Question. We fought together during the War of 
Independence with Kurdish people. They did not take part in the Battle 
of Gallipoli, as they were fighting in the Tripoli War at the same time. 
Finally, there were no technological facilities in those old times. That 
is why Kurds had to fight on the fronts of the war close to their region. 
Some of them say that there are not so many Kurdish martyrs in the 
cemeteries of Canakkale, but while Turkish people from the west were 
fighting on the front at Gallipoli, Kurdish people were fighting on the 





On the other hand, this narrative of commonality was sometimes a matter of 
annoyance for the Kurds, who believe that it is a superficial account that serves to 
cloud the issue and create a fake sense of equality. The Kurdish participants are 
aware that their ancestors fought together with the other people living in Anatolia, 
but still did not have their rights respected. Unlike the other minorities, such as the 
Greeks, Armenians etc., who made up the population of Anatolia, they did not deny 
their ethnicity in order to be part of the nation-state project as so-called Turks. 
Within the new nation, all groups were required to define themselves as Turkish, 
even if they belonged to a different ethnic group, with the aim being to erase 
differences of language and culture. The claim that “Those [ethnic and religious 
minorities] who agreed to assimilate into the Turkish culture were always welcomed” 
(Kaya, 2012: 150) is still an argument operated and practiced at both official and 
unofficial levels in Turkey. 
 
“Let‟s go to the martyr‟s cemetery in Canakkale now. You cannot find 
the graves of any Laz people because they did not fight in the Gallipoli 
war, although they behave more nationalist than the Turks do. While 
they [Turks,Lazs etc.] avoid fighting for this land, Kurds fought 
there.” (Nazim, Kurdish, male, 36) 
 
Another prominent theme in the interviews, used to legitimatise the argument that no 
conflict exists between Turks and Kurds, accentuated the lack of inequality in 
society. This theme appeared when participants asserted that the political demands of 
the Kurds were unnecessary, in that they already have cultural and political rights. 
Economic, cultural and educational inequalities have been essential elements in the 
evaluation of the Kurdish Question from the time of the first emergence of the issue 
within the state narrative. Overcoming inequality and increasing economic and social 
investments in the Kurdish territory have long been seen as the only solutions to the 
problem. Framing the issue as one that is based merely on economics has not helped 
the state in achieving a permanent solution. As the problem has been seen primarily 
as one of economic inequality by the administrative cadre of the state, speaking of 
cultural and political rights has been deemed unnecessary. Everyone living in Turkey 
has a Turkish identity card and is therefore accepted as equal in official terms. In 




possible to assert that Turks occupy a privileged position. While some of the Kurdish 
and Turkish participants take the perspective that Kurds experience inequality by 
default, for most of them this is a simple argument to be refuted. 
 
“They (Kurds) have equal rights to us. Is there any barrier to them 
becoming civil servants, teachers, doctors or deputies? There are 
many Kurdish deputies in Parliament in all parties, and the richest 
businessmen in this country are Kurdish. Some have even become 
president of this country. At these times there was no problem. Why 
did it emerge so suddenly? Because they ask for more in all sectors, 
both money and power. They want to be the only authority in the 
places where they are settled. They are accustomed to being fed by the 
state. They do not pay any electricity or water bills. They do not want 
to work, but all of them have at least fifteen children. Neither the state 
nor the other citizens of this country have to the feed them.” (Adem, 
Turkish, male, 42) 
 
 As stated above, so long as a Kurd does not challenge their Turkish identity or 
express a problem with their sense of belonging to a Turkish society, they tend not to 
be exposed to any discriminatory treatment in everyday life. This principle operates 
in the same way in the workplace. As long as they define themselves as Turkish and 
do not highlight their Kurdishness or their dissimilarity, Kurds may climb to the 
highest levels in their careers. This argument has always been based on the case of 
Turgut Ozal, who, although he never stated specifically that he was Kurdish, it was 
claimed that he was. He became the eighth president of the country and served for 
six years. The existence of Kurdish judges, advocates, doctors, teachers, academic 
staff and even parliamentary deputies is held up as proof of the equalities; however, 
the counter-argument of the Kurdish participants offers a quite different perspective 
on the issue. As Omer stated, 
 
“In Turkey, we [Kurds] can be anything: teachers, soldiers, judges, 
engineers, deputies, prime ministers, even presidents. We do not have 
to be only Kurdish. Despite being Kurdish, anything is possible for 






5.2.2. A Fabricated Clash 
 
The logical sequence of the accounts of the participants is determined by their need 
to legitimise the ideas expressed. A common theme employed to support denial of 
the Kurdish Question is that the whole issue is fabricated. The Kurdish Question is 
often considered to be a fake issue that does not stem from real and fair motives, but 
something that is fabricated by people who want to undermine Turkey. While in the 
second level of this argument, various parties are declared as responsible, in this 
level the tendency is to accentuate the fabricated feature of the Kurdish Question. 
 
According to Gulsum, a responsible figure, such as an „invisible hand‟ that plans and 
perpetuates the conflict, is defined. Such a perception of the Kurdish Question serves 
to alienate the issue in the minds of individuals, and diverts focus to external targets 
within their political accounts. When I asked Gulsum about her the ideas on the 
Kurdish Issue, she said: 
 
“When we were young, there was no indication of the Kurdish issue or 
the Kurdish identity on television. Why did it emerge so suddenly? I 
mean, why is it mentioned in all of the news and discussion 
programmes? Someone wants to create this problem, for no reason at 
all.” (Gulsum, Turkish, female, 49) 
 
The emergence of the conflict between the Turkish army and PKK remains the dark 
side of the issue, which has not yet been understood in the minds of the Turkish 
participants. While they recognise the conflict between the state and the PKK, they 
resist accepting the existence of a conflict between ordinary Kurds and Turks. In 
other words, the Turkish participants tend to see the Question rather as an armed 
conflict between the PKK and the state, and as something that is totally unrelated 
with ordinary Kurds and Turks. In this sense, the Kurdish movement is equated to 
the PKK and its use of terrorism.  
 
Being aware of the Question but discrediting its importance was a common strategy 
within the accounts. The inconvenience of the imputed importance of the issue 




do not understand the real roots of the problem make comparisons with the situation 
of other minorities living in Turkey, and in doing so, arrive at another question: Why 
do issues concerning these minorities seem so important? As Nihan said, 
 
“It was not an important element of the agenda until the 1990s. 
Recently, the Kurdish Question has become a means of covering up 
the real problem of this country. Instead of the Armenian problems, 
the problems of the Kurds and Alevi are discussed in the media.” 
(Nihan, Turkish, female, 43) 
 
The rationale articulated by Nihan, that “if nobody talks about it, there won‟t be any 
problem”, is a fairly common way of evaluating the issue. According to this logic, 
public discussions of the Kurdish Question is completely unnecessary, and even a 
malevolent act, that needlessly produces and reproduces discomfort between the two 
groups. 
 
The strategy of denial fulfils a controlling function in preventing a possible internal 
war in the accounts of both the both Kurds and Turks. In other words, acceptance of 
the Kurdish Question may be an act of provocation, and may lead to uncontrollable 
conflict. While on the Turkish side the narrative of denial operates as a kind of 
“tolerance” for the continued presence of Kurds in the country, on the Kurdish side 
this narrative strategy functions as a defensive strategy, presenting themselves as 
individuals who follow the official ideology. Ufuk, the owner of a hair salon in a 
quite wealthy district of Ankara, expressed his annoyance about giving voice to the 
Kurdish Question in the following way: 
 
“Someone wants to present it as a real problem by provoking and 
scratching it. It is just fabricated by someone. It always annoys me to 
talk about it. It is a way of creating the problem. It may be worse in 
time. You may even fuel the fire by conducting research into this issue. 
Would you consider conducting the same study fifteen years ago? No. 
It is fabricated. People are made to believe that. Like you. Even it is a 
sign that this issue is being taken seriously, it is a way of agitating the 





Although Ufuk has known me for ten years, he was annoyed at being part of a 
research project on the Kurdish Question, as he did not believe the topic to be worthy 
of discussion or research, maintaining an attitude of denial. 
 
Younger participants tended to explain the issue as being related to the hidden 
agenda of external enemies, which is coherent with the hegemonic discourse. 
Middle-aged and older participants, on the other hand, sought to explain the way in 
which the issue emerged with reference to the social clashes that occurred before the 
raising of the Kurdish Question. The traumas of the military coup of 12 September 
1980 have not been forgotten, and the emergence of the Kurdish Question made it 
hard to understand another conflict based on ethnic distinction. While five or six 
years ago the social conflict based on left and right ideologies, from the mid-1980s 
onwards a different form of social discord was experienced. Inasmuch as the 
confrontation of the left-right political groups was still alive in the collective 
memory, comparisons are made with reference to the experiences of the coup, which 
made no sense for them: 
 
“I was twelve when I came to Ankara, and I did not hear the word 
„Kurd‟ before the 1990s. Even if we heard it, we could not make sense 
of it. Before the PKK, I had no experience with anything related to the 
Kurds around me. We did not know the difference between Kurds and 
Turks. It was said that people from Erzurum were Kurdish or people 
from Haymana were Kurdish. But that is all ... There was a right-left 
conflict before the 1980s, and while I never approved of the coup, it 
did stop the deaths. Every day several young people died in the 
clashes. It was ridiculous. But at that time the troubles were spread 
across the whole country. The fighting between the Kurds and Turks 
was contained in a small area. My generation is aware of the danger 
of the social clashes, but I do not think that the Kurdish issue is a real 
clash like the left-right conflict.” (Adil, Turkish, male, 51) 
 
5.2.3. Conspiracy Theories: Allocating Responsibility to External 
Forces 
 
The meta-narrative of Turkish nationalism is also linked easily to conspiracy 




referring anxiety. Respondents, when seeking someone to blame, would often 
identify external enemies. Besides the potential internal threats, the paranoia of unity 
is also employed to produce conspiracy theories about „external enemies‟, who have 
retained their separatist intentions since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This 
narrative has always operated and has an irreplaceable role in both the state and 
public discourse since the Ottoman era. All of the conspiracy theories featured the 
participants‟ accounts referred to the Ottoman Empire. Blaming the United States 
and other imperialist countries for Turkey‟s internal problems was a common part of 
the political accounts of most of the participants. This conspiracy culture is a 
prominent element in popular culture in Turkey, where film, television series and 
everyday conservations commonly refer external forces playing a malevolent role in 
internal politics in Turkey. Unsurprisingly, under the impact of this trend, seeking an 
external party responsible for the Kurdish issue emerges alongside denial as an 
articulating strategy. This „paranoia‟ triggers the need to be ready for attacks, 
whether internal or external, that may threaten the unity of the country. It is a social 
reflex to conceptualise issues in different arenas, such as international affairs, 
security, relations with neighbouring countries. 
 
“The Ottoman Empire collapsed because of our external enemies; but 
the new strategy when attacking a country is not like it was in times 
past. Now those big countries provoke the minorities in the country to 
break up the Empire. There are hundreds of secret agents of the 
United States and Israel in Turkey even today. It is obvious that they 
want to provoke someone to damage the unity of this country.” 
(Mehmet, Male, Turkish, 32) 
 
Proving the role of external forces as the directors of the story creates a new narrative 
form that makes it easier to articulate the meta-narrative that “There is no Kurdish 
Question in Turkey. This is a problem of terrorism”.  
 
5.2.4. There is no Kurdish Question; This is Terrorism 
 
Although the policies and projects of the current government reflect an attempt to 




policies is no different to that of previous governments. It is still attested that the 
problem with the „Kurdish problem‟ does not relate to ordinary Kurds. This idea 
repeated by the then Prime Minister Erdogan framed the policies of the government 
towards the Kurdish Question.  
 
Such assertions are based on a denial of the popularisation and massification of the 
Kurdish movement in Kurdish society, leading to the cultural and political demands 
of the Kurdish Question becoming invisible. By underlining religious and historical 
commonalities between the two groups, the issue is both covered and denied. 
Defining the Kurdish Question as a terror problem functions to radicalise the ideas 
and practices with regards the ordinary Kurds. The recent political narrative has been 
created and recreated by journalists and political leaders, but ignores the everyday 
experiences of ordinary people. 
 
“There is no Kurdish question; there is a terrorism problem that is not 
related to Kurds. We (Turks) do not see people in terms of ethnicity. 
The important criterion is the ideology by which they define 
themselves and what they are like as people. If we did same as the 
Kurds, it would not be possible for Kurds to live in Ankara, Istanbul.” 
(Ozlem, Turkish, female, 20). 
 
According to the argument above, conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state 
should not be referred to as the Kurdish Question, as it is actually a terrorism issue. 
While this statement has gained support in the speeches of the administrative cadres 
of the government, it has also been widely stated in the speeches of the other 
nationalist political leaders.  By referring to this statement it becomes possible to 
reduce the Question to terrorism, and the people who support the movement into 
terrorists, and to regard the cultural and political demands as illegitimate.  In other 
words, this definition and understanding of the Question as terrorism in the minds of 
the public refers to the PKK and the sympathisers of the movement. Through this 
definition, the everyday aspect of the Question is completely ignored, thus reducing 
it to a security problem of the state.  
 
While in the accounts of the Turkish participants the Kurdish Question is completely 




existence of the conflict by referring to their own personal experiences. The lack of 
negative experiences in their daily encounters compels the Turkish participants to use 
a strategy of denial based on the one-dimensional perception that accepting the issue 
as a political question that does not reverberate in daily life at all. The daily aspect of 
the issue is regarded completely free from politics and political institutions such 
government, Parliament and the military. This categorical perception is based on the 
imagination of a private sphere free of politics and completely isolated from the 
effects of the public sphere. Asli, a young educated Turkish woman, defines herself 
as completely 'apolitical', but defines the Kurdish Question as an issue that is 
completely political, and that is organised and steered by politicians. She bypasses 
the role of politics in the issue by referring to her personal experiences, and sees the 
personal/private living space as one that is free from politics: 
 
“I have Kurdish friends, but I never observed any negative attitude 
from them. On the contrary, they were always more close to us. Look! 
In my childhood we employed Kurdish labourers to gather hazelnuts 
in our gardens. We were always so close with them. They always 
brought gifts to us. Both my mother and my father were always quite 
helpful and kind towards them. I even tried to learn a few words of 
Kurdish with my brother during the summer. I never thought that they 
were bad, separatist or racist. We had never experienced any attempt 
to manipulate us. I mean, as I said before, I never experienced bad 
things with them. I always saw their good sides.” (Asli, female, 
Turkish, 24) 
 
5.3. Counter-Narratives: Challenging Denial   
 
The discussion put forward by Molly Andrews on the power of the counter narrative 
contributes to the argument of this research: „while superficially the narratives 
presented here may seem to fit within this master narrative, a closer reading of them 
reveals a more complex picture‟ (Bamberg, Andrews, 2004: 9). It is possible to say 
that themes create its own counter-themes in course of the practice of talking politics. 
As Gamson states;  
“Themes are safe, conventional, and normative; one can invoke them 
as pieties on ceremonial occasions with the assumption of general 
social approval, albeit some private cynicism. Counter themes 




challenge some specific aspects of the mainstream culture; they are 
adversarial, contentious, oppositional” (Gamson, 1992: 135). 
 
As with the accounts of the Kurdish participants, there appeared some exceptional 
narratives also in those of the Turkish participants. It is not hard to recognise the 
emergence of a counter-narrative against the official accounts. The political 
transformations made by the recent government need to be explained to allow an 
understanding of the emergence of the counter forms of narratives that changed the 
public perception of the army and other Kemalist institutions by discrediting them. 
As mentioned in the contextual chapter, the main „other‟ for the current government 
is the „Kemalists‟ rather than the Kurds. While the „conservative-democratic‟ 
government has designated the Kemalists as its „anti‟ camp, the Kurds are seen as 
Muslim brothers with whom it may be possible to reach an agreement. The clash 
between the Kemalist and Islamist camps in Turkey has provided the opportunity for 
people to criticise the Kemalist ideology and its exclusionary attitudes. While it was 
not possible to criticise any idea related to Kemalism in the past, now arguments 
against Kemalist nationalism and its practices related to the Kurdish Question have 
emerged. As one female Turkish participant stated: 
 
“At the beginning of the relationship the Kurds had no feelings of 
inequality, but then after that they began to think that they were being 
discriminated against by Turks. I think they are right. Even the 
lecturers exclude them from university. People should not blame the 
Kurds. Before accusing them, they should look at themselves. If the 
professors exclude them, what can these people do? They can only go 
to another place where they will be accepted. There are some types in 
the university who follow these kinds of Kurdish children trick them 
into joining illegal Kurdish organisations, and their traps work very 
well. Frankly, I would tend to join these groups if I was discriminated 
against like these people are. I would not think about whether it is 
right or wrong. They are so young and inexperienced about life.” 
(Canan, Turkish, female, 21) 
 
While macro political transformations affect the perceptions of ordinary people, 
giving them an awareness of the discriminatory policies employed until today against 
the Kurds, the most important arena in which discrimination occurs is in the concrete 
personal encounters that people face in their daily lives. As Canan stated in her 




Question, through her own experiences she had gained another perspective for her 
evaluation of the issue. From the narratives of the participants it can be concluded 
that personal experiences are quite effective in reconstructing people‟s perceptions 
and transforming their political ideas and the ways of practising their own identities.  
 
Given the room for manoeuvre provided by the transformed policies of the Turkish 
state related to the Kurdish Question over the last decade it has also become possible 
to criticise the army in terms of its policies. People have started talking about their 
own experiences and sharing their real ideas about the war and the situation of the 
people who live in eastern Turkey. Omer, a Kurdish nationalist and a volunteer for 
the Kurdish party of Peace and Democracy, states: 
 
“Just think for a moment; two people from each family are killed. 
There are too many examples like this. This issue cut people to the 
quick. It is inconvenient for a person whose family you have killed to 
remain calm in front of you. Just imagine! They have very strong and 
close connections within their own community and they have a blood 
connection. If I experienced something like this, I mean, if my father, 
brother or son were killed, it would be the first thing I would feel. If 
you harm my family, why should do nothing? People living in the 
region feel that way I think. One of my friends told me a story. He did 
his military service in the eastern part of the country. He was saying 
„we went to the villages for an investigation at around 3–4 am while 
the sun was rising. We did not wait for the morning. I mean we 
swooped down. We did not wait for people to open their doors; we 
broke them down and entered the houses. We were throwing out the 
women in their underwear.‟ If anyone entered my house in this way, 
not only soldiers, whoever it was, I would blow their brains out. Just 
imagine, while you were sleeping with your wife and your children, 
your door was broken down and your wife and your daughter were 
thrown out in this way.” (Omer, Kurdish, male, 35) 
 
The personal experiences and stories heard from their friends provide legitimacy for 
their Kurdish nationalist standpoint. The concept of empathy has become a part of 
the daily political speech of ordinary people related to the Kurdish Question as an 
inference of the humanisation of the Question. The shared experiences of ordinary 
Kurds have resulted in feelings of empathy and expectations of empathy within 
Turkish society. Empathy provides people to transcend their personal experience and 




to empathise with the Kurdish people living in the eastern region of Turkey appeared 
as a narrative figure in the accounts. The policies of the state and the army were 
discussed in detail, and both Kurds and Turks started to evaluate the issue from a 
different perspective. The changing media discourse related to the Kurdish Question 
served as a resource for the respondents, which they employed to develop a counter-
narrative. As Gamson states, people use media discourse in various ways to support 
the frame of their accounts (1992: 120). References to specific „spotlighted‟ facts, 
such as “Kurds have been discriminated against throughout history”, and cases, such 
as “Diyarbakır Prison”, are examples of the use of the media discourse in the 
accounts. People tended to avoid checking the accuracy of these kinds of spotlighted 
facts. Adil, a 51 year old trader who defines himself as a Kemalist nationalist and 
leftist, highlighted the points that he thought should be brought to the table for 
discussion: 
 
“Our state is not as pure as the driving snow, you know. They tortured 
the people living there [in the eastern part of Turkey]. These people 
were tortured and exiled, forced to emigrate. They separated the boy 
from the dad, the girl from the mum. They made them unemployed. 
What could these people do? They went up into the mountains as a 
final remedy. You know about the brutality in Diyarbakir Jail in the 
period of the coup. A lot of people were hanged for nothing. They 
hanged 17–18 year old boys, and they did this to stop the bloodshed, 
allegedly. They just created hostility and anger; and the result was a 
new generation that has been brought up in this atmosphere. They 
have grown up as enemies of the Turkish state.” (Adil, Turkish, male, 
51)  
 
Members of majority groups tend to use a “get passive” approach, such as: “These 
people were tortured and exiled, forced to emigrate”. Wortham et al. state that “get-
passive is generally used to report adversative or problematic events, and 
construction focuses on the consequences for the patient or the grammatical subject 
of the construction” (Wortham et al., 2011: 65). In other words, by opting for the 
passive construction, respondents present the minority groups as victims with whom 
we, the audience, can build an emotional connection (2011: 66).  
 
Recent political shifts related to the Kurdish Question have permitted people on both 




last thirty years in the eastern part of Turkey. While such accounts were being made 
before the political change, doing so would be considered a crime against the Turkish 
army, based on ensuring the unity of the state. Such accounts, giving voice to critics 
of the army, can be also criticised in terms of their conformist nature in supporting 
state narratives, but still have the potential to criticise bellicist and military 
narratives. 
 
“Actually, the basic demand is obvious: neither a separate state nor a 
flag. Nobody besides a couple of people is demanding this, and this is 
the starting point of the PKK as well. These men just want their rights. 
Just as you [Turkish people] have your rights here, they want their 
own hospitals and schools. They just want to have their interests met, 
just like the other people living on the same land.” (Levent, Turkish, 
male, 36) 
 
5.4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter the continuity and ruptures between the official narrative on the denial 
of Kurds and the personal accounts of the participants are discussed. Denial, the 
founding narrative strategy, can be found at the centre of all accounts. The first part 
of the interviews was devoted to developing an account based on the narratives of 
denial, in particular raising challenges against it. The respondents preferred to make 
a general speech on the ethnic conflict based mostly on the conversational resources 
of media discourse and popular wisdom. After defining the borders of the issue 
through a general political discussion, they started to consider its micro aspects, and 
situated personal experience within this frame. Seeing ways of the “self” and the 
“other”, and expressing ways of personal experiences are constructed by the 
vocabulary that narrative of denial gives. All the meanings are created under the roof 
of denial.  
 
 While the existence of the denial as a narrative strategy in the personal accounts 
stands as a highly powerful theme, the existence of criticisms and counter narratives 
shows how the meta-narrative has become a challenging issue. It can be said that 
macro political transformations have changed the perceptions of the Kurdish 




discussion on the issue. Besides this paradigmatic change in macro politics, the 
increasing potential for personal encounters has affected the perception and acts of 
denial. Experiencing these encounters with each other in everyday life has created a 
new means of politicising the Question that is based on its human aspect. From this 
perspective, personal experiences have gained more importance in both people‟s 
perceptions of the Question and in each other. The dissemination of stories of 
personal experiences has created the possibility of empathy for the members of each 
group. In other words, in Turkish society in particular, some anticipation concretising 
in the statement “if I were he/she...” has become possible. In this way, the violent 
policies of the state and the bitter experiences of the Kurds have begun to be 
evaluated from a more human perspective. Despite the appearance of new 
possibilities to challenge the narrative of denial, the issue still holds a crucial place in 
the accounts of the participants. The strategy of denial functioned in two ways:  
 
(i) Denial of the Kurds and Kurdish language without any effort to challenge the 
meta-narrative, and  
(ii) Recognising the Kurds but denying the Kurdish Question through arguments 
aimed at legitimising the denial, such as: (a) Stating a lack of reason behind the 
conflict, (b) defining the Question as a fabricated one, (c) assigning some external 
agency as responsible for triggering the Question in (d) conspiracy theories.  
 
However, the existence of counter narratives opens up the possibility of framing the 
Question in a different way. As it stated above, the strategy of denial functions as a 
starting point in accounts concerning the Question, after which, the participants 
tended to legitimise their main arguments based on the narrative of denial, and in 
order to do this, they gave more detailed information about themselves and the 
„other‟. Defining the „self‟ and the „other‟ in this way appeared as a secondary 








6. Self and Other: Narratives of the Turks and Kurds about 
Each Other 
 
All stories comprise plot line, timeline, space and actors, but the most important 
feature of a story is how these various components interconnect. Stories usually 
begin by introducing the main actors before moving on to the main plot. If one 
narrates a personal experience as a story, it becomes crucial to position the „self‟ and 
introduce the actors that one is going to talk about. As Riessman says: 
 
“When we tell stories about our lives we perform our identities. 
Identities are constituted through such performative actions, within 
the context of the interview itself as a performance” (2003: 337,340).  
 
To understand the accounts and identities of the people we research, it is necessary to 
take into account not only their cultural and ethnic origins, but also the political 
context in which they reside and the social, cultural and political formation to which 
they belong. Interviews provide opportunities for participants to recreate, transform, 
negotiate, challenge and deny identities through their individual accounts. Interviews 
also should be seen as an on-going process of negotiation, aiming to produce a 
though immanently failing subject/identity position. As Cirakman states, the answer 
to the question: 
 
 “…‟who we are?‟ is designated by the story of foundation, origins 
and ethos for collectivity, whereas self-image is about how a society 
reflects on its identity in the presence of the others or in public” 
(2011: 1894). 
 
On a number of occasions in this research, the respondents made self-definitions and 
definitions of others. In making definitions and giving details about themselves and 
others in an effort to provide legitimacy to their narratives, the participants employed 
particular narrative strategies. For the participants who were not accustomed to 
engaging in political conversations, the most important motivation to continue 
talking was the desire to provide as much legitimacy to their accounts as possible. 




comparisons and listing observations. In this research, the telling of narratives was an 
important means through which self-definitions could be made and definitions could 
be made of others. The interview questions were not designed to prompt the 
participants to make either self-definitions or definitions of others, as this act 
emerged rather as a means of constructing individual narratives and was undertaken 
spontaneously by participants.  
 
This chapter outlines the forms of and motivations for making self-definitions and 
definitions of others, and is divided into two main sections. The first section 
describes how each of the two groups makes self-definitions, while the second 
section assesses how and why participants make definitions about others. Within this 
categorization the main questions to be addressed in this chapter are: 
 
i. What is the purpose of making definitions in an account? 
ii. How do individual narrators want to present their collective/personal 
characteristics?  
iii. Why do they regard it as important to define themselves in terms of nationalist 
identities?  
iv. What is the meaning of this nationalism?  
v. How do personal experiences affect perceptions?  
 
6.1. Self-Definitions: „We are Nationalist‟ versus „We are not 
Terrorists‟ 
 
6.1.1. How do Turks Define Themselves? 
 
Since the 1990s, Kurds have appeared as the main „other‟ to Turkish society. Recent 
definitions of Turkishness have been reasserted in response to clashes between the 
PKK and the Turkish army, although, of course, this is not the only factor affecting 
the new definitions and perceptions of either self or other. That said, the data 




on new ethnic-identity definitions than the Armenian case, European Union relations 
and other national/international affairs. In the many cases in which nationalism has 
been stirred up, such as in the event of political crises between the Turkish state and 
such actors as Armenia and the EU, it would appear that the most prominent means 
of identity positioning is as a „nationalist‟ subject. 
 
The expression „I am a nationalist person,‟ which is analogous to a declaration of 
patriotism, appears as an introductory theme in the narratives of the Turkish 
participants, and can be considered as the normal position of nationalism in the 
political field. It is crucial to note, however, that declaring oneself a „nationalist‟ 
does not carry the same meaning for all subjects, and this section will discuss the 
various meanings of nationalist self-identity.  
 
As a narrative strategy, referring to oneself as a nationalist appears to be a „taken-for-
granted‟ element of the accounts of the Turkish respondents. Of the 22 Turkish 
participants, only one did not refer to themselves as „a nationalist person‟. This 
struck me as unusual, and so I asked the participant directly whether or not he 
defined himself as nationalist. He said, in no uncertain terms: „No, I am not. I am not 
even close to the idea of being nationalist.‟ The other Turkish participants were quite 
keen to express that they were nationalists. Prior to the interviews, I had some idea 
about the extent to which Turkish people defined themselves in this way, but I did 
not realise just how widespread, banal and taken-for-granted this standpoint was. 
More than a mere label of political position, it is also a sign of loyalty and honesty as 
a citizen of the country, and can almost be considered a prerequisite for citizenship 
and a sense of belonging within society. People expressed the idea that every citizen 
should possess a natural nationalist sense, and that this should carry an emotional and 
moral meaning. As one participant said:  
 
“First of all we all should look at ourselves. If we are living on the 
land of this country, we need to love here. This is nationalism. Do you 
understand? Is there any other definition of it? I don‟t think so. I 
mean, you have to be always aware of potential threats. If you are not 
a nationalist, I can never trust you. Ok? I may not predict when you 




country and the people in it, you can easily sell everything.” (Ufuk, 
Turkish, male, 39) 
 
I also observed during the interviews that whereas nationalism is seen as a sacred and 
unquestionable issue, defining oneself as „nationalist, a patriot who is loyal to the 
country‟ seems to be an efficient form of self-representation. This is a widely and 
much-approved way of reflecting on oneself in a political situation, as the following 
interview except shows:  
 
“I define myself as a nationalist. It is not a bad thing, is it? Aren‟t we 
all nationalists? We love our country. We do not want to lose it, do 
we? Hmmm, I mean it is better than being a separatist. Our ancestors 
were heroes; we owe them for this country. We love our country, our 
state, our religion and honour. For me, this is what it means to be 
nationalist.” (Nihan, Turkish, female, 43) 
 
As a narrative strategy, defining oneself as a nationalist cannot be understood only as 
a motive driven by „security anxiety‟. It is a taken-for-granted form of representing 
oneself as a subject in terms of a social and political stance. This research will make 
no such discussion of the psychological roots of this phenomenon, but generally it 
can be said that it is a way of articulating to hegemonic thinking that creates an 
unquestionable position within the common sense. Even people who are not involved 
in politics at all may pretend to be politically active, which can be referred to as „the 
policy of the apolitical stance‟. Over the last two decades, the political identity of 
apolitical people has been unquestionably Kemalist, which refers to being loyal to 
the state and army, and respecting the basic components of the Republic and the 
Constitution, especially secularism. With the upsurge in the conflict between the 
PKK and the Turkish army, nationalism usurped Kemalism as the dominant political 
discourse, bringing with it such other political ideologies as Islamism and 
conservatism. This does not mean that nationalism ignores Kemalism as an ideology, 
but rather is articulated with it; and the new transformations in the political space 
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Nationalist self-definitions appear in a variety of contexts in Turkey, and are 
common in discussions of political and social issues in daily speech and in the media. 
For example, a person accused of smuggling, theft or even worse crimes may say: 
„Am I Armenian or Rum, Kurdish or a member of the PKK? I am a nationalist 
person. Why do you mistreat me?‟ Another person convicted of rape may say, „I am 
a nationalist person; nobody can accuse me of anything.‟36  
 
Another interesting form of self-expression concerns the use of the Turkish flag. 
Cirakman argues that „on ordinary days, flags hang out of the windows and shops 
and are displayed in the rear windows of cars much more often than before in 
Turkey‟ (2011: 1898). For example, during a shantytown demolition, a Turkish flag 
was hung from a balcony of the building that was going to be demolished in order to 
protect it. Even in tragic and urgent situations people sometimes use the „sacred‟ 
meaning of the flag. Hanging the flag from a balcony or displaying the flag in a car 
conveys the meaning „I am a nationalist person‟, while in some situations means „I 
am a nationalist person. If required, I will fight to protect our sacred values and the 
unity of the country.‟ These uses of the Turkish flag in everyday life by ordinary 
Turks are quite self-considered and explicit acts of nationalism.  
 
The act of identifying oneself as a nationalist was not limited to the interviews that I 
conducted. While working in the field I observed and personally experienced people 
challenging nationalist identifications and declaring their nationalist identities in 
various environments. One particular observation I made during the course of the 
fieldwork exemplified an aggressive way of defining oneself as a Turkish nationalist 
and imposing power over the „other‟. While in a hospital garden waiting for one of 
my friends I heard voices and saw people walking over to where the noise was 
coming from. I joined them and saw a group of young uniformed intern doctors. As 
the two of them were fighting, the others were trying to break them up. One was 
shouting: 
                                                 
36 The statement, „Am I Armenian or Rum, Kurdish or a member of the PKK?‟ was also a 
catchphrase from a popular TV series called „Behzat C.‟, which has quite a critical political context. 
This statement has been used in various situations after it was popularised in the series as a part of the 





“You are a terrorist; you do not have to live here. If you support them 
that much, go up to the mountain like your perfidious siblings. Stay 
away from us.” 
 
I understood the situation and started to take notes. I did not hear any response from 
the other intern, who was possibly Kurdish, but he had clearly been badly beaten. 
After the crowd broke up a few minutes later I approached a woman intern who may 
have seen what had happened and I asked for details. She told me that the Kurdish 
man was their colleague, and that he had very radical political views that they could 
not accept. She avoided giving details at first, but then subtly started to say more. 
Her exact words were: 
 
“He is a terrorist. He graduated from the universities of this country 
and became a doctor, just like us. I do not know what he wants. He 
behaves like a guerrilla. He always shares messages of support for the 
Kurds who attack us. You know that they always attack us and kill our 
soldiers. Can you believe that? I am witness to the fact that the other 
guy who beat him had warned him several times, but he did not care. 
Actually, he deserved it. My friends and I will never be close to him 
again. I am sure of that.” 
 
Needless to say, being a nationalist and defining one‟s self as a nationalist carries 
quite positive connotations in the presented accounts. In other words self-definition 
as a nationalist functions as a strategy of self-legitimisation in daily life. Although all 
of the narratives about being a nationalist are built upon a constructive, protective 
and defensive discourse formation, they can easily become pushy, aggressive and 
destructive, with sentiments about annihilating the enemy. As one participant said:  
 
“I do not have even a small problem with the Kurds around me. They 
are everywhere. We do not have any serious problem but we are not so 
close to each other. But if I feel any unrest in my street for example ... 
because of them of course, I will have a severe reaction to them. We 
have nationalist sensitivities, and these are sacred to us.” (Ali, 
Turkish, male, 24) 
 
Being a (Turkish) nationalist is not an undesirable stance either for Kurds or Turks. 
In Turkish accounts, people often declare „Sure, I am a nationalist person‟ when they 




Kurdish accounts it is a more an act of self-defence that is stated at the very 
beginning of the interview to ensure their loyalty will not be mistaken. This was not 
the case for all the Kurdish participants who took part in the research, in that those 
with a national and ethnic consciousness and a clearer political perspective defined 
themselves rather as Kurdish nationalists, and so this was not an issue for them.  
 
Although identifying oneself as a Turkish nationalist is often a natural reflex, 
declaring oneself as a Kurdish nationalist is justified as a result of an action and 
reaction process. In their accounts, the Kurdish participants emphasised that they had 
held no nationalist feelings prior to their mistreatment at the hands of the Turkish 
state. A common expression was, „We accept your nationalism, but if you impose it 
upon us, we will insist on our own nation and nationalism as well.‟ It has been stated 
that Kurdish nationalism is not a taken-for-granted concept for any Kurd, as both the 
Kurdish movement and Kurdish nationalism revived in response to the nationalist 
policies of the Turkish state towards the Kurds.  
 
Another factor of the Kurdish Question related to the importance of identity is the 
pronunciation of the PKK acronym. While the Turkish pronunciation, „PeKaKa‟, 
implies the illegal positioning of the group as a terrorist organisation, the 
pronunciation in Kurdish, „PeKeKe‟, means that the Kurdish movement is 
recognised in some respects. This general distinction was confirmed during my 
interviews. While the Turks and some Kurdish participants used the Turkish 
pronunciation of the abbreviation, other Kurdish respondents prefer to use the 
Kurdish pronunciation to mark their political stance. Everyone is aware of the 
distinction, but the Kurds are particularly and intentionally careful about using the 








6.1.2. How do Kurds Define Themselves?   
 
Kurdish accounts tend to refer to the common perceptions of the Kurds in the eyes of 
Turkish society. In other words, the Kurdish self-image is often constructed vis-à-vis 
the Turks. It was common in the accounts of Kurds to express the idea that, „We are 
not the kind of people you think we are,‟ which was based on the Kurdish 
participants‟ own experiences and stories, and was used in the forming of self-
expression and criticism of the general perceptions of Turks. This tendency can be 
observed in both the language they use and in the content of their accounts, and 
makes their narratives comparative and self-defensive. Although they begin by 
accepting the poor reputation of the Kurds, they move on to explain the 
circumstances surrounding – and reasons for – their behaviour. This can be seen as 
both a clarifying and a legitimising strategy, as the Narin‟s narrative shows:  
 
“Kurds are perceived as impolite people. Yes this is true on one level. 
Of course normality changes from culture to culture. In the simplest 
terms, they show themselves [wear skimpy clothing] when they are at 
the seaside, I can also see it; but they have a culture. When they are 
eating, Kurdish families sit separately, but this is a custom rather than 
being related to ethnicity. People find it strange, because they do not 
know anything about that region. I explain to them that I know some 
Turkish families practicing these customs as well. But they see 
everything from the perspective of race. They explain it as racial 
backwardness. It is exactly the same situation with the perception of 
African communities. We believe that they are under civilised but they 
do not. How can you define the civilisation? It depends.” (Narin, 
Kurdish, female, 31)  
 
There is another subject about which the Kurds regularly defend themselves in their 
narratives; proving their loyalty to the Republic of Turkey. While this argument 
cannot be generalised for all Kurdish participants, it was underlined by most of them, 
and Onur‟s account serves as an example. Onur is a 55 year old Kurdish man who 
has lived in Ankara for 40 years. He is a shopkeeper and has a great interest in 
politics. Even though he has some conflicting thoughts about the Kurdish Question, 
he emphasised his basic political stance by saying „my family and my ancestors have 




the state.‟ He repeated this sentence four times at different points in his account. 
After legitimating his political stance, he spoke about the discredited position that 
Kurds have had in society for many years:  
 
“Before the terrorism issues, we had a greatly respected position in 
society because of our manliness and our courage. We lost it after the 
1990s. At the time of our migration here, the relationship was 
completely different. When a person said “I am Kurdish,” he was 
welcomed with respect and sympathy. The people who knew that I was 
Kurdish behaved better towards me when I was in secondary school 
and high school. Kurds were liked at that time. After the terrorism 
thing appeared, the Kurds were damaged; they lost their prestige and 
credibility in society. Kurds were liked and they tried to be deserving 
of it. They were seen as manly, brave and friendly. That was in my 
university days. My Kurdish friends were always treated as proper 
people. There were not that many Kurds in the big cities and they were 
appreciated in the places where they went.” (Onur, Kurdish, male, 55)  
 
While the Kurds are aware of their negative image in the wider Turkish society, they 
sought to highlight the fact that positive characteristics were frequently attributed to 
them in social discourse before the eruption of terrorism. While Turks do at times 
refer to the hospitability, generosity, bravery and honesty of the Kurds at times, 
which can be conceptualized as „orientalisation of Kurdishness from a Western 
perspective‟, this is not embedded in the collective memory of the younger 
generation. It cannot be said that a positive image of the Kurds has been wiped 
entirely from public memory; however, the general perception of the Kurds is still a 
challenging issue. Turks‟ perceptions of Kurds will be discussed in detail in the next 
section, but it should be stated here that Kurds aim to draw attention to and 
accentuate these positive connotations through their accounts. Kurds are upset by 
how their image has transformed, and this makes them want to keep earlier positive 
images alive and to prove their accuracy with more recent experiences. The Kurdish 
respondents articulate their accounts into an oriental representation of Kurdishness, 
which was originally a component of the Turkish nationalist narrative. 
 
“Believe me; Kurdish people are more open to having a relationship 
with Turks. I do not say that because I am Kurdish, but I observe that 
Kurds are not prejudiced. Actually I do not like to use the word 




forward in brotherhood. However they have same reflexes in 
situations involving conflict. If a Turk says something, the Kurd says 
more. It is the natural disposition of the Kurds. The people of the 
„east‟ are kind of rude due to the environment in which they grew up.” 
(Onur, Kurdish, male, 55)  
 
“If I invite you to our house in the village, even if you are Turkish, I 
swear that in any case, they will treat you with great respect. They are 
that hospitable.” (Yavuz, Kurdish, male, 26).  
 
In their accounts, the Kurdish participants admitted to the existence of negative 
images of the Kurds, but they are motivated to challenge such images, to prove that 
they are friendly, forgiving and open to forming relationships with Turks. All of 
these stories communicate one essential message, „We are trying to show what we 
are really like so that they will accept us.‟ The Kurds narrate their stories of „building 
close relationships with Turks‟ as successes. Through these stories we see that Kurds 
believe that they must prove themselves to Turks in order to have relationships with 
them. That is, they feel the need to be self-sacrificing and forgiving, and then they 
wait to be accepted by Turks:  
 
“We are friendly, everyone should know it. I know children who were 
locked in their houses for playing with me in my childhood; but of 
course we went to school together and we got closer there. The 
families could not prevent it. Then they recognised that I am not as 
bad as they thought, and they allowed their children to play with me. 
After we grew up they explained to me themselves “because we knew 
that you are Kurd we did not let our children be friends with you. 
Because you were Kurdish and you were from Haymana. But you 
cannot be from there”. I heard these kinds of stories from my friends 
all the time. Firstly, they behaved as if we were cannibals, eating 
human flesh, and then when they see our humanity, everything 
changes. I do not believe that any region‟s people can be as hospitable 
as us.” (Omer, Kurdish, male, 35) 
 
“One day there was a funeral in the neighbourhood. We went to the 
funeral house with our friend from the party (Peace and Democracy 
Party/Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi). When our friends said that we 
were party members the entire atmosphere changed in a negative way. 
I called my wife and asked her to cook for the funeral house. Then they 
said to me that only you and your friends brought a meal on the 




friendship with those people. I mean everything [negative perceptions] 
was like that until they got to know us.” (Nazim, Kurdish, male, 36) 
 
“Aunty Gulsen was our next-door neighbour. She lived in flat number 
8, we lived in number 9. She had grandchildren who were the same 
age as my brother. They fought in front of the apartment and my 
brother hit one of the children and that child threw a stone at my 
brother‟s leg. But they were just 9 years old. We heard crying in the 
apartment and my mother went downstairs and I saw her shouting at 
my brother. Aunty Gulsen came down and started yelling: “Aren‟t you 
Kurdish? You are just making trouble everywhere you go.” I was 
surprised because we were so close. She was my mother‟s only friend 
in the neighbourhood. I could not believe that she thought that way. 
They did not talk to each other for around 2–3 months; then one night 
the doorbell rang. It was quite late. Her husband‟s blood pressure had 
gone up. She was so worried and in shock. My older brother is a 
doctor and he was at home at the time. He checked the husband and 
took him to the hospital. After this event we never talked about their 
dispute again. We never said a word about it. We just helped them 
when they needed it. I believe that they understood then that we were 
not bad people. The situation was about the life of a person. It was 
about humanity.”(Narin, Turkish, female, 31)  
 
From these accounts it is evident that the inequality in the interaction was ignored by 
the Kurdish narrators. It was taken for granted that having a trusting relationship with 
Turks involves inequality. The kind of interaction described involves having an 
encounter with a Turkish person, being subject to a negative action by that person 
and, in reaction, behaving with devotion to prove their real intention and their 
humanity. After the Turkish person changes their behaviour and attitudes in favour of 
the Kurds, the Kurdish person no longer cares about the inequality in the 
relationship. They accept that they need to try hard to be accepted and to be more 
visible in social relations.  
 
It must be stated that interactions between the two groups, both in the neighbourhood 
and in the workplace, are quite limited in everyday life. In other words, casual and 
random encounters do occur, but members of neither group put particular effort into 
building relationships with one another, and the reasons for this lack of interaction 
are listed as cultural differences, contrasting life perspectives, and so forth. The only 




strict network that is closed to non-Kurds and those outside of the extended family, 
and this form of socialisation may be defined as „compulsory introversion‟. 
 
This explanation was also common in the Turkish accounts, but in the Kurdish 
accounts it appeared as a distinct theme in defining the Kurds. Being part of a large 
network consisting of immediate family members, relatives and other tribal 
connections appears as a natural way of life for Kurds; and they define themselves 
within these relations. Specifically, they present these networks as a homogenous 
body whose identity is no different from their own personal identity. They are proud 
of the strength of these relations, and complain if they are transformed under the 
dynamics of modern life. The theme of taking care of each other and providing 
comfortable and safe conditions for the members of their networks features strongly 
in their accounts:  
 
“People say that Kurds are very keen on their families and relatives, 
and in fact all the Kurds, even people they do not know. Yes, they are 
right. If it wasn‟t for our strong family and tribal ties, everything 
would be worse today. We came from a war. It was a traumatic 
experience for us. We needed to have people in Ankara when we 
arrived here, and they helped us. If they hadn‟t, we could have been on 
the streets. Fortunately we have primary connections here. In this way 
we survived in that period.” (Yakup, Kurdish, male, 30) 
 
“Yes we look after each other wherever we are, because we aware 
that if we become weak in a place, in a workplace or a 
neighbourhood, we can be discriminated against. We stand close to 
each other because we need to defend ourselves. For example, in 
market places we are strong and all the Turks are annoyed about that, 
but we have to, because we remember our bitter experiences in the 
Kecioren market places where some organised groups attacked us. 
They wanted to kick us out of there and we resisted. Now we have to 
stay closer to each other to look after ourselves.” (Nazim, Kurdish, 
male, 36) 
 
In the course of the interviews I asked the question „Do you like to have interactions 
with your Turkish neighbours, and do you have Turkish friends from workplaces and 
school?‟ The answers were similar for all Kurdish participants, to the effect: „We 
generally meet with our relatives. It is so rare to meet with our neighbours. We have 




habit of socialising in one specific network is led not only by the motivation to be 
more powerful, as although the Kurds stay close together in response to insecure 
situations, they also do so because this is part of their custom and the traditional way 
of life.  
 
As in the public discourse, Kurds define themselves as a group with the highest sense 
of honour. In their accounts, several participants aimed to show how proud they were 
of their close relationships, how they perceived honour and how they behaved to 
protect it. Filiz‟s story is a striking example of this, as a Kurdish woman who was 
born and grew up in Haymana:  
 
“I want to tell you about a situation that arose in our village. It started 
in our village and then jumped to the other villages as well. The drug 
business is so common in Yenidogan. Drug dealing was happening 
everywhere, in the streets, around the houses. Someone started to sell 
drugs in front of the house of the families from our village. They were 
told several times that women and children were living there and that 
they should go to another place to sell their things. The dealers did not 
care about it, and just kept selling. They broke into a house when the 
woman was alone and threatened her, so the woman called her 
husband. Our men are so protective of their wives and children. They 
are crazy about their honour. It was a case of “how can you enter my 
house when I am not in the house?” Everyone heard about it in a short 
time. The guy from our village came together with the guys from other 
villages and they raided the home of that dealer guy. The required 
warning was made by 200 people. They never sold anything there after 
that. I mean honour is the most important thing for them. They cannot 
stand it. No man can enter any house if there is not a man in the home. 
Some 150 men shouted slogans in the street carrying sticks as a 
warning to the drug dealers.” (Filiz, female, 27)  
 
As stated by Filiz, individual conflicts do not stay at a personal level. Being a 
member of a minority group eases the transformation of the personal cases into a 
communal level.  
 
This research set out to focus on ordinary people, with little regard attributed to 
politics, however it was nearly impossible to find such a respondent among the 
Kurds. It could thus be understood that Kurds of all financial and educational 




year-old high school students and housewives who only a primary education had a 
distinct political language, as well as their own observations and arguments. They 
were quite confident about their political identities and arguments, and frequently 
pointed out that they were different from the majority of society due to their 
knowledge of, and interest in, social problems:  
 
“People are ignorant. Look! You are in the university. Compare it to 
your environment. The Kurdish youth are informed about everything. 
They know very well what is what. In contrast, 90 per cent of Turkish 
youth are unaware of political issues. Go and sit in a 
coffeehouse/teahouse in Diyarbakir and you will see many people 
whose appearance is awful, whose clothes are too old, but when you 
talk to them your jaw will drop. You cannot imagine such great 
political analyses as they give. They are far superior to the TV pundits 
who are paid a lot.” (Ahmet, Kurdish, male, 35)  
 
“People just repeat second-hand ideas about the Kurdish Question. 
The arguments they defend are not actually theirs. I am proud of 
myself and my family for not being like them. At least I am able to 
think and compare the arguments that I hear. I don‟t just repeat the 
general approved ideas about the issue. I research by reading 
different perspectives. While I compare myself with them, I put myself 
at a higher point.” (Guliz, Kurdish, female, 17) 
 
Kurds do not compare themselves only with Turks, as they also make comparisons 
with other Kurds from different cities of Turkey and different sects. While at times 
these comparisons appear to be a sign of regionalism, at other times they refer to the 
common distinction of bad-good Kurds, and often define themselves as legal and 
loyal Kurds. Making distinctions within the Kurdish group does not always seem to 
be a political reflex to legitimise one‟s own identity. The Kurds living in the Turkish 
territories are extremely heterogeneous in terms of their religious sects and spoken 
languages. Differences in dialect, religious sect, tribe and clan exist and define 
people as Kurdish. For example, Alevi Kurds
37
 make a strict distinction between 
themselves and other Saffi and Sunni Kurds by highlighting their more „modern‟ 
way of life based on their interpretation of religion. Another aspect of these 
differentiations relates to the good-bad Kurd categorisation that is common in 
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Turkish society. As Kurds are designated as either terrorist Kurds or normal (loyal) 
Kurds, they refer to this categorisation and define themselves by trying to prove their 
assimilated Kurdishness.  
 
“All we know about our ancestors is that they came from Horasan to 
Sivas, but when you look at the customs of the Kurds living in the 
south-east, they are completely different from ours. Even our language 
is closer to Turkish, for example tomato is tomato in our language as 
well. There are several different Kurdish communities, such as Zazas 
and Kirmancis. When I compare my family with the south-eastern 
Kurds I cannot make a connection. I know some people from that 
region, but we have nothing in common. How can I put it? Their 
family life is stricter. Although we have also maintained our customs, 
they are not like their customs. Their rules restrict way of life and have 
a great power over people, especially women. We are more relaxed in 
these issues.” (Selen, female, 31) 
 
Creating an image of the „loyal citizen‟ appeared to be a powerful motivation for 
self-definition in the interviews. While Kurds define themselves by referring to the 
other „bad‟ Kurds and sharpening their own positive characteristics as a self-defence 
strategy, in the Turkish accounts, self-definitions appear to act as a self-explanatory 
way of proving their patriotism.  
 
6.2. Definitions of others: „The Good-Bad Kurd distinction‟ 
versus „We are not the bad people you think we are‟ 
 
“Turkey is interesting; it is colourful, but the colours are not beautiful. 
 Everything is like mud.” (Guliz, female, Kurdish, 17) 
 
Thus far I have focused on the narrative strategy in making self-definitions. The 
counter approach is making definitions of others as another way of defining the self, 
and vice versa. The question of “how people set about this task of [ethnic] identity 
construction and maintenance” (Kiely et al. 2001: 33) emerges as a prominent one 
through the personal narratives. As Kiely et al. assert in order to understand the ways 
of identification of individuals are required to examine the interactions in different 
layers. They prefer to examine three related processes: “people‟s own claims to 




claims of others or react to identity attributed to another by a third party” (Kiely et al. 
2001: 36). In this research all the processes that they stated are took into account 
when the data was analysed. The first thing can be said about the identification forms 
in the case of Turkey, both Kurd and Turk participants dealing with an ethnic form of 
nationalism rather than civic. 
 
Locating identities should not be seen as a simple sub-theme of the accounts. Rather, 
all positioning of identities by the participants should be seen as a determining factor 
of the narratives. Through these definitions, the respondents construct the general 
ideological structure of their accounts, presenting their ideological preferences and 
building their stories as part of their definitions of identity. In this regard it is 
important to understand the motives of the participants in making definitions of 
others, how they define others and what kind of references they make in their stories. 
These are the questions that this section aims to address.  
 
6.2.1. How do Turks define others? 
 
Stereotyping, generalising and presenting the entire Kurdish community as a 
homogeneous entity, thus erasing difference and refuting alternative claims of 
identity, was the most prominent narrative strategy in the Turkish accounts. As a way 
of understanding the world, the way of thinking and the method of narration, this 
strategy is commonplace in daily political conversations, and are based on collective 
thought. The collective language is influenced strongly by the hate speech expressed 
in the speeches of political leaders and in media coverage, and as a result, 
accusations for the most prominent elements of these accounts. While narrating is 
accepted as a means of understanding the situation, the making of definitions 
presents a challenge by which the narrators link their stories to structured definitions. 
In other words, most of the narratives have multiple discursive levels, such as: 
 
i. Seeing all Kurds as terrorists,  




iii. Legitimising the categorisation by presenting personal experiences that attest 
to the good relations  the narrator has with some „good Kurds‟. 
 
 As will be shown in the following section, the accounts do not present one cohesive 
argument from beginning to the end. A narrative is a process in which the narrator 
starts with a basic argument and then is compelled to legitimise it by recounting 
illustrative stories. For this reason, the accounts are discussed following a discursive 
process rather than highlighting the striking themes within them.  
 
The first discursive level of the accounts involves accusing all Kurds of being bad 
people who have hidden ill intentions towards the state, and further labelling them as 
terrorists or at least sympathisers of the PKK. In Turkish accounts, this emerged as a 
kind of reflex that was accompanied by outbursts of anger, mirroring the self-defence 
reflexes of Kurdish participants. While this „confession‟ is often made at the beginning 
of the account, in some cases it appears towards the end; however the point at which 
the reflex appears has consequences on the way in which the remainder of the account 
is produced, in terms of both content and language. While some accounts start by 
labelling all Kurds as terrorists, and later try to cover this „unfair‟ argument, other 
accounts end with the confession, explaining that although there are some good Kurds, 
even they cannot be proper people, as can be seen in Neriman‟s account: 
 
“I can say that all Kurds sympathise with the PKK. It is a kind of a 
proof that they protect each other all the time. They just engage in 
regionalism. Sometimes I wonder whether it is us that are the 
minority, rather than them. I am anxious about the environment in 
which our children will grow up. Things are not going well. I think in 
that way because I have experienced things that reinforce my feelings, 
especially during the medical treatment of my mum in hospital. The 
story of a Kurdish boy I met in the hospital at that time says so many 
things about my concerns. After arriving in Ankara he bought a house, 
he found a job and he was treated very well thanks to his Kurdish 
network in a very, very short period of time. Can you imagine that? 
There is a significant inequality in between us in terms of 
opportunities that are open to us. They communicate by the means of 
their “detectors”. There were times when I was paranoid about 
whether a Kurdish doctor gave my turn to a Kurdish person, or 




always hear these kinds of negative cases around me.” (Neriman, 
Turkish, female, 54) 
 
In some Turkish accounts the good-bad classification of Kurds was also challenged. 
As could be seen in Berk‟s account, the Kurdish movement is led by Kurdish 
nationalist sensitivities. The nationalist nature of the Kurdish movement results in it 
being referred to as a fair struggle, however it is in direct contrast with Turkish 
nationalism. Presenting the Kurdish movement in this way depicts all nationalist 
ideologies, practices and policies are seen entirely legitimate, and bestows 
nationalism with a universally sacred position. Unsurprisingly, this thinking justifies 
all means of reaching nationalist goals. Seeing the struggle of the Kurds as legitimate 
and permissible also makes the policies, attacks and counter-attacks of the Turkish 
state legitimate, and for this reason it is not possible to interpret Berk‟s account of 
sacrifice as a counter-narrative, trying to empathise with activist Kurds, but rather as 
a contribution to the approach of the Turkish army and state. Departing from this 
perspective, Berk considers the Kurds are to be mistrusted as a result of their sacred 
aims to try to succeed. He states that:  
 
“I have a hypothesis about this issue. Let‟s switch positions. Imagine 
that we are Kurdish and we are living in Kurdistan as a minority in 
their country. Just imagine the opposite situation. Imagine we grew up 
with the explanations that our nation has been suppressed and 
tortured. There is nothing like that in reality. Imagine that these ideas 
are passed down from your father to you, and he says “Come on son, 
we will establish our own country, a Turkistan in Kurdistan”. Even if I 
had money and I was happy on this land, why would I not want to 
make it real? I would. That is why there is no such thing as a good 
Kurd for me. Just put yourself in their place. What if this dream was 
told to you for years…? It was made for years. These people have 
heard this story for years and I think it is a great dream for them. It 
would be great for the worst Kurd as well.” (Berk, Turkish, male, 24)  
 
The account of Pelin, 23 year old, well-educated Turkish woman, is an interesting 
example of how the accusations aimed at Kurds are taken for granted. The common 
discursive elements are more salient in the accounts that contain no stories or 
personal experiences. In other words, regardless of whether or not the participant can 




of the official discourse. In the course of the interview with Pelin, she said repeatedly 
that she had never been interested in politics and that she could give no answers to 
the interview questions. Although I tried to encourage her to talk about her personal 
experiences, the interview was practically finished at her first answer: „I have never 
met a Kurdish person‟. This answer became more understandable when she 
described her family background and her life. When I stopped asking questions she 
started to speak about her father and his nationalist, idealist political background. She 
admitted to having no idea about either nationalism or the Kurdish question; 
however, she did say a couple of sentences at the end of the interview about her 
father‟s ideas:  
 
“I don‟t know them [the Kurds] very well but I think that they are 
trying to separate the country. I have no idea about the [Kurdish] 
question, but I think that it is not good. They want to divide the country 
and they kill the soldiers. It would not be easy to kill a human. They 
are just aiming to divide the country. That is why I agree with my dad. 
I think he is right. If they do not have good feelings for us, we should 
defend ourselves.” (Pelin, Turkish, female, 23) 
 
Narratives that repeat the accusation and label Kurds as terrorists are not just fed by 
the general political discourse. Personal experiences are shaped and framed also by 
general perceptions of identities, and the inferences based on personal experiences 
are taken as generalisable truths about identities. As Tilly argues,  
 
“…in everyday life we deploy practical knowledge. We draw practical 
knowledge from individual experience and from the social settings in 
which we live.” (2006: 21).  
 
 Inferences from personal experience are situated at the top of the hierarchy of 
credibility of truths, as is exemplified by Nermin‟s account. Nermin is a 53 year-old 
retired civil servant who has lived in Ankara her whole life. While she gave a 
conflicting account about the Kurdish question, she referred to her personal 
experiences to validate her definitions of Kurds:  
 
“My friends were quite biased towards Kurds. I was not. I wanted to 
learn whether it was my friends or me that were right. One day in a 




marketplaces in Ankara – I wanted to talk to one of the Kurdish 
salesman. I began by asking him “How are things going?” He started 
to complain about everything – sales, customers, money … I asked him 
“Why do you insist on staying here if you are not happy?” He said to 
me “We do not want to leave these places empty. He means that you 
want to stay here to kick up something‟. My nationalist emotions were 
suddenly aroused due to his response. That is why I am angry with 
them. I do not think that they are honest in their feelings. I will say 
something to their faces as well, and maybe that is why they find me 
more intimate and sincere. I do not have any secret intentions or 
feelings about them. I tell the shopkeeper story to my Kurdish friends 
as well. If you do not like this city, go back to where you came from 
and the Turkish people who are living there can come here. Just like it 
was with Greece before. If you work there, it is a nice place to live as 
well. Instead of being the slaves of your masters, go and work there 
properly. Your Kurdish businessmen can build factories there to 
provide working facilities. We may even support you in doing this. But 
they do not want to do this; they always keep some hidden and bad 
ideas in their heads. At my age I do not find them honest. I am 53. I 
have experienced so many things during my lifetime and now I am 
convinced that they are not frank and honest. None of them.” (Nermin, 
Turkish, female, 53)  
 
During the interviews the theme of „being a slave to the masters‟ is referred to in 
many ways by Kurds, and implies that Kurds are passive and subject to the rules of 
their masters by way of their tribal affiliations. Even today, in Kurdish culture tribal 
relations have a determining impact on the way of life of the individual. The general 
rules that are announced by the masters are almost obligatory for all members of the 
tribe in terms of politics and way of life. The master may change, but the rules 
remain the same for centuries, and absolute loyalty is expected from all members of 
the tribe. This is a well-known and often referred-to aspect of the Kurdish culture. It 
has been particularly represented in TV series over the past decade, and creates a 
passive image of Kurd in the eyes of the public. In media representations, the passive 
position of the average and poor Kurds is explained by a lack of education. Kurds are 
referred to as a drove of sheep, moving together without thinking and obeying rules 
without criticising. They are perceived by Turks to be not progressing, not becoming 
civilised and not being educated as a result of their subordinate position in social 
relations. In popular discourse it is often repeated that Kurds who are in the position 
of „the slave‟ are guilty of not trying hard enough to break the rules and to make 




passive and a collective weakness that is depicted as the racial weakness of a nation. 
From this perspective, it becomes easy to assert that Kurds do not have the capacity 
for self-determination, and that they will always need masters to control them. In 
popular nationalist discourse, even the Kurdish movement for national self-
determination is deemed incapable of autonomous governance due to the lack of 
experience of having a Kurdish state historically. It is claimed that as the Kurds have 
always lived under the rule of other administrations, they have neither the ability nor 
the power required to achieve this aim. It is necessary to state at this point that there 
is a growing interest in conspiracy theories that reveal how Turkish pride can be 
destroyed by the enemies from within and outside. That being said, mostly the PKK, 
but also Kurds in general feature in these conspiracy theories. In other words, Kurds 
are represented as internal traitors who collaborate with the external enemy. There is 
a common belief that they still serve Turkey‟s external enemies, such as the United 
States, Israel, Iraq, Syria and countries in Europe. According to this theory, the 
masters have changed, but the same scenario is again unfolding in which the Kurds 
are represented as cheated and passively used actors within it. One of the examples 
frequently given during the interviews was the high level of fertility among the 
Kurds and the hidden intention to take control when their numbers are high enough:  
 
“They just believe in the United States and Israel. Why? They 
comprise 20 percent of the population now, but they are going to have 
70 percent of Turkey in 50 years … While a normal Turkish family has 
three children, they have 17children: five times more than us. In the 
end they will proliferate and they will take control. While they 
procreate, the number of Turks will decrease. It will be in favour of 
the external enemies like the United States and Israel who already 
control Syria and Iraq. They take courage from somewhere. They are 
brave enough to throw stones at the police. A Parliament member did 
this, can you believe that? Another of them, also a Parliament 
member, slapped a policeman. Some 10-12 years ago they were not as 
comfortable as they are now. Although speaking Kurdish was banned 
at that time, they still spoke Kurdish in secret. It was made clear that 
the language of the citizens was Turkish, and people were not allowed 
to speak another one. Now everything has completely changed. They 
even have a Kurdish channel in the state television service.” (Mehmet, 





Another issue raised by Turks in their accounts was the „ignorant and uncivilised 
„nature‟ of Kurds‟. Surprisingly, the most frequently referred to subject in this respect 
was women/gender. In referring to the perception of Kurds as passive, ignorant and 
rude people, the position of women in Kurdish society was often touched upon. The 
Turkish participants stated that Kurdish women were the most disadvantaged group in 
society due to the strict Kurdish traditions and the patriarchal structure of Kurdish 
society, and such perceptions are based on the high proportion of cases of domestic 
violence against Kurdish women and the way in which these cases are represented by 
the media. The Turkish participants also considered Kurdish characters in TV series 
and movies to be representative of Kurds, and media representations of Kurds as 
violent, criminal, unable to speak Turkish properly; rude and oppressive towards 
women reinforce these stereotypical ideas. The moral laws, honour killings and the 
disadvantaged position of women in Kurdish society are the most commonly 
criticised aspects of Kurds, with the treatment of women mentioned by all of Turkish 
participants, without exception. While this sensitivity seems to be a positive 
acknowledgment of a critical social issue, it creates a kind of illusion about a social 
fact. While violence against women is constructed as a Kurdish, it is not a problem 
only within the Kurdish community, as the oppression of women is a common and 
rising problem accross Turkish society. Kurds are depicted as the only group who are 
guilty of oppressing women, and the violence against women that occurs on the 
Turkish side is ignored. Explanations based on the notion of race do not adequately 
capture the complexity of the issue.  
 
6.2.1.1. The Distinction of „Good‟ and „Bad‟ Kurds  
 
“There are good Kurds and bad Kurds. 
 Isn‟t it the same for Turks?” (Gulsum, Kurdish, female, 49) 
 
In the Turkish accounts, Kurds are repeatedly subjected to the distinction „Good 
Kurds‟ and „Bad Kurds‟, which is based on the idea that „not all Kurds are terrorists, 
and all nations have good and bad people‟. This expression is one of the most 
common in daily political discussions related to the Kurdish Question. In their 
narratives, most participants insisted that there were two categories of Kurds: one 




intentions regarding Turks and the state, while the other includes terrorists or people 
who are close to being terrorists due to their political identities. Most definitions of 
Kurds are made referring to this classification.  
 
The Turkish participants stated that at the level of ordinary life, they had no problems 
with the Kurds in their cities, streets or workplaces, but they may have problems if 
they encountered „bad‟ Kurds. Such encounters with this „small provocateur‟ group 
are unlikely, as sympathisers tend to live as introverted groups in big cities or in the 
mountains as guerrillas:  
 
“What kind of problem may we have? Of course we do not have any 
problem with Kurds. As long as they do not touch us, we do not touch 
them. After all, we have a common history. We fought together in the 
War of Independence. Yes we have some problems right now, but it 
does not mean that all Kurds are terrorists. There are only some bad 
people among them, it is usual, all societies have these kinds of 
people. I personally have no bad experiences with them” (Adil, 
Turkish, male, 51) 
 
Throughout the interviews, the Turks concretised the ambivalent category of bad 
Kurds embedded in their minds, in which the „bad‟ Kurds are a hypothetical group, 
living somewhere and working to achieve their bad aims. For the majority of 
participants it was obvious which Kurdish groups should be categorised as „bad‟, 
„harmful‟ and „dangerous‟; however, the perceived markers of this category varied 
between participants. Although most participants accused Kurds living together in 
the same neighbourhood of being terrorists, some also depicted the bad Kurds as 
living in faraway places, which makes interaction with them improbable. The 
common idea was that the category „bad Kurds‟ is not limited to guerrillas living in 
the mountains, but includes also Kurds with hidden dangerous intentions that could 
be found everywhere: in big cities, in the east or even in their own neighbourhoods.  
 
The categorisation of the Kurds was made clearer in two particularly interesting 
interviews. Although Berk and Gulsum gave completely different accounts in terms 




interview: levelling the Kurds in terms of political identity and ideology that they 
have and where they live. 
 
Berk is a 24 year-old Turkish man who lives in Ankara, and who graduated from a 
private university, after which he spent eight months in London, attending an English 
language course. According to Berk, this period of his life modified his political 
stance. In his words: 
 
“While I did not like Kurds before, after I went to London, the things I 
saw there completely reinforced my ideas. I went there as an ordinary 
nationalist, and when I came back I was a racist. Do you know what 
the Kurds do in London, all over the United Kingdom? They say „we 
are Turkish‟ and using the name of Turks and tarnishing it. Only 
because of this, all British people hate Turks now. And they are right. 
All of the Kurds living there, I mean all of them, are terrorists. I do not 
hesitate in saying that. I can say this everywhere. I saw it. I observed 
everything there for myself, they distribute flyers, calendars, etc., with 
Apo‟s
38
 photo on them. They use the Kurdish flag everywhere; they 
hang PKK flags in their shops and flats. I am sure that this is a big 
game that is directed by big countries like the United States and some 
European countries, and we do not have even a small role in this 
game. The Kurds are so confident there. Not like in Turkey. In Turkey 
they do not have the comfort to express their poisonous ideas in this 
way. I observed everything there and nobody can change my mind 
anymore. I know that all the Kurds living abroad, at least in the 
United Kingdom, are terrorists.” (Berk, Turkish, male, 24) 
 
Personal experiences have great power in the construction of personal inferences and 
their articulating into broader discourse. Berk‟s personal ideas, based on his 
experiences in London, apply not only to Kurds living in the United Kingdom, as 
they have altered also his perception of Kurds living in Turkey. He had Kurdish 
friends in Turkey and refers to them when describing the differences between Kurds 
in the United Kingdom and those in Turkey: 
 
“I have Kurdish friends here in Turkey and we are so close to each 
other, but they have lived in Ankara for years. Even their families did 
not live in the eastern part of the country. They are Turk anymore. I 
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would not say that they are Kurdish, but after London, I am quite 
suspicious of all Kurds. All of those living in the eastern part of the 
country are potential terrorists, in my opinion. The thing I am not able 
to digest is their complaints about unemployment. They are weak. The 
richest men in Turkey are Kurdish. The coasts of the Mediterranean 
and the Aegean are in their hands, and still they say “we are hungry”. 
This is terrorism.” (Berk, male, Turkish, 24)  
 
 
It is possible to say that Berk‟s political perspective was sharpened in a negative way 
because of a particular experience, although this is not necessarily the only way of 
forming personal ideas about a subject. Political positioning is mostly produced and 
reproduced through the media, although this does not mean that audiences are 
passive recipients of messages conveyed by the media (Hall, 1973). That said, a lack 
of personal encounters on which to base a perception can make people more 
vulnerable to the meta-narratives of the media, as was the case in Gulsum‟s 
interview.  
 
 Gulsum was born in a Kurdish-dominated city, but she had no memory of an 
encounter with a Kurdish person worthy of recounting in the interview. When I 
asked the Turkish participants to tell more about their personal experiences of Kurds, 
they tended to understand this in a negative way and thus relayed bad experiences. 
Gulsum, a 49 year-old Turkish housewife who has lived in Ankara for 30 years 
declined to share any personal memories about the Kurds, although she did mention 
some general good memories, but only briefly: „We lived together with them for 
years in our village. We were neighbours and then became relatives. I did not feel 
any disturbance and vice versa‟. However, when the subject turned to the political 
base of the Kurdish issue, she made a firm distinction between Kurds. While she had 
a concrete memory of the good Kurds, she made abstractions of the other category. 
Her first categorisation was based on the distinction between Kurds living in south-
eastern Turkey and Kurds living in the cities in the west of Turkey. In her good 
memories of her hometown, she positions the resident Kurds in the category of good, 
which reveals another distinction, as the one that exists between „local-immigrant 





“I came to Ankara after I got married. I was 20 years old. There were 
Kurds in our village as well, we had Kurdish neighbours. Of course 
sometimes we had disputes, but the Kurds of that time and the new 
Kurds of today are not the same. At that time, my family was together 
with locally resident Kurds, and my aunt married a Kurd. Her 
children as well ... we have relatives who are locally resident Kurds. I 
mean the Kurds who have already lived there for ages. When my 
grandparents arrived, they were already there. They were living 
together for years. We still have relations. They gave their daughters 
to us and vice versa. They also spoke in Kurdish and are so religious. 
They strictly observe their traditions and customs. The Kurds of the 
present time are completely different from them. I do not believe that it 
is a Kurdish-Turkish issue. It is terrorism; it is an issue of 
participation.” (Gulsum, female, Turkish, 49)  
 
Besides sharing her good memories about the Kurds living in her village, Gulsum 
reinforces her idea with stories told by her relatives. However, the series of 
ambivalent distinctions did not finish here. While she was talking, she remembered, 
eliminated and made links between her memories and her general ideas at the same 
time. In other words, while producing a narrative, she also produced and reproduced 
her account. That is why she changes her mind, contradicts her previously expressed 
ideas, and creates new types of classifications: 
 
“Some police officers serving in the south eastern part of the country 
who are our relatives say that despite the presence of separatist 
Kurds, the majority of the people do not affiliate with the PKK. They 
have quite intimate neighbourhood relations with the Kurds living 
there. The resident Kurds are always respectful and hospitable to the 
doctors, teachers, soldiers and police working there. The real problem 
is related to the immigrant Kurds who are living in the western part. 
They probably could not find anything that would harm and separate 
the country in their villages and just migrated to the big cities. They 
purposefully settled among the Turks in big cities.” (Gulsum, Turkish, 
female, 49)  
 
The accounts highlight the fact that identities are multi-layered, as the participants 
touched upon other components of identity. As a religious woman, Gulsum‟s 
„religiosity‟, which is embedded in her personal discourse, played an important role in 
her narrative. She was sure about the religiosity of the locally resident Kurds who are 
from a Saffi sect; however, she is aware of the existence of the Alevi Kurds living in 




who are not even seen as Muslim in many respects. Her classification is based on the 
religion that she refers to as „another other‟ of the (Sunni) Muslim Turkish identity.  
 
“The Kurds in the PKK are not Kurdish I think. They are neither 
Kurdish nor Muslim. They are of Armenian origin and came after, I 
mean, in the course of the war of Independence. You know, Armenians 
came to this side in the course of the war and pretended to be Kurds 
and then they settled here. I mean they are Kurds of Armenian origin. 
That is my idea. I think that everything is about religious 
belief.”(Gulsum, Turkish, female, 49)  
 
The argument about the Kurds being Armenian is not an invention of Gulsum. „Seed 
of Armenian‟ is a popular discursive element that has been repeated in the media 
since the 1990s for Abdullah Ocalan, along with „baby killer‟ and „the head terrorist‟. 
This emerges in Gulsum‟s account as part of a larger conspiracy theory – that 
Armenians pretending to be Turks infiltrated Turkey and are trying to divide the 
country. 
 
Another level of definition of the Kurds is related to their assimilated identities as a 
way of entering Turkish society. It has been always possible for Kurds to gain a 
higher place in society, to have a career and to achieve an average standard of living, 
free from discrimination by pretending to be Turkish. A key principle of Turkish 
modernisation policy was to ignore ethnic differences and live under one common 
identity, that of Turkishness. In other words, ignoring ethnicity to achieve greater 
equality and living standards was part of the history of the Turkish state. However, 
with the rise in nationalism after the late 1980s, the politicisation of the Kurdish 
nation led to changes in this state policy. At this point, awareness of the existence of 
different identities grew, but it was nevertheless still expected during the early 
Republic that Kurds would abandon their ethnic identity (which was and is also a 
political identity) and become Turks, particularly after the 1980s. Today, Kurds who 
claim a political/ethnic identity as Kurdish are marked as dangerous and unwanted, 
while those who do not underline their ethnicity and do not express any Kurdish 





“I have Kurdish friends, but they have been living in Ankara for a long 
time and they do not have any problems with the system. The most 
radical thing they do is listen to Kurdish music. They respect me, and I 
also behave respectfully towards them. Most of my Kurdish friends do 
not speak Kurdish while we are together. I warned them a couple of 
times that they will only be my friends as long as they respect me. I 
would say that they are already assimilated. They have been changed. 
They are just struggling for their lives. All of my friends have legal 
jobs, they do not do anything to harm society and they do not 
encroach. That is why I do not even call them Kurdish. They are just 
my friends who I happen to know are Kurdish.” (Volkan, Turkish, 
male, 36) 
 
As exemplified in many of the different accounts presented above, the distinction 
between good and bad Kurds is not a matter of distinguishing between guerrillas and 
ordinary Kurds. In other words, this is not a clash between guerrillas and the state 
army. The new scope for designating Kurds as „bad‟ is wide, which makes Kurds in 
general more vulnerable to violence. The general criteria for the distinction between 
good and bad Kurds stems from to what extent a Kurd has a political articulation to 
the Kurdish movement. All of these efforts to define Kurds have the same objective: 
to recognise Kurds who have a particular political identity and political ideals. 
Although the narratives have different points of reference, their intentions are the 
same.  
 
 6.2.2. How do Kurds Define Others? 
 
The first point that needs to be made in this final section is that Kurds do not talk 
about Turks as much as Turks talk about Kurds. Their narratives tend to refer to the 
army and the state, and describe their experiences with these organisations. Kurds do 
not see ordinary/civilian Turks as their enemy. As they repeatedly assert in their 
accounts, „Our problem is with the state and the army, because we have suffered 
from their policies and practices‟ (Nazim, Kurdish, male, 36). Kurds have encounters 
and personal experiences with Turks in everyday life and have ideas and feelings 
about Turks, however they dedicate much less time to describing such experiences 




definitions and make fewer generalisations about Turks, having more awareness and 
being more distant from everyday nationalism thanks to their political consciousness.  
 
Kurds are less likely to give general political accounts. While some Kurds are aware 
of ethnic ties and have a sense of being part of a Kurdish nation, others have neither 
the sense nor the emotional ties of such involvement. In any case, the determining 
factor is not being a political person, but the invisible anxiety that is embedded in 
their identities and seems to be a natural part of being Kurdish in Turkey. This does 
not mean that all Kurds avoid talking about Turks, but there is another factor that 
dominates in their accounts: the wish to share their personal experiences. They want 
to talk. They want to find some relief by giving voice to their experiences, and that is 
why most of the Kurdish participants cried during the course of their interviews. It 
was obvious that the interview was one of the rare occasions that they had to talk 
about their feelings and ideas, and they wanted to make the most of this chance by 




The experiences they narrated were mostly about soldiers and police officers, and 
focused on the subject of discrimination. They used the word „Turk‟ as a synonym 
for the state, the army and the police, and this word substitution seemed to be a 
collective discursive practice that was passed down through the generations. 
However, it must be stated that they were aware of the necessity of distinguishing 
between terms:  
 
“I first recognised that I am Kurdish, that I am not equal with Turks, 
when the soldiers came to our village. While they were passing 
through the creek that was in the middle of the village, they were 
riding us [literally climbing on their backs] (laughing). Can you 
believe that, like a monkey or a horse? After this, the feeling of being 
Kurdish and being vulnerable to every type of discrimination has 
worsened with other experiences in Ankara –experiences with the 
police and the municipality police officers. From these experiences I 
have with Turks, by which I mean the state, the army, the state is seen 
as something that discriminates against us. Nothing more than this!” 
(Yakup, Kurdish, male, 30) 
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The only narrative strategy to defining Turks is to give responses to the common 
arguments about the negative images of the Kurds. By defining themselves, they 
attempt to prove that they are as bigoted or as rude as is believed. The young 
respondents in particular strictly refute this claim, stating that the real ignorance on 
the Turkish side. They make self-definitions vis-a-vis the Turks. Generally they 
claim that even though they are seen as a rude group, they have defended their 
traditions and have „biased thoughts‟ due to their customs. As Narin states:  
 
“I know most of our traditions seem weird, but that does not mean that 
we are primitive people. How can you define civilisation and 
modernisation? Yes, we are different from you, because we have 
different traditions.” (Narin, Kurdish, female, 31) 
 
The other response is related to the cehalet argument, or lack of education, 
ignorance. Most of the participants claimed that the new generation is different to the 
older ones, and explain that the older generations are ignorant due to the 
exclusionary policies of the state that operated in the eastern part of the country for 
years. They highlight that this situation is ongoing, as some of the Kurds living in the 
west have had better opportunities and have increased their educational level. They 
emphasise the importance of political awareness, which in some respects is presented 
as being more salient than educational attainment. They are proud that Kurdish 
society has become politicised by the mass Kurdish movement and are „aware of the 
reality of this country‟, which is not cared about by especially young Turkish people. 
As Narin states: 
 
“Our mothers and fathers were kept uneducated; Turks who were 
born after the 1980s were kept politically ignorant. They do not know 
or care about the country.” (Narin, Kurdish, female, 18) 
 
The most important theme embedded in the Kurdish accounts was the desire to prove 
their innocence, being an impulse in response to the accusation that all Kurds are 
terrorists. Although it is not such a common discourse, it would seem that the Kurds 
have become quite sensitive about it. When I asked „Have you ever heard this 





“We already know this. They all see us as terrorists, even if we have 
never been to the east, even if we have served in that region as 
soldiers, even if we pay our taxes to this state. They believe we are all 
terrorists.” (Aliye, Kurdish, female, 43)  
 
The account of Fatos, a 26 year-old Kurdish woman who lives and works in Ankara, 
included a sincere confession to prove her innocence:  
 
“There was a message that was shared on Facebook. The brother of 
my friend shared it. It said that Kurds are terrorists. It was on my wall 
and I responded to him. I said that I am a Kurd living in this land. I 
am not a terrorist. I also work for this state, I also pay the taxes. He 
tried to explain by saying that „I have a few more Kurdish friends like 
you, we get along well, we eat and drink together, I don't have any 
complaints about you‟. Then don't generalise about the Kurds. We are 
not terrorists. In this case, say these things to the terrorists directly. I 
am a Kurd, but I am not a terrorist.” (Filiz, Kurdish, female, 27)  
 
As this quote indicates, the self-defensive accounts of the Kurdish respondents refer 
to their personal experiences. As they define themselves vis-a-vis Turks, they try to 
draw a picture of the „other‟ by describing their personal experiences with Turks. 
They explain their positions, their own experiences and how they are treated rather 
than assigning particular qualities to Turks or making generalisations about them. 
The stories of Dilan and Guliz are good examples of this approach:  
 
“In the course of a class, I think it was philosophy class, a discussion 
occurred and a nationalist guy started to talk. He was insulting and 
humiliating the Kurds. I got nervous, my eyes even filled with tears. 
„The people from Diyarbakir are not human‟, he said. I could not 
believe that. Can you imagine how they see the Kurds? If they had the 
chance to kill and bury all of the Kurds, they will be so happy. I could 
only say „if you do not know anything about the issue, do not talk 
about it‟. I am so annoyed at living in this country with these racist 
people.” (Dilan, Kurdish, female, 18)  
 
“During a painting class, the teacher called one of the guys and said 
„I will give you a duty‟. I was enthusiastic to do it, but she did not give 
it to me. She took some pushi
40
 out of her bag and told people to 
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mangle all of the scarves. The entire class started to cut and mangle 
them, after which the teacher said that students who put on these 
scarves do not have the right to study here or at any school. I could 
not believe it. If you are treated like this, you will also go up to the 
mountains to be a guerrilla. After the class was over I talked to my 
philosophy teacher about it, and complained about the teacher to the 
head teacher. Then I thought that she is already around 40, I cannot 
change her mind. Even worse, they informed the families of the student 
who were wearing the scarves and reported that their boys and girls 
were terrorists. How can a mature, adult person do that? They are 
supposedly the educated of Turkey. For this reason, nothing can be 
better in Turkey, but I will stay here, I will not run away. If people 
leave, everything will be worse. I am studying to serve in my territory 
(south-eastern part), rather than making a lot of money. I will always 
work for my people.” (Guliz, Kurdish, female, 17)  
 
Rather than making distinct definitions of Turks, the Kurds make comparisons. By 
showing their collective positive attributes, they reveal the negative approach of the 
Turks. This is a mutual argument in which both sides believe that if their side does 
not act with patience, the situation will get worse. Turks believe that they are quite 
indulgent towards the Kurds, but believe that in turn they are aggressive and 
annoying in their demands. Kurds, on the other hand, believe that if common sense 
does not prevail in the territory, it will lead to a bloody war. Cevat‟s account is an 
example of this tendency:  
 
“If the Kurds have no common sense about the issue. everything will 
be worse. Turks are so biased and single minded. I always hold myself 
back. I pretend not to have heard. For instance, some of them say to 
me „why don‟t you bring Karayilan
41
?‟ Like I arrested him. Think! It 
becomes worse day by day. Recently it became much worse due to the 
news of the funerals of martyrs in the media. I can hardly prevent 
myself from becoming a killer. They just make ridiculous judgements, 
such as “all the Kurds are responsible for the losses of soldiers”. Just 
after this news, autonomy was declared, as you know, and we became 
suspects in the issue. They think they know you and automatically 
judge you, not the guerrillas fighting in the mountains. Then they 
apologise to me with the explanation that Cevat does not like them. 
They decide on my behalf. Sometimes I make comments as well. For 
instance, I say that you bury the villagers, but there are so many 
unidentified murders. Your army has been sold; all of these people 
were killed by them. We saw in the transcriptions of the transmitter 
                                                 




conversations, the soldiers asked for a helicopter but your army sent it 
one and a half hours later. Then you accuse the Kurds and the PKK. It 
is not fair. Go and ask your army these questions!” (Cevat, Kurdish, 
male, 34) 
 
As proof of their lack of a connection with the Kurdish movement, they tell stories 
about how they have also suffered for years from the PKK atrocities. The first thing 
they say is: „We also serve in the army. We also wear the uniforms of the Turkish 
army. We have also been in armed clashes with guerrillas. Does it matter when you 
become a target for a PKK guerrilla whether you are Turkish or Kurdish?‟ (Yavuz, 
Kurdish, male, 26). Besides this common explanation, they speak of their own losses 
at the hands of the PKK guerrillas to show the extent to which they are also under 
threat, and maybe even more so. It is commonly thought that if you are Kurdish, you 
need to make your side visible:  
 
“If you are not a supporter of the PKK you will be between two fires. 
My father had the biggest hotel in Siirt. They (the PKK) threatened 
him and he left the city. You have to be in one of these groups. 
Standing in the middle is not possible. There is no state there. Either 
you are with the moll/religious leaders of tarikat [a kind of religious 
organization], or you are closer to the PKK. If you stay between these 
two groups there is no chance of living there. They asked for money, 
and said that if you do not give, next time they would tear the place 
down. Either you will serve us, or you will leave. My father came 
home without hesitation: they did not give us a chance to live there.” 
(Cevat, Kurdish, male, 34) 
 
While the Turkish respondents were concerned with making self-definitions and 
explaining the characteristics of the Kurdish identity, the Kurds defined themselves 
in a completely different way. They described themselves and the other distinct 
Kurdish communities (such as Alevi Kurds) through personal experiences without 
making generalisations about the Turks, although they did tend to generalise about 
the perceptions of Turks. There was common agreement that they are mistreated and 
discriminated against by Turks, and it did not seem to matter who committed such 
acts, because they believed that they could be mistreated by anyone, at any time. It 
can be argued that not specifying a group of people, but making an over-generalised 
explanation of the behaviours to which they are exposed is another form of over-




6.3. Conclusion  
Personal narratives represent a great opportunity to show the different methods by 
which individuals draw upon daily politics accounts to produce and reproduce the 
“self” and “other. Gamson suggests that “categories such as race, ethnicity and 
gender etc. are important in their perception of politics, ordinary people tend to see 
the issues as embodying a „we‟ and a „they‟.” (1992: 84). 
 
From this point of departure, this chapter described is a basic distinction between 
Kurdish and Turkish accounts in terms of how they make their definitions. Firstly, 
making definitions as a narrative strategy means more than its content. In other 
words, it does not function solely as a means of providing details to contextualise the 
stories and enrich the content. As a narrative strategy, it is about producing an 
acceptable identity image in common sense, and creating a subject position. The 
strategy of presenting a self-identity works in two ways, as a self-reflecting and self-
defensive mechanism. In the Turkish accounts, self-definitions emerged as a form of 
self-expression, implying how true citizens are, and they did this by defining Kurds 
as „bad, unwanted‟ citizens. In other words, in the Turkish accounts, the self-
definitions and definitions of others were made for the purpose of self-reflection and 
accusation. In contrast, in the Kurdish narratives, both the self-definitions and the 
definitions of others worked as a self-defensive mechanism to show how Kurds 
differ in reality from the way in which they are perceived by Turks.  
 
Defining the „self‟ and the „other‟ as components in the practice of ethnic 
identification is a daily practice among ordinary people. The means of ethnic 
identification become possible as a result of comparing the „self‟ and the „other‟. For 
this very reason, the definitions made by the participants have a crucial role in the 
accounts of ethnicity and nationalism. If we see the narratives given by the 
participants as distinct stories in themselves, the „strategy of denial‟ and „strategy of 
defining the self and other‟ should be regarded as an introduction to the personal 
narratives. In the following chapter we will see the actors who are already defined as 







































7. Nationalism by Personal Stories  
 
“The storyteller speaks, but the story teaches” 
 (Arthur Frank, Letting Stories Breath) 
 
“People not only think about stories; far more consequentially, people think with 
stories. Or, stories give people their first system for thinking” (Frank, 2010, 47). 
Narrating personal experiences is a way of building ethnic identities. By telling their 
stories, individuals define themselves and ethnic others in various ways. By giving 
general political accounts, the respondents draw a big picture to explain the political 
situation from their perspectives, in which they and their communities, as well as 
others, are depicted.  
 
As Gamson states, people differentiate between two ways of knowing: knowing 
something from personal experience and knowing something more abstractly, due to 
second-hand data. Within this hierarchy of knowledge that people construct, there is 
a tendency to privilege their own experiential knowledge (1992: 125), and although 
their account is based on personal experience, they tend to change the tone of their 
accounts. In other words, a general account of any political issue is likely to have 
different content to an account within the frame of a personal experience. In this 
regard, there would appear to be inconsistencies and conflicting arguments between a 
general account and an account based on personal experience. So people use 
different narrative strategies to fix and legitimise the conflicting points of their 
accounts. Sometimes they confess the inconsistency of their accounts, or they may 
take a step back and change their accounts. Sometimes they may even recognize the 
inconsistencies between their political ideas and personal experiences, but insist on 
the same idea and become more aggressive to reflect their identities. All of these 
strategies are prompted by the practice of “narrating”.  
 
As Tanil Bora (2006) asserts, besides well-known writers and journalists, ordinary 
Turks have started to employ  more exclusive language, in which Kurds are 
portrayed as culturally backward, intrinsically incapable of adapting to the „modern 




Chapter 1, through the conceptualisation of Saracoglu‟s (2009) „exclusive 
recognition‟ we know that the dominant anti-Kurdish rhetoric emerged as a new 
pattern of Turkish nationalism within Turkish society over the last decades. As 
Saracoglu (2009) asserts, this new way of perceiving the Kurds cannot be regarded 
as a continuation of the state ideology that was imposed from above, but was based 
mostly on the daily encounters between ordinary Kurds and Turks in the Western 
cities of the country. In accordance with the statements of Bora and Saracoglu, the 
main arguments that emerge through the accounts are based on supposed negative 
traits of Kurds, such as their being ignorant, culturally backward and separatist. 
 
This chapter is composed of two sections related to the way Turkish participants 
portray Kurds, and the narrative strategies they apply when doing so.  
 
(i) The first section presents stories of contempt. Based on personal experiences, 
these narratives deal mainly with the supposed ignorance, rudeness and 
weakness of the character of the Kurds.  
(ii) The second section analyses accounts of in which Kurds are accused of being 
criminal and separatist. 
 
7.1. The Strategy of Contempt 
 
In this section, I bring together the „Narratives of Contempt‟, which mainly highlight 
the cultural differences between two groups, and the supposed intrinsic incapability 
of the Kurds to adopt to modern city life. The arguments discussed within this 
framework are supported by the essentialist thinking, which define an ethnic group as 
a racial entity with distinct insufficient racial and cultural features. In this regard it is 
possible to say that a significant amount of confusion exists between the 
respondents‟ perceptions of culture and racial features. Furthermore, these cultural 
features and differences that are considered as essential characteristic of the Kurds, 
are also perceived as free from influence of other macro determinants such as 
religious sects and economic structures. Kurds are depicted as passive actors who are 




that reflect the narratives of contempt and that are found awkward and funny by the 
Turkish respondents are (i) exaggeration, (ii) dehumanisation and (iii) humiliation 
 
7.1.1. Contempt through Exaggeration and Dehumanisation 
 
“They usually have three wives, especially those who live here. We 
cannot afford just one wife, (laughing), he has three wives. I think this 
is because of ignorance. Ignorant people have more children. It is 
same everywhere. They do not care about the time or place or where 
they do this thing [have sex]. This is the sign of their ignorance. Today 
in our country all contraception methods are known by all married 
women. Normal people have three children at most, and after three 
children they use contraception. The Kurds do not know anything.” 
(Mehmet, Turkish, male, 32) 
 
The narrative of contempt employed through the accounts of the Turkish respondents 
is practiced using different narrative strategies, such as exaggeration and mocking. 
Even if it was not particularly a funny story, Turkish participants were making fun of 
the cultural beliefs and living styles of Kurds that were not familiar to themselves. 
The laughableness of the „other‟, being regarded as extremely strange in all of its 
components, is a discursive element of discrimination and contempt. The mainstream 
media also applies a strategy of exaggeration to produce „humour‟ by accentuating 
the differences of the „other‟. Participants in this study used the same technique when 
giving their accounts – presenting the other in terms of its radical differences through 
such strategies as exaggeration, repetition, comparison, accentuating awkwardness, 
etc.  
 
The narrative of contempt is not only employed as a strategy of exaggeration and 
mocking, as while engaging in these strategies, the basic objective of the respondents 
is to dehumanise the Kurds. 
 
“I want to give you an example about my Kurdish neighbour 
(laughing). One day I asked her how many children she had. She said, 
17 or 20. She was not sure about the number. Even she does not 
remember. She is also quite old. This is like a Turkish movie 




20 times?” She did not know this either. She said that one of the 
babies had died from an illness, and another had died after being sat 
on (laughing). Another one died from a lack of oxygen. I thought that 
she was joking. So I asked „how many of them are alive‟ to which she 
replied that only seven were alive. I am not joking. Seriously! This is 
the funny part of the issue. We had a Kurdish caretaker friend here (in 
the workplace) who had 27 brothers and sisters and three mothers. 
Joking with another colleague of mine, we said „do you remember all 
of them?‟ (laughing). He said that of course he knew all of them: 
„They are my sisters and brothers. Even though we have different 
women, our dad is common, and all of my mums are equal in the eyes 
of my father” (laughing). (Nihan, Turkish, female, 43)  
 
The supposed lack of moral and human values was a common subject in the 
accounts. Nihan, herself a mother, telling a story of another mother who lost her 
children in different ways, makes light of the issue, but rather than ridiculing to 
woman for the loss of her babies, the strangest thing for her is the detachment of the 
mother. She finds it awkward to talk about the losses of her children with any sign of 
any emotion, making it seem that the number of children makes the losses 
unimportant. This emotional detachment of the Kurdish woman makes the situation 
ridiculous for Nihan, resulting in a situation in which empathy or taking the reasons 
and tragic consequences seriously is not required. Ridiculing the issue removes the 
need to understand the roots and the destructive impact of the deaths on the mother 
and the family. Using the issue as the subject of a funny story creates the illusion that 
the players in the story, in this case, the mother, are inhuman. For Nihan, forgetting 
losses and not remembering how many children you have might be a source of great 
trauma in her own life, but are considered trivial for the Kurdish woman. This way of 
presentation represents the Kurdish woman as a person with lower moral and human 
values. In other words, this is a way of „othering‟ through dehumanisation. 
 
“I have a memory about Kurds. I did my military service in Agrı (a 
city in eastern Anatolia). Our security post was in the middle of the 
village and was surrounded by houses. Every day there were clashes 
and fighting in the village. It was around 2000 or 2001. After they had 
killed each other we just went there to collect the dead bodies. Even if 
they kill each other, we did not care about it; it was not my business. 
Kurds are so ignorant. They do not speak Turkish. I served in a prison 
at that time, and on one visiting day I told one man to join the queue. 




just stand there when you ask them to queue. They only understand 
beating; after being blackjacked they queue properly”. (Mehmet, 
Turkish, male, 32) 
 
In Mehmet‟s account, the strategy of dehumanisation appears in several forms, such 
as representing the Kurds as „animals‟. Cultural backwardness is regarded as a sign 
of barbarity, primitivism and a lack of ability to adopt to such practices of modern 
life as queuing. However, from another perspective, under such conditions the act of 
not queuing may easily be read as an act of defiance in situations in which Kurds are 
being ordered around by soldiers.  
 
The accounts of the Turkish respondents repeatedly highlight the idea that Kurdish 
culture has nothing in common with the characteristics of a modern city life. Modern 
facilities and daily practicesare unfamiliar to the Kurds, and this is also considered to 
be a structural, natural and default characteristic of being a Kurd. Again, the 
essentialist way of thinking erases the differences within the referred “social values”, 
and highlights the distinctions between the differences of the „others‟. In other 
words, defining the „other‟ necessitates a homogeneous „we‟ and „us‟ conception 
first. While ignoring the differences in the „us/we‟ category, then it becomes 
impossible to ignore the distinct features of the homogeneous „other‟, which is a 
laughable entity. 
 
“The Kurds migrate that here from the eastern cities due to the 
evacuation and burning of their village. They are quite happy about 
living in western cities. I saw one of them; the man was homeless and 
was living on the beach. While he was talking to his cousin on the 
phone he said, “Brother, it is great here; it‟s like paradise. Let‟s move 
here.” Can you believe that? He is living on the streets and sleeping 
on the beach and he calls his relatives to join him. This means that 
these conditions are really good for him. I could live at most for 3 
days under the conditions in which he lives. Probably, I would lose my 
health. They should pry for the state to bring electricity to their 
villages. Their villages are that bad. Their best friends are the cows” 






7.1.2. Contempt through Underlining Cultural Differences and 
Humiliation 
 
During our conversations, making comparisons in terms of the disparity between the 
standard of living, life expectancy and living conditions between Kurds and the „self‟ 
emerged as another narrative strategy among the Turkish respondents. Turkish 
respondents did not consider the reasons why the standard of living of Turks and 
Kurds were unequal, and so rather than developing empathy towards the 
disadvantaged group, the poverty and unequal conditions of the Kurds were taken for 
granted. Considering misery as the default is also a way of maintaining the 
essentialist approach towards the Kurds. Taking for granted the notion of injustice 
between the two camps is makes invisible the broader structure of the society. This 
way of perception may “exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand 
broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate 
targets” (Gamson, 1992: 33).   
 
While the Kurdish Question is considered a „political issue‟ that does not affect the 
daily life or perceptions of the „other‟, personal stories show that the practice of 
humiliation does not target the political practices of the individuals or the group. In 
other words, while the daily life aspect of the encounters supports that there is a 
“lack of conflict and problem” between the two groups; personal stories show that 
the perceptions of the Turkish respondents target the practices in private spheres of 
the Kurds rather than their political activities. While accepting the private life and the 
power relations as an embedded part of the daily interaction as “political” practices, 
it can also be said that the produced and reproduced critical narratives of contempt 
do not target only the Kurds. Despite the distinction between „bad‟ and „good‟ 
Kurds
42
 functions to distinguish the assailable and unassailable Kurds at the 
discursive level, in personal stories the credibility and importance of the distinction 
of the bad/good Kurd fades away. 
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The grounds for criticism within a political sphere filter into the private sphere 
through narratives of personal experiences. As exemplified above, the „supposed 
common features‟ of Kurds relate to contempt of traditional differences that are 
mostly related to family lives and general way of living, with reference to the number 
of children, marriages, interactions between family members, low standard of living, 
and so forth. Referring to traditional codes and even the consequences of the chronic 
poverty faced by Kurds are read as markers of their cultural and racial backwardness. 
 
Within this perspective, „intergroup marriages‟
43
 emerge as a distinct theme in 
narratives of contempt. Marriage is taken more seriously than other forms of 
interaction, such as being neighbours, sharing the same work place and so forth, as 
marriage means becoming relatives not only with the bride or groom, but also their 
extended family. Due to prevalent cultural codes, marriage does little to change the 
lives of couples, as coherence between the two families in terms of ethnicity, 
religion, religious sects, political identities, financial status, and so forth are regarded 
as quite vivid issues. According to this way of thinking, a lack of common cultural 
codes may lead to problems, and so marrying outside one‟s own community or is 
considered something to be avoided. This general way of thinking becomes even 
more critical when the possibility exists of marrying a Kurdish person.  
 
“I had a friend. She was gorgeous. How can I say; she was as 
beautiful as Turkan Soray
44
. She married a Kurdish man. We met 
recently, and I could not believe the physical appearance of her. I was 
shocked. She had changed completely. I mean in negative way. I asked 
what had happened to her, and why she had changed that much? She 
said that if you marry a Kurdish person, you will change as well. She 
said: “You cannot believe how Kurdish people live. I was living in 
Gazi Mahallesi (close to the city centre). All of the Kurdish people 
who become ill or who came to Ankara before going to another place 
stayed at my house as guests. I really got bored with their culture.” I 
could not believe just how much she had changed and how ugly she 
had become because of the Kurdish culture.” (Neriman, Turkish, 
female, 54). 
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 Intergroup marriages and relationships between Kurds and Turks also appeared as a distinct theme 
in the accounts of the Kurdish respondents. See Chapter 8. 
44Turkan Soray (1945- ) is a popular film actress in Turkey who has for many years been accepted as 




Neriman‟s account reflects that cultural differences and their allegedly devastating 
effects are regarded as a significant issue when it comes to marriage. It is not 
possible, though, to read this account only on the basis of the cultural differences 
between partners. The subject of the narrative was not cultural difference, but rather 
Kurdish cultural backwardness. The tribal way of life which refers the Kurdish style 
living, referred to the pre-modern terms of human history the way it is used in 
common daily language. There is a common belief that besides the Kurds, all other 
ethnic groups, (and Gypsies) still maintain a primitive way of life. This includes 
living together with members of the extended family, keeping close relationships, 
having a large network that functions as a help and support community. This way of 
life is completely unfamiliar to members of individualistic nuclear families.  It 
should be stated here that the differences between the two groups in terms of family 
structures and the means of interaction in both small and large families is not that 
different. Large extended families, including also the family members of one‟s 
partner, and taking care of relatives is a common cultural code for both Kurds and 
Turks. While the modernisation projects of the nation state have been launched 
mostly in the western part of the country, the „modernised‟ living practices are 
accepted and practised by people living in urban areas more specifically and 
commonly. Furthermore, the urbanisation process has resulted in another mode of 
family life that is driven by economic and social structures. Both migration to urban 
areas and transitioning to the urban way of life are more recent practices for Kurds. 
In other words, the macro elements that dominate social structures and the modes of 
socialisation among the groups, and also the micro conditions that affect perceptions 
and practises make the differences of the Kurds more visible in the eyes of Turkish 
respondents.  
 
“I have a friend, Hacer, who has good relations with Kurds. She is an 
activist and is close to Kurds politically as well, even attending their 
political party congress. She was divorced because of her political 
beliefs, which were opposite to those of her husband. I suggested her 
to marry again, maybe with a Kurd. I said: “Hacer, you like Kurds. 
You generally socialise with them. You also support their political 
base. I think that you should get marry with a Kurdish man.” To which 
she replied: “I cannot live with them. Kurds are so oppressive. I 
cannot be comfortable with them. They are so introverted. They think 




them but, I do not want to marry one. Kurdish men are so oppressive.” 
Can you believe that? Not even Hacer wants to marry a Kurdish man 
(laughing).” (Nermin, Turkish, female, 53) 
 
All of the cultural codes emphasised by respondents may be read as traditional urban 
codes rather than a structural account of Kurdishness. However, as seen in Nermin‟s 
account, even a friend who is Turkish and has a good relationship with the Kurdish 
community due to her political affiliations does not have sufficient commonality to 
build a closer relationship such as marriage. Both Hacer‟s explanation and Nermin‟s 
mode of narration are based on a definition of the Kurdish way of life and family 
relations. Nermin‟s account highlights the structural incoherence of the two cultures, 
referring to hierarchically different levels. Even if all these cultural determinants are 
accepted as default attitude sets, what is accentuated here is that despite Hacer‟s 
close relationship with Kurds, coalescence is impossible. In other words, the desire to 
be an activist in the Kurdish movement as a Turkish individual, spending a great deal 
of time with Kurds, building a trusting relationship and taking risks for „their‟ fight 
does not necessarily constitute enough of a reason to marry a Kurd. 
 
“I want to tell another story about a friend with whom we work 
together here. She is a single woman in her 40s who has never been 
married. She said that she wanted to get married, and asked us if we 
had any friends we could introduce to her. I asked her for her criteria 
in men, and she said that she had only two, “First, I do not want to 
marry a Kurd, and second, I will never marry an Alevi.”  I was 
surprised, and asked, “Don‟t you care about anything like his age, his 
job, his education level? The woman said that these were the two most 
important things. She said, “Neither my family nor I would never ever 
accept a Kurd or an Alevi
45
 into our family.” Her last sentence was 
really interesting. She said that she had waited for such a long time, 
and so why should she marry a Kurd? I am an Alevi, and so I asked 
her what she had against Alevis. She said that they are doing different 
things. I mean sexually. Something like group sex. I was shocked. I 
said that there are thousands of people who are sexually deviant, 
raping their daughters for years. Is this related with ethnicity and 
religion? What kind of thinking is it that this an Alevi practice. Men 
who do that are just sexual deviants.” (Nihan, Turkish, female, 43) 
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Marrying a Kurd is not the only taboo for Sunni-Turks. For Shafii Muslims, which 
makes up most of the Kurdish population in Turkey, marrying an Alevi is 
unthinkable. While the most prevalent „other‟ among Turks is defined as Kurds, 
Alevis were cited as the greatest taboo among the Turkish respondents on the subject 
of marriage. When any question is asked about marriage, anti-Alevism rises from the 
grave. In terms of „otherness‟, Kurds rank below Alevis; “If the subject is marriage, 
maybe I can let my daughter/son marry a Kurd; but I will never allow them to marry 
an Alevi”. Such opinions were related several times during the interviews, and 
numerous stories were told about the conflict between Sunnis, Shafiis and Alevis.  
 
7.2. Accusation by Personal Stories  
 
7.2.1. Kurds are not disadvantaged; we are (Turks)! 
 
The most important counter-narrative form reflected by the Turkish respondents was 
employed against the idea of the disadvantaged position of Kurds. Although this 
argument strictly rejected by the Turkish respondents, counter-narratives were 
common in the comparisons of Kurdish and Turkish citizens. The argument that 
Kurds are disadvantaged and are discriminated against was considered completely 
unfair by the Turkish respondents, with Turks who feel that they are in more 
advantaged position and obtaining greater benefits from the state than the Kurds. 
Motivated by their disagreement with the argument, they tell some personal stories to 
counter the arguments of the Kurdish respondent, saying that the Kurds actually hold 
a more advantageous position than Turks. 
 
These arguments are based on the economic policies of the state that have been 
applied in the Kurdish region for 30 years in a bid to resolve the Kurdish Question. 
While the Kurdish issue has been regarded as dependent upon regional 
backwardness, varied economic strategies
46
 have been applied in the Kurdish 
districts aiming to resolve the problems of poverty and unemployment. These have 
appeared alongside using repressive state apparatuses such as the army, the police, 
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the courts and prisons. Economic development is seen as the only way to resolve the 
unrest and slow the trend of politicisation among the public as a result of PKK 
propaganda throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Economic development targeted a 
number of large-scale state-sponsored economic investments in the Kurdish region 
through the 1980s and 1990s. However, throughout the 2000s the AK Party 
government took a different approach to the Kurdish region. Rather than making 
huge economic investments, the government aimed to provide assistance poor 
individual Kurds through extensive social assistance projects such as free health 
care, conditional cash transfers, food stamps, housing, education and disability aid 
for the poor. (Yoruk & Ozsoy, 2013: 155) 
 
These social assistance policies implemented by municipalities create the feeling 
among Turkish people of being discriminated against, and encourage a counter-
narrative targeting the argument of „being discriminated against‟ that is asserted by 
the Kurds. The ethnicity based charitable policies and implementations of the state 
do little to ease the economic poverty of the Kurds, while at the same time widening 
the gap between Kurds and Turks living in the same area. In the eyes of Turks, 
although Kurds obtain more state benefits than Turks due to their ethnicity, they still 
complain about poverty, inequality and oppression, and find cause to rebel. The 
Turks criticise the state for its positive discrimination of the Kurds, while blaming 
the Kurds for abusing these good-intentioned benefits. In this way it becomes easier 
to accuse the Kurds of hypocrisy and as having „bad intentions‟. 
 
“Most of the students with scholarships come from eastern cities; the 
state provides them with some advantages. Look at the new civil 
servants they are mostly from eastern and south-eastern cities. This 
has caught our attention in recent years. For example, a new 
caretaker was appointed to our office last year who was from Sırnak, 
where he had graduated from one of the important universities. We 
said that you cannot do this job. He was a quite successful student and 
finished his education with a scholarship. He was over-qualified for 
that job, but he insisted and said that he needed the job. It was 
expected to serve as a caretaker, so boss expected different things 
which should be done by a caretaker such as cleaning etc. But he did 
not do. He said that I did not graduate from the university to serve 
another people in this way. He spoke in Kurdish, especially when he 




their culture, a woman should not give orders to a man, and so he said 
that he would not take orders from a woman, as it would be 
unbearable for him. We explained the rules of the office to him, telling 
him that he had already accepted them. He refused, and we sent him to 
another department of the University. Afterwards, the people who 
worked with him in the other departments said all he did while he was 
at work was read. It is the same thing that the PDP is doing. What is it 
called? Hmmmm, yes, civil disobedience! We learned that he was sent 
from that office as well. When we were arguing about his job 
definition, he said that he was sent here, but that it did not mean that 
he would stay here forever. I mean, he came here with discriminatory 
ideas in his mind. His real intention was not to work here, but just to 
benefit from the financial opportunity of the state. He insisted in not 
working. He only thought about serving his people (the Kurds), not 
Turks, and that is why he avoided work. Although he was paid by the 
state, he saw the state as an enemy” (Nihan, Turkish, female, 43)  
 
As it is seen in Nihan‟s account, the main criticism relates to the perceived 
„disadvantaged position of Kurds in society‟, refuted with the counter-argument of 
equality determined by the course of law for all citizens of the Turkish State. Turks 
tend to show that they aware about the positive discriminative policies of the state. 
Rather than criticising the state policies, it is the attitudes of the Kurds that they find 
worthy of criticism. They articulate into the state discourse and situate themselves on 
the side of the state easily. Just like the state, they also, as ordinary Turkish citizens, 
expect more comradeship and loyalty from the Kurds as return for their charity. It is 
important to stress that the inequalities created by the state are not criticised in terms 
of its policies, but rather the abusive attitude of the Kurds.   
 
Assertions of inequality from Kurdish individuals are answered with a new counter-
narrative form that suggests Kurds have more advantages than Turks as a result of 
their close networks, which function like large families. Besides the inequalities 
based on the implementations of the state in the form of positive discriminative 
policies, the Kurds also watch out for each other. Due to their strong regional and 
ethnic sense of belonging, Kurds are very quick to exclude others [Turks] from a 
situation to protect their compatriots. While Kurds refer to this form of interaction as 
a consequence and reaction to being displaced and being discriminated against, for 
Turks this is a structural component of being Kurd that excludes and creates 




Kurds and Turks more salient and visible. The idea that „Kurds always look after 
each other‟ is perceived and experienced as an exclusionary practice by Turks, and 
this is why they tell similar stories referring to the exclusive practices of the Kurds, 
such as preferring to hire a Kurd rather than a Turk for a job, easing bureaucracy for 
Kurds if one is in a powerful position in an institution, and so on.  
 
“You know the coup of 1980 and people‟s stories about being held in 
custody. My second story is about this. I was one of the people who 
were sent to jail, but this was not about my connection with a 
movement or a party of individuals. [At the time] if you said that you 
were a leftist or rightist, you were taken into custody. Anyway, I was 
taken to the prison in Mamak,47 where there were a lot of women of 
different ethnicities and of different ages, ranging from 16–32 years 
old. We lived communally; everyone tried to support each other. That 
said, the Kurdish women were behaving exclusionary. They found 
each other and they started to socialise just within this Kurdish group. 
At the time I did not see the situation very clearly, but when I look 
back now I can see what was happening. Whenever I see green pepper 
and tomato I remember this story. We all ate the meals that were given 
by the prison administration. You did not have a choice. One day I 
was the guard, I was cleaning the corridors, you now regular things. 
There was a small room for isolation, you know. I will never forget it, 
I saw the Kurdish women in that room eating green peppers and 
tomatoes. It was impossible to find these vegetables in the middle of 
January. I felt so sorry. I have never told this story to anyone. Then I 
asked the women but they rejected. You know there was regular 
counting every day. We were beaten by the soldiers, but they were 
never beaten. They were always in the medical room or another place. 
We did not recognize it at the time. One of my friends from that time 
told me recently “One day we were run the gauntlet.  Sultan [a 
Kurdish friend] said something to the soldier in Kurdish, and the 
soldier did not hit him”. My friend asked me if I remembered this 
story, but I did not. But now I recognise that the doctor was Kurdish, 
and was always being called to the medical room. I really remember it 
now. They only looked after each other. If you are not one of them 
[Kurd] they just ignore you. This attitude of the Kurds is so 
annoying.” (Neriman, Turkish, woman, 54) 
 
Stories are re-framed and reconstructed at different times and in different places as a 
result of the recent experiences of the individuals, as in the story of Neriman. 
Making a retrospective analysis, she remembers and reconstructs the experiences 
                                                 





from her current perspective. The recent „self‟ has ethnic distinctions, and lived 
experiences about the „other‟ that are different from the previous „self‟, which most 
probably became visible after the emergence of Kurdish Question in the 1980s. As 
she stated after telling the story:  
 
“We were all leftists; our only enemies were the fascists and the 
idealists (Ulkucu) at that time. We did not even recognise people‟s 
ethnic or religious differences”. (Neriman, Turkish, woman, 54)  
 
It is worthy of note here just how the respondent remembers the event. Although she 
recalls the Kurdish women convicts eating green peppers she did not see the situation 
at the time as intentional exclusionary behaviour, but now she is certain about the 
bad intentions of the Kurdish women.  
 
Another story of Neriman along the same lines as her previous stories, in which her 
memories reinforce the argument that „Kurds are not discriminated against; on the 
contrary they have more advantages than us [Turks] in this country.‟ As a left-wing 
activist, Neriman is self-critical of her ideas, feelings and attitudes related to Kurds:  
 
 “Sometimes I really have to ask myself if the Kurds are really right in 
their struggle; but after these experiences I am sure that the Kurds do 
right at this conflict.” (Neriman, Turkish, female, 54)  
 
The dilemma of having on one side ideas and feelings about the Kurds and the 
Kurdish movement, and on the other, leftist arguments about equality, freedom and 
democracy, force Neriman to seek reasonable explanations that will allow her to 
maintain a legitimate political stance without challenging her leftist ideals or political 
identity. 
 
Similar stories from the Turkish respondents stress the „irritating and annoying sense 
of a created image of “victim-hood” among the Kurds‟. There is a belief in Turkish 
circles that the Kurds are not mistreated, although they maintain rhetoric of being 
oppressed, excluded and discriminated against. In opposition to this rhetoric is the 
counter-narrative that is formed to refute the argument by the Turkish respondents. 




continue with the stories of Neriman to show in what ways different personal 
experiences are linked to each other. 
 
“My other story about Kurds is about the time my mum was staying in 
hospital. I have some experiences about Kurds; if I did not, I would 
never talk in this way. It was earlier times when mum was on dialysis, 
around 1998. We were in Hacettepe Hospital, we went there as 
ordinary citizens, you know, looking for a bed, waiting for our turn; 
but as Kurds came in they found everything ready for them. The 
Deputy of Diyarbakir came and made the procedures easier for them. 
When you protested, they said that they had arranged everything 
before they came, saying that they had connections and benefited from 
them. We followed the rules as normal citizens, waiting in the queue to 
see the doctor, and suddenly the doctor said something in Kurdish and 
they went into his room before us. It made me angry. At that time I 
started to wonder if they were the minority or us”. (Neriman, Turkish, 
woman, 54)  
 
Neriman‟s interview was somewhat different to the others. After explaining to her 
the general aims and the questions of the research, she began telling about her 
personal experiences as if she had prepared a text before the interview. She had quite 
structured and strict ideas about the Kurdish Question and went to great efforts to 
legitimise her political ideas with personal experiences. She stressed the importance 
of personal experiences in having „a proper idea‟ about a political issue. Due to her 
political affiliations she had distinct categories in her mind in which the 
contradictions and ambiguities were invisible and the borders were quite clear. The 
arguments that „Kurds are not discriminated against; on the contrary, their lives are 
easier than ours [Turks] in terms of the state benefits they receive and their Kurdish 
networks” are reproduced in her account, supported by her personal experiences. She 
did not question her own identity at all. Having already thought about the issue, she 
maintained her personal stance towards the Kurds and the Kurdish Question, but 
criticised her own ideas before giving the account. That is why she was quite sure 
about which experiences she would speak, in what way these stories were linked to 
each other and what these stories imply. All the themes in this section are already 





Besides the perception that Kurds are a positively discriminated group in society, 
there is also a common belief that they do not fulfil the obligations associated with 
being a proper citizen. This is evaluated as a form of challenge to the state and to 
Turkish dominated society. As Adil stated „they [Kurds] do not feel any sense of 
belonging to this country. That is why they always challenge the rules in any 
situation‟. (Adil, Turkish, male, 51) As a result of personal encounters and varied 
interactions between Kurds and Turks in daily life, different narratives and counter-
narratives are produced that reinforce the negative perceptions of each group about 
each other.  
 
“The owners of the shops in this neighbourhood are Kurdish. I do not 
approve of how they do this job, as they do it without a licence and 
without paying tax. They earn money in this way. They sell “kokorec” 
[grilled sheep's intestines] and alcoholic drinks without licences. They 
always do these kinds of illegal things. If you try to prevent them, 
fights break out. I pay my taxes; I do all my paperwork for getting 
approval. As a normal citizen, it is my duty. I sell something for 5 
[Turkish] liras, but he can sell it for just 3 liras because he does not 
pay anything to the state. They destroy the market. I can never accept 
this. They need to be educated.” (Volkan, Turkish, male, 36) 
 
It is hard to conceptualise the themes that appeared in the different accounts into 
distinct categories, in that no narrative strategy, form or motive functions in one way, 
but rather articulates with the others. For example, the argument of cultural 
backwardness does not refer only the language of contempt, while in another story, 
these categories become a means of narrative accusation.  
 
In this way, the theme of cultural backwardness that frames the perceptions of the 
Turks about Kurds emerges in different forms within the stories of accusation as well 
as contempt in the Turkish accounts. The lack of social conventions and modern 
cultural attitudes in the behaviours of Kurdish people are considered as indicators of 
cultural backwardness. Disobeying the rules and not following accepted ways of 
doing something are, in public opinion, regarded as forms of resistance to the 
practices of modern life, and as a show of strength against the rules of the society 
and state to which the “Kurds feel no sense of belonging”. Such „destructive‟ 




Nihan asserted: „They have some complexes … maybe a kind of inferiority complex. 
That is why they are so aggressive and opt to display their power on any occasion by 
ignoring the rules. They see themselves as superior and powerful, but I know that 
they are just pretending to be powerful and rebellious.” (Nihan, Turkish, female, 43)  
 
“On another day we were in the hospital, and again a group of Kurds 
entered the hospital garden. I think there was someone in the hospital 
who they wanted to see. They came in a big bus, which was full. I 
could not believe it; they arrived at hospital door and wanted to enter, 
but the security guards tried to explain why they could not visit the 
patient. Of course they did not listen to them. They hit the door all 
together and opened it. The patient was brought outside, and they left 
after they had seen the patient. We could never do this kind of thing; 
we would probably be taken into custody. They are not like us, if they 
decide to do something, they do it.” (Neriman, Turkish, woman, 54) 
 
Besides the perception and representation of the Kurds as an „uncivilized‟ and 
„ignorant‟ ethnic group, there is also a tendency in Turkish society to see them as 
„being criminal‟.
48
 This perception of criminality functions in two ways in the mind 
of the Turks. First, it leads to the association of the Kurds with terrorism. As Sezgin 
and Wall (2005) state, „Kurds are depicted as being against the Turkish government, 
with never ending demands, or as criminals involved with the PKK‟ (2005: 790). The 
other and more common outcome is that the Kurds are considered the „usual 
suspects‟ in the event of any criminal acts in society.  
 
The rapid demographic transformation and rise of criminal opportunity in the big 
cities as a consequence, have infected the perceptions of ordinary Turks related to the 
Kurds. Throughout the interviews, this criminal perception of the Kurds emerged as 
a prominent theme, with the most striking example being given by Ozlem, a 
manicurist who has job in her brother‟s hairdressing salon for 15 years. Although her 
grandmothers were Kurdish, she insisted that they [she and her family] do not 
consider themselves to be Kurdish. Immediately after mentioning her Kurdish 
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ancestors, she went to great efforts to persuade me about the Turkishness of her and 
her family. After discussing the „subject of Kurdishness‟ to learn about her 
perception of the Kurds, I asked her if she had any Kurdish neighbours. Her answer 
was exemplary: 
 
“There are no Kurds living in our neighbourhood, but we were 
attacked by paint thinner addicts one night while coming back from 
my brothers flat. We were about to die. They are so dangerous. But 
there are no Kurdish people that I am aware of.” (Ozlem, Turkish, 
female, 36) 
 
As can be seen in the account of Ozlem, the „Kurds‟ are stereotyped as high-profile 
criminals.  Kurds are situated in a supposed criminal hierarchal scale as a 
homogeneous category. They do not represent the urban poor suffering from 
increasing poverty and exclusion but the “Kurds” who make their living through ill-
gotten gains‟ (Saracoglu, 2009: 652). Saracoglu (2009) states that the so-called 
„Kurdish mafia‟ notion has a prominent role in creation of the negative image of the 
Kurds‟ in the minds of Turks. Through their close networks and sense of solidarity, 
Kurds construct mafia-like structures to strengthen their position both in legal and 
illegal economic sectors. Already, existing struggle between some powers, which are 
seeking to gain the control of various economic sectors, has created an ethnicity 
based conflict.   
 
The prosperity of the Kurds is regarded as a threat, and whether this wealth is gained 
through informal economic sectors or from family heritage, there is always the 
possibility in Turkish minds that financial assistance is being provided to the PKK. 
In other words, even if Kurds have enough money to maintain a high standard of 
living, it does not change their “backwardness”. 
 
“While I was working in a university dormitory as an officer there was 
a girl there who I liked so much. She was pretty and clever, but she 
had some psychological problems. I think she went mad from reading 
a lot. She was diagnosed with schizophrenia. One day I saw her 
carrying a duvet that had bloodstains on it. She brought the duvet in 
front of the door to room in the dormitory in which a male Kurdish 




happened to her, that the guy who lived in that room had come to her 
room last night and raped her. He was of Kurdish origin, and did not 
care about women; he always humiliated the girls around him, and  he 
always told that girl that she was mad. I was in a difficult situation, I 
needed to stay calm. I asked some questions to better understand the 
case. She said: “He came to me and suggested sexual intercourse. I 
did not accept. Then he said: „You are crazy. You go to the forest on 
your own‟. I pitied the girl, when she gets angry at people she goes to 
the Beytepe forest. I was worried about her. I warned her several 
times not to go there alone. “You are a girl (bayan), you should not go 
to such places alone.” She went there especially when it was rainy. 
What impressed me the most was that she read the Koran in the 
dormitory; she said that the Koran made her feel good at night. We 
always talked about it.” 
 
“I talked to this guy to understand if the story was true, but he denied 
it and said that she was lying. While we were talking to the boy, the 
girl saw us and brought the duvet to show the bloodstains. She 
shouted, “You did this to me!” I took the girl to the health centre, and 
she kept saying: “He did it! He did it! He told me that nobody would 
believe me because you are crazy.”  
 
“The boy‟s family came; they were very wealthy. He was thrown out 
of the dormitory. She was diagnosed with schizophrenia. My manager 
asked me if I believed her or not. I really believed that girl. His family 
was so rich; he did not care about anything. They were Kurdish, and 
you know that these kinds of things are not that important for them. 
Then we heard that he had announced to everyone that he had slept 
with her. I witnessed their encounter in front of the library. She was 
crying and shouting at him, „Firstly you denied everything, now you 
are telling everyone what you did!‟ This story was told on the basis of 
his Kurdishness. In the Kurdish districts, you know, women do not 
mean anything. There are no women there.” (Nihan, Turkish, female, 
43)  
 
The story told by Nihan is a challenging one in terms of its tragic consequences. It 
was quite hard for her to tell the story, and it was also hard for me to listen. This was 
a rape story about a Kurdish man and a Turkish woman, but this lived experience 
was not just a story that happened between two people. It was observed and told by 
different people with different perspectives, as is the case with all stories. The 
important thing that should be accentuated is the perception of Nihan and her means 
of narrating of the story. While remembering the story as she was giving her account, 
she classified this story under the title of „Kurds are not a disadvantaged group‟, and 




the idea that „Kurds do not care about women.‟ These two sub-headings function as 
contributory categories that feed each other mutually through personal accounts. The 
arguments were seen as a default fact, as was also stated by Nihan, “Kurds attribute 
no importance to women, so any crimes committed against women are not regarded 
as a crime by them.‟  
 
Not just the content of the stories, but also the order in which the experiences are 
narrated and the structural articulations between the stories give visible clues to the 
logical and ideological structures of the respondents. While this is a rape case that 
might be evaluated from the perspective of the oppression of women and as a 
gender-based clash of class, Nihan coded this story as an ethnic based incident. 
While talking about the cultural differences between Kurds and Turks, these kinds of 
criminal „attributes‟ are depicted as Kurdish characteristics.  
 
7.3. Conclusion  
 
These two forms of perception of Kurds are considered as the main obstacles to 
interaction with Kurds in everyday life. It is crucial to highlight the rupture that 
exists between the content of general political narratives and those of a personal 
nature. In the stories and observations narrated during the interviews, it can be seen 
that various terms are produced by the Turks that stereotype and mock the Kurds. 
While Kurds are represented as equal citizens and as an ethnic group with a common 
history and religion in general political speeches, in narratives of personal 
experiences, the objects of the narratives become real Kurds. In other words, in 
general speeches, both negative and positive generalisations refer to an abstract 
group of people called Kurds, while narratives based on personal experiences tell 
stories about real, concrete individuals, who they encounter, live together with or 
observe.  
 
 In general political narratives care was taken by the respondents to remain 
„politically correct‟, while personal experience narratives were produced with the 




is employed in Turkish accounts, a different way of anti-Kurdish narrative‟ is also 
produced; through exaggerating and mocking with „default characteristic‟ and 
„culture‟ of Kurds, and thus rather through alienating to the real problems and 
inequalities between the two camps.  
 
The anger and language of hate used when referring to the Kurds was reflected in 
various ways in the personal stories of the Turkish respondents. Identifying the 
Kurds as a culturally backward ethnic group who should be educated and civilized is 
clear evidence of how Turks see themselves as being in a superior position in a 
comparison of the these two groups – the „Us‟ and „Them‟. This unequal positioning 
falls short of displaying an attitude of „tolerance‟ towards the „uneducated‟ and 
„ignorant‟ groups, and works actually as a way of reflecting anger onto the Kurds by 























8. Personal Stories of Kurds: Discrimination and 
Resistance  
 
Discrimination emerges as a practical reflection of nationalism and the feelings 
created by an ideology of nationalism. In adopting the ideology of nationalism, the 
majority group members obtain a tool with which to demonstrate their power in 
everyday life: discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the accounts of the Kurdish 
respondents are framed by the narrative strategy of discrimination.    
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the general framework conceptualizing the Kurdish 
Question in the accounts of the Turkish participants is based on a strategy of denial. 
When it comes to the issue of discrimination, the common reaction among Turks 
does not change, in that most of the Turkish participants tend to ignore arguments 
related to discrimination, and suggestions of inequality between Turks and Kurds. In 
response to this tendency, there is explicit approval of discrimination against Kurds 
in Turkish society in the accounts of the Kurdish participants, and in this respect it 
can be said that “being discriminated against” is taken as a self-evident fact by the 
Kurds. A number of different definitions of discrimination are made, and examples 
are given to reveal the “victimised position” of Kurds in society. The Kurdish 
respondents were quite eager to tell their personal stories of discrimination in many 
forms – in schools, in the workplace, in their neighbourhoods, during military 
service, in the street, and so forth. At this point, it is necessary to raise the question of 
why the participants are so willing to tell their stories of discrimination.  
 
An attempt will be made to come up with an answer to this question during the field 
research, recognising that the Kurdish respondents were quite aware of the 
discrimination to which they are exposed, and that they have discursive tools to 
express their personal experiences in this respect.  It can be easily understood that 
discrimination is an important topic in their everyday lives. Kurds have a broad 
repertoire of stories of discrimination based on their own experiences and the 
experiences of others in their network. Moreover, it can be said that the 30-year 




other words, the political and social mistreatments that Kurds experienced for years 
are defined as “discrimination. “Being discriminated against” by the Turkish state is 
considered to be the main grievance of the Kurdish movement. The results and 
outcomes of the conflict are also evaluated within the notion of “discrimination”, 
which appears not only as the reason for the rise of the Kurdish movement, but also 
the result of the Kurdish Question in Turkey. As Verkuyten (2005) says in his study 
into the ways people account for ethnic discrimination, the sensitivity of the 
discrimination issue and its debate in everyday life is based on the related practices 
of blame and accusation (2005: 67).  
 
As Saracoglu (2009) asserts “… it is not difficult to see that the split between 
Turkish state and the Kurdish nationalist projects further provokes and reinforces 
negative images of the Kurds and Kurdishness in the circle of everyday life”. (2009: 
653). The stereotypical representations of the Kurds in the media and in public 
speech were reinforced by a new media campaign that pointed to Kurds as potential 
sympathizers of the “separatist Kurdish movement” after the 2000s. During the 
1990s, the dominant tendency was to differentiate between the Kurds and the PKK. 
Even the families of martyrs refrained from turning their anger towards the Kurds 
living in Western Turkish cities. Although this reflex is still continuing, the negative 
image of Kurds in the western part of the country has becomes familiar element in 
public thought. Though the deep-rooted rancour against the PKK did not turn into 
collective violence or racist attacks, suspicions of Kurds became more visible, rather 
than being based on personal encounters in the flow of everyday life. Through these 
dominant societal beliefs, prejudice and discriminative attitudes became prevalent in 
everyday life in different forms, while also bolstering the discriminative policies of 
the state.  
 
In this respect, the first thing that should be stated is that the different stories and 
experiences referring to the notion of discrimination cannot be discussed without 
reference to the concept of resistance. Classifying minority and majority group 
members as two distinct groups in a research as active and passive elements in an 




During the interviews, several stories of discrimination were followed by stories of 
resistance to show how the individual coped with discrimination. Resistance and 
discrimination are like two sides of the same coin – it is not possible to relate a story 
of discrimination without referring to the notion of “resistance”, and vice versa. 
Making visible the everyday resistance practices of individuals is a hard task because 
of its veiled feature as Gamson states “everyday forms of resistance involve evasion, 
deception, and subtle sabotage rather than rebellious collective action” (Gamson, 
1992: 61).  
 
I argue that neither a distinct/majority group who discriminate nor the group that are 
being discriminated against are homogeneous and passive receivers of these acts. For 
this reason, it is necessary to show the heterogeneity of both groups by revealing the 
ruptured and exceptional attitudes of the majority group members and the acts of 
resistance of the members of the minority group. In this way it is possible to hear 
also the stories of resistance of the respondents when their discrimination stories are 
told.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to challenge researchers to move beyond studying 
Kurds and racial prejudice as passive targets, and move towards studying them as 
functioning individuals who are able to influence the intergroup dynamics of Kurds 
and Turks. The distinction between discrimination by the state (referring to police 
and soldiers) and discrimination by ordinary Turks appears as a distinct factor in 
many accounts. In the interviews, two groups were defined in the stories of 
discrimination: first, “police and soldiers”, referred to as “the state” in accounts, and 
second, ordinary “Turks”. At this point it can be said that feelings of being victim of 
discrimination emerges as a narrative strategy in the accounts of the Kurdish 
respondents, although accounts referring to the various practices of resistance also 
articulate into the “narrative of being discriminated” against, while “narratives of 
resistance” emerge as a narrative strategy.  
 
The stories of discrimination and resistance related by the Kurdish respondents may 




i. Discrimination by the state and the system. In this matter, the respondents 
most frequently in their interviews told stories about ID checks. The 
argument that the “state discriminates against Kurds” is supported by stories 
about police and soldiers, the lack of opportunity to gain official and qualified 
jobs, schools, workplaces and military service.  
ii. Stories of discrimination and resistance in everyday life; in other words, 
discrimination by ordinary Turks. The argument that “Kurds are 
discriminated against in their daily lives by Turks” is supported and 
exemplified in stories about flat rental, marriage, friendship and experiences 




8.1. Discrimination by the State  
 
8.1.1. Discrimination Rituals of “Police and Soldier”: ID Controls 
 
ID checks were a daily routine all over the country during the “state of emergency” 
in the 1990s, but especially in eastern and south-eastern areas. At the time of the 
most frequent clashes between PKK and the Turkish army, comprehensive ID checks 
were made on both urban and inter-urban roads, with buses and cars stopped by 
police and soldiers. This became a daily ritual, as soldiers and police had authority to 
make such checks whenever they wanted. During the late 1970s and following the 
military coup of 12 September 1980, systematic and random ID checks were 
everyday events. Accordingly, as a particular personal experience, ID checks retain a 
significant place in the both collective and the personal memories of Kurds.  
 
It could be said that political awareness and feelings of discrimination are directly 
proportional. Experiences of ID checks are seen as the most visible evidence of 
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“being discriminated against” among the Kurdish respondents. When referring to the 
issue of discrimination, the respondents tended to tell stories involving the state, the 
police and soldiers, and the mistreatment that they faced in the past. Their memories 
of ID checks from the 80s and 90s are recalled as natural and self-evident parts of 
daily life. As Cemal stated: “I remember being stopped by the police ten times in one 
day in Diyarbakır in the 90s. It was not a strange thing for us. Nobody complained 
about it.” (Cemal, Kurdish, male, 68). Likewise Mahmut states; 
 
“I can give an example from last month. I was drinking something 
with one of my friends in a bar in Sakarya,
50
 then we left. At the corner 
of the street was a group of police. All people were passing by them. I 
was a bit drunk and I said „they will stop us when we pass‟. One of 
them asked for our IDs. You know, our skin colour is a bit dark. We 
gave our IDs, and they made us wait there for fifteen minutes. The 
only reason they made us wait was our place of births. My friend and I 
are from Diyarbakır. If our birthplaces were different, I mean 
somewhere from the west, they would just check and give back the IDs. 
If the ID says Diyarbakır, Mardin, Hakkari or Siirt on the ID, they 
check the GBT
51
 records. We are regarded as potential criminals.” 
(Mahmut, Kurdish, male, 40) 
 
Fatmagul is a 48-year-old Kurdish civil servant, and is the daughter of a Kurdish 
soldier. She had grown up in a western town due to her father‟s job, but is unable to 
speak Kurdish, despite Kurdish being spoken at home, especially between her father 
and grandmother. She emphasized that Kemalist and leftist political thought were 
dominant in her family when describing her childhood. She describes herself as an 
“assimilated Kurd”, and underlines that while she never experienced the Kurdish 
movement first hand, she is a sympathizer of the movement as a leftist-feminist 
activist. In the course of the interviews I did not ask directly whether she had any 
negative experiences with the Kurds/Turks, but asked rather when she first 
recognized her Kurdishness
52
 She told me a long story about an ID card check that 
had first given her an idea of her ethnic identity, and also her first story of 
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discrimination. This long story presents to what extent personal encounters have an 
impact on perceptions and emotions of individuals.  
 
“It was the first time that I realized I was Kurdish, rather than a Turk. 
It was a week after the 12 September coup; one of my friends had 
come from Bandırma, where we had grown up together, to register at 
the University. It was my second year at the university. Although she 
was Kurdish, her place of birth was shown as Balıkesir (a western 
county in Turkey) on her ID card. We were in a rush to complete her 
registration, as she was staying with her relatives for only a short 
time. I was staying in a dormitory. It was an extraordinary time, you 
know. Everyone was quite nervous, all the streets were empty. We 
were stopped by two police cars containing three civil policemen. My 
friend`s father was a soldier, like mine. They asked for our IDs and we 
showed our military IDs. They rejected them. They did not get out of 
the car, but instead talked through the car window. They said 
“obviously you are students”, and asked for our IDs again. My 
birthplace is Diyarbakır, Siverek. They started to talk about my ID 
inside the car. They closed the windows. After that, they wanted us to 
give them our bags. In mine was a letter from a friend of mine who 
was a medical student in Diyarbakır, who had written about our 
political ideas as well as some childish talk. He gave me a detailed 
explanation of his political thoughts in that letter. They saw the letter 
and took me into the car.  They asked me if I was „Apocu‟ [a follower 
of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish movement and the 
PKK]. I was very scared. Then they asked me if I was Kurdish or 
Turkish?  I felt terrible. I could say neither Turkish nor Kurdish (She 
cries). This story always made me so sad. I know that after all of the 
terrible things that have occurred this is not a big deal but ... I could 
not say anything. I could not respond to the question. They asked this 
question millions of times throughout the day. I was terrified, because 
people had been taken and never returned. We knew this. Nowhere 
was secure.  They brought me to the Security Station, where on the 
fourth floor, everywhere was covered in blood. Screaming, tortured 
people were all around! They kept asking me while I was sitting in the 
corridor, „Are you Kurdish or Turkish?‟ I got off lightly under these 
circumstances. Probably one of the police was leftist, and that was 
why they allowed me to go. If they were fascist, I would not be alive 
today. It was 10 am, they took me, and around 5pm they brought me to 
the dormitory. It was my first traumatic experience related to being 
Kurdish, and my first encounter with the state. During these hours 
they asked me only this question. Are you Kurdish or Turkish? I was 
unable to say anything.  If I had said that I were Turkish it would be 
over, but I could not. It was so insulting. When they finally let me go 
they asked me the question last time. „We will leave you alone, answer 
this question, are you a Kurdish or Turkish‟. When I was leaving I 




me say anything besides this. After this experience I was checked twice 
at all control points due to my birthplace which was written on my ID 
card. It is not so common anymore, but during the 90s in particular it 
was a regular practice. I told this story to my friends as well as my 
other ID control experiences, but they did not believe me. It was 
around the 2000s, one day we were together in a car and the 
gendarmes stopped us and asked for our IDs again. Only my ID was 
taken and my personal records were checked in detail. At this point 
they apologized for not believing me. They said that did not think it 
would be so obvious; but it was.” (Fatmagul, Kurdish, female, 48) 
  
It is obvious that being Kurdish and leftist at the same time puts one at a more 
disadvantaged level in front of the conservative and nationalist state of mind in 
Turkey.  Both leftist political affiliation and Kurdish ethnic identity are marked as 
internal separatist forces. They are coded as disloyal who live among the obedient 
and true citizens of the country. Defining both groups as internal threats is regarded 
as an attempt to destroy the unity of the country in official ideology, producing a 
mind-set that marks both Kurds and the leftist groups as a target. State institutions 
share a common conservative, nationalist and anti-leftist ideology, even when based 
on Kemalism or neo-Islamism. The combination of Fatmagul‟s identity as both 
Kurdish and leftist made her persona non-grata in her relationships with the state. 
Another encounter moment with the Turkish State is told by Yakup. He states that;  
 
“When we came in Ankara, I can say that we did not have any 
problem with the people, but our relationship with the police was 
horrible. One day I got beaten up (by the police) because I was a 
Kurd. Last year, on 24 July at 4.30 pm I was passing by Seyran Police 
Station. The police stopped me and asked me to fill out a form. I am a 
student of “Justice” in the Open Education (Acık Ogretim 
Fakultesi
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), and so I am aware my rights as a citizen. I said that I 
have a right to see the document, but they told me not to talk much and 
to give them my ID. I gave them the ID and said again that I wanted to 
see the form first. After saying this, I was shocked. I was beaten up for 
half an hour. They were also swearing. They did this in the police 
station. I sued them. I cannot say more as the case is 
continuing.”(Yakup, Kurdish, male, 30) 
 
The relationships with the police were stressed quite often in the accounts of Kurdish 
participants. While most of the stories were related to show how they and Kurds in 
                                                 




general are discriminated against, some are told to show how they [the respondent] 
resisted discrimination. Yakup spoke about the normality of such kinds of 
discrimination among Kurdish people, asserting that: 
 
“I do not think this story is worth telling; it is nothing; but this story is 
especially important for me because I can sue because of mistreatment 
of the police.  This is not due to the positive transformations in the 
country. I can go to court today because I educated myself. I know my 
rights.” (Yakup, Kurdish, male, 30) 
 
8.1.2. Discrimination in Employment and Lost Opportunities 
 
Experiences of ID checks were just one example put forward by the participants as 
evidence of the discrimination to which they were exposed. Another common 
response to the question of discrimination, can be categorized into the inequalities 
experience in jobs, school, the workplace and military service. As Guliz asserts: 
 
 “We [Kurds] have become used to all types of discrimination in our 
lives. Me, my friends and the people around me always face this. We 
do not talk about these issues anymore; it is an internalized part of our 
life.” (Guliz, Kurdish, woman, 17) 
 
Seeing discrimination as a self-evident and obvious part of life was a crucial 
motivation in the accounts as something that certainly happens. In other words, the 
Kurdish respondents did not challenge the existence of discrimination in society, and 
tended to tell their personal experiences to contribute the argument that Kurds are 
mistreated and discriminated against. Discrimination appears as an integral part of 
the collective and individual memory of the Kurds.  
 
While personal discrimination is not downplayed, it is seen as a distinct part of 
group discrimination. In accounts of discrimination, Kurds are depicted as a 
“homogeneous victim group”. Personal stories are considered to be separate 
examples of a comprehensive discrimination culture. Participants think that they are 




subjects in such accounts. They are sure that they are discriminated against due to 
their ethnicity, without reason.  
 
“Guliz: Both of my elder brothers are shopkeepers. The younger one 
used to want to be a footballer, but he could not because he is a Kurd. 
There was another small problem; he is a little shorter than the 
demanded limit. But still he would be a goal keeper. His trainer said it 
to him openly that he would never be an important or famous player.  
Emel: Do you think this is because of his ethnicity? 
Guliz: I do. When his trainer said this it was a big disappointment for 
him. He was just eighteen. It was more sadness than a teenager can 
bear. Now he has some sort of mental disease, he is so depressed. All 
of these are an outcome of our ethnicity. If he was Turkish, maybe he 
would be a successful and rich footballer by now.” (Guliz, female, 
Kurdish, 18)  
 
Inequalities in opportunities appeared as a distinct theme in the accounts. While the 
disappointments they felt during their lives may be attributed to different things, 
such as the competitive structure of the job market, personal inadequacies or some of 
the inequality producing systems that are so common in society (such as preferential 
treatment), the Kurdish respondents tended to explain the issue from the perspective 
of discrimination. It can be said that minority groups might be more inclined to feel 
discriminated against, insomuch as any disappointment related to life and the 
difficulties faced may bring about a feeling of discrimination. Rather than thinking 
about the other inadequacies that prevented her brother from becoming a football 
player, the primary reason for exclusion and his personal disappointment is, in her 
mind, the problem of ethnicity. All the other possible reasons are covered up, and 
both the perpetrator and the victim of the story are presented easily. We do not have 
any quantitative information about the Kurdish athletes in the football or in the other 
branches of sport. While the athletes are Kurdish they are not presented by their 
ethnicity or they do not prefer to introduce themselves by ethnicity. So the important 
issue here is not the presence or non-presence of Kurdish athletes in sport branches 
in reality, instead it is the strong belief at the side of the Kurdish participants that 
they will not be allowed to involve in such activities even though they want to. 
 
In this research, the stories of ethnic discrimination experienced by the Kurdish 




the state or ordinary Turks against Kurds, as it is also necessary to take into account 
the aspect of resistance, as the other half of stories of discrimination. In this sense, 
Aliye‟s story is one of both discrimination and resistance. Aliye has worked as a 
secretary in an NGO for 15 years, after coming to Ankara 20 years. She defines 
herself as a leftist, but without any direct affiliation. Aliye claims that she has always 
experienced different forms of discrimination in her life, but says that this story was 
particularly significant due to the negative effect it had on her future life: 
 
“After I came to Ankara I started to look for a job, and at the same 
time I was preparing for the entry exams of the official institution. A 
job exam was announced by Gendarme General Command, and I 
applied for the position; but now I am thinking that maybe it would be 
better if I did not. Maybe it was a mistake, but I was looking for a job 
in the state sector to guarantee my future. There was a written exam in 
which I got quite high marks, and then it was required to enter another 
exam for the application. The applicants had to show to what extent 
they were able to use computer programmes, and I did quite well in 
this part as well. The final step was an interview. We waited for hours 
until 11 pm; finally it was my turn. I entered the room, but before I sat 
down, one of the examiners said, “Aliye is from Kars Digor”. There 
was an awkward silence, and at that moment I understood that it was 
over. They would not accept me because of my ethnicity. They only 
asked me some trivial questions. Unsurprisingly, I did not get the job. 
It was a quite frustrating experience for me, and I was not happy. I 
wrote a letter to the highest person in Gendarme General Command of 
the time, I think it was Levent Ersoz, who is in the jail now accused of 
being a member of the Ergenekon
54
 organization. After a while I 
received a response from him explaining that the result of the exam 
was completely unrelated with my ethnicity. The decision was made 
according to the applicants` exam results and so forth. Of course I did 
not believe that. I was not expecting a reasonable response from them, 
I just wanted to satisfy myself.” (Aliye, Kurdish, female, 43) 
 
While Aliye received an answer to her letter about the inconvenience of her job 
interview, she was not convinced, but conveying the personal inconvenience and 
questions in her mind to the responsible people was a means of resistance. The story 
takes place in the 1990s, at the height of the conflict between the PKK and the army. 
According to her, to write a letter of complaint accusing the members of the 
examining board of discrimination and highlighting her Kurdish identity required 
                                                 




courage. She remembers this story not only as a case of discrimination in her 
personal history, but also as the first moment she recognised her “difference”, her 
“disadvantaged position” and her “Kurdishness”. In other words, her first act of 
resistance was also the beginning of her political awareness.  As can be seen in 
Aliye‟s story, experiences of discrimination are not only recounted to explain their 
encounters with discrimination, but also to show the sense of resistance and the 
instigation of personal political awareness.  
 
8.1.3. As a Discrimination Space: School and University 
 
The feeling of being discriminated against can be followed in the school experiences 
recounted by the Kurdish respondents. The lack of education has for 30 years been 
cited in official discourse as one of the main issues in the Kurdish Question, and the 
shortage of education facilities in the eastern part of the country is still a discussion 
topic in Turkey. One of the main narratives of Turkish nationalism is related to the 
inequality in education opportunities in the eastern and south-eastern cities. While 
schools and other education facilities are built there, the Kurds damage these to show 
their anger towards the state. Based on the experiences of the Turkish teachers that 
have served in that area, “Vandal Kurds” entered the narrative as an element of the 
“Terrorist Kurds” in Turkish nationalism. In patriarchal language, it is claimed that 
while state efforts to decrease inequality by investing in that area, building new 
schools and enhancing existing educational facilities, the Kurdish people do not want 
to be educated by the Turkish state, which is considered to be the enemy in the 
Kurdish society. In this regard, all the facilities and the investments of the state in 
their area are seen as targets that should be damaged in favour of the PKK. In the 
hottest period of the conflict in the 1990s,
 
teachers and civil servants working in the 
Kurdish cities were killed by PKK guerrillas, bringing about the idea of the Vandal 
Kurds‟ rejection of the help of the Turkish state. This made it acceptable for some to 
accuse all Kurds living there as being terrorists and supporters of the PKK. However, 
it is also possible to hear the same stories from challenging perspectives as can be 





“I have worked in a Kurdish village in Agri. The head teacher of the 
school was a nationalist man who hated Kurds, and who would voice 
his hatred on any occasion. The children felt that the head teacher 
also hated them.  They [Kurds] already dislike the state and military, 
growing up with these ideas of hatred, and are so insulting to us. We 
were three teachers working there at that time, and the head teacher 
was always discriminating. There were some social assistance 
projects lead by the Ministry of Education for which it was required to 
make a list of the names of the children of poor families. He would 
refuse to make these lists, or if he would give 10 names for assistance. 
But he gave just five names. He did not believe our state should feed 
them. The people of the village understood these kinds of things, and 
that was why they started to damage the school.” (Narin, Kurdish, 
female, 31) 
 
The Kurdish respondents, rather than relating only their own personal experiences of 
discrimination, often spoke about what they had observed or heard from others. 
Narin had a comfortable position working as a teacher in an eastern city that was 
close to her home town. Her personal sensitivities related to inequality and 
discrimination were strengthened after observing some particular events in that 
period. She also stressed the difference between her encounters with Turkish 
colleagues in a Turkish area and in a Kurdish dominated area. During the interview 
she tried to explain how she sometimes challenged her own identity and experienced 
difficulties in balancing her relationships with her nationalist Turkish colleagues.  
 
Besides the stories about schools and inequality in education in the eastern region, 
some Kurdish participants also talked about their sense of being discriminated 
against even in the western part of the country. Attending the same schools, sharing 
the same facilities and being educated in the same classrooms do not give rise to 
feelings of equality most of the time among the Kurds, as Nazim explains: 
 
“Kurdish university students struggle to complete their degrees just 
because of their ethnicity. My brother has not been able to graduate 
from the university for seven years. He still tries to be a mechanical 
engineer. Is he stupid? Is this the reason he could not graduate? We 
warned him about going to university, telling him to stay away from 
political issues, but what can he do? He is human. Even if he did not 




friends. All Kurdish students are considered terrorists, especially in 
some of the fascist universities. He cannot pass his degree. We 
[Kurds] do military service, it is not a matter of discrimination. They 
[the state] do not say „you are Kurdish, you do not need to complete 
your military service‟. I pay my taxes, but there is discrimination in 
other areas.” (Nazim, Kurdish, male, 36)  
 
According to Kurds, the anti-Kurdish perception affects their situation in the course 
of the encounters experienced in everyday life. As Kubra stated: 
 
“I saw so many situations in which Kurds were discriminated against, 
provoked and excluded by the lecturers in our university. This is not 
fair. As a Turk, I feel annoyed on their behalf.” (Kubra, Turkish, 
female, 22) 
 
 In the interviews the Kurdish participants implied that one did not have to be a 
Kurdish activist to be discriminated against, excluded or to suffer prejudice, as 
having friends from Kurdish groups was enough. Based on the accounts of 
discrimination, it can be said that being a Kurd or having a relationship with Kurdish 
activist group members, despite having no political affiliation or Kurdish ethnic 
identity, are considered as a challenge for Turks. Such attitudes make the Kurds 
vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion, and at this point, different forms of 
resistance emerge within the stories of discrimination of the Kurdish respondents. 
 
“At school I experienced a lot of bad things due to my ethnicity. My 
Turkish friends would talk easily about Kurds using swearing, and 
insulting and humiliating terms. I started to talk about Kurds when the 
subject was opened, just sharing my family‟s experiences. I see this as 
a kind of resistance, as I am only a high school student. Speaking is all 
I can do now. My teachers recognised me and my political 
transformation, and started to take an interest in me. One of them gave 
me high grades. My friends said that he [the teacher] behaved in this 
way in order for me to “grow” as an individual. When we have to 
write an essay for homework, I write about the Kurdish issue. I write 
well. All of the class listens to me when I read my essay. My teacher 
wants me to grow as a person. But he could not. He tried many things 
to form a connection with me, but he could not. He asked me tell him 
the books I read, but I did not want to have a close relationship with 
him because I do not want to be assimilated. I do not want to be a 





Being suspicious of the attitudes of majority group members was another form of 
reaction among the Kurdish participants. Trying to gain the trust of young Kurdish 
people and protect them from harmful and illegal separatist ideas was another 
narrative form in Turkish nationalism. The belief that Kurds are passive figures that 
are vulnerable to being cheated leads some Turks to believe they have a mission to 
protect young Kurdish people. Encounters between passive and cheated Kurdish 
subjects and active Turkish objects, equipped with the mission of protection and 
salvation, creates another form of resistance on the Kurdish side. Any “remedial” 
reactions of Turkish individuals in this regard are seen as the latest practices in the 
assimilationist policies of the state, and are strictly rejected.  
 
8.2. Discrimination and Resistance in Everyday Life  
 
8.2.1. Encounters in the Neighbourhood 
 
While being discriminated against by the state as a student in a public school, as a 
worker or civil servant in the public sector, and as a citizen in the streets by the 
police and gendarmerie, Kurdish people also claim that the state is not the only 
perpetrator of discrimination.  In this regard, “ordinary Turks” also discriminate 
against them in their daily encounters, such as in the neighbourhood, in the issue of 
marriage, in friendships, and so forth.   
 
While very few neighbourhood stories were told, the difficulties in “renting a flat” 
was one of the most common sources of discrimination in everyday life. A lack of 
interaction or only limited forms of interaction in the neighbourhoods make it 
apparent that Kurds are not wanted either as a tenant or a landlord in Turkish-
dominated parts of the city. Living in the same apartment or in the same street as a 
Kurd is not a well-accepted situation for Turks. The Turkish respondents often 
mentioned in their accounts about how they avoided sharing apartments and 
neighbourhoods with Kurds and narrated their discussions with their Kurdish 
neighbours several times, besides any positive experiences. Cultural difference and 




alongside Kurds. Both the Turkish neighbours and the landlords of Kurds complain 
about the same things, such as the overcrowded Kurdish households, misuse of 
houses, the perception of Kurds as criminal, etc. In the event of a problem with a flat, 
such as unpaid rent, Turks avoid from the supposed harsh reactions of the Kurds. It 
should at this point be stated that Kurds are not the only the social group in the flat-
rental market, as students, couples and those who want to live alone also opt for this 
form of accommodation. This is a kind of rule that functions in everyday life without 
questioning among landlords and tenants.  
 
“I lived in Altındag
55
 for ten years with my family; the landlady of the 
house was Turkish. We found the house with reference of my 
husband‟s aunt. The landlady did not want to rent us the house 
because we are Kurdish. She said that Kurds fight all the time, and she 
did not want to face with these kinds of problems. A year after we 
rented the house, her perception changed completely, and a mother-
child relationship developed between us. I think when sharing 
increases, a transformation occurs in relations. They [Turks] are 
biased against Kurds, but Kurds are more conservative (in a moral 
and religious sense) and have strict rules about the life and honour. 
That is why they fight more often than Turks. I think that Turks feel 
themselves to be weak in front of the Kurds, and that is why they 
[Turks] avoid interacting with them.” (Filiz, Kurdish, female, 27) 
 
Stories about problems in renting property were told by most of the Kurdish 
respondents. To overcome this problem they tend to live in the more Kurdish 
dominated neighbourhoods or look for Kurdish landlords. It may be seen as a minor 
problem; however the amount of time these stories took up in the accounts was clear 
evidence of the importance of the issue in the daily lives of Kurdish respondents. The 
most common theme in these stories was that the Kurds are aware of their perception 
in the eyes of the Turks, and that is why they tended to interact with Turkish groups 
as little as possible, so as to avoid negative encounters. In unavoidable situations, 
hiding one‟s ethnicity, presenting landlords with a fait accompli or forcing the 
landlords to rent the flat emerged as leading strategies. Selling or renting these 
                                                 
55  Altındag is a metropolitan district in Ankara that is located just outside the city centre and has long been 
home to the workers of the city. It remains as one of the poorer quarters of the capital, with a high rate of 
illiteracy. The hillside is covered with illegally-built shanty houses [gecekondu] that are home to low-income 
families. In these areas there are some municipal buildings, public housing, state housing for civil servants and 




properties to Kurds appear as a political encounter moment in which various types of 
discrimination are produced.  
 
Landlords are not seen as the only decision-maker in such exchanges; as neighbours 
often want to be able to influence the decision. If a landlord wants to rent a flat to a 
Kurd, student or couple, the decision may need the approval of the other residents. 
While this process cannot be generalised for all apartments, it can be said that this is 
widely accepted procedure in society.  
 
“I had a detached house, and I sold the land to a building contractor 
to build an apartment. At that time we looked for a flat to rent. We 
found many flats that we wanted to rent, but the landlords did not want 
to give us them, as we are Kurdish. One day my wife viewed a flat, and 
before the landlord could ask our hometown, I mean our ethnicity, she 
grabbed the keys and signed the contract. After everything was done, 
he [landlord] asked where we were from, and she said told him we 
were from Haymana
56
. He immediately regretted (allowing us to sign 
the contract) and tried to get the keys back from us, but it was too late 
(laughing). He said that at the time a lot of people around him asked 
him how could let the house to Kurds. Our neighbours from the 
apartment also scolded him for letting the flat to a Kurdish family. 
Then we moved in. After several months they [neighbours] confessed 
this to us after seeing our humanity and kindness. They said: “Before 
you moved in, we thought that Kurds were immoral, unbalanced, 
abusive people, like cannibals. You cannot be Kurdish. You cannot be 
from Haymana.” (Omer, Kurdish, male, 35) 
 
As can be seen in both of the examples above, the stories finish in the same way. The 
problem, the mode of narration and ending to the stories are quite similar. In these 
stories, three common points are stated:  
 
i. We are discriminated against by ordinary Turks. 
ii. We found the ways of dealing with this mistreatment.  
iii. Any opportunity of interaction changes the perceptions of Turks about us 
[Kurds]. 
 
                                                 




As a form of agency, the Kurds wanted to show their kindness, respect and humanity 
in these accounts. As was discussed in Chapter 6, as a narrative strategy, “self-
defence” emerges as a means of self-definition and self-expression in the accounts of 
the Kurdish respondents. In this way, there is a desire to prove that Kurdish people 
are modern enough to live alongside Turks. Some positive stereotypical language 
forms, such as “Kurds are a hospitable and helpful community”, were used by the 
Kurdish participants, and all these narrative strategies can be read as an attempt to 
gain an equal footing with Turks in residential areas.  
 
Of the 20 Kurdish interviews within this research, only one commenced with a story 
of discrimination. In the account of Filiz (Kurdish, female, 27), it can be said that her 
general perception of the Kurdish Question is based on the notion of discrimination 
faced by the Kurds in everyday life. She initiated her account with a story that 
showed how Kurds cope with discrimination in their daily lives. Filiz‟s story refers 
to her struggle with her family to continue attending school and how she refused to 
get married at a young age. As she stated in her account:  
 
“Resistance is so important to reach one‟s aims. I have lived through 
this in my personal life. I resisted my parents and managed to 
convince them in some ways. I reached my goals. If I had not done 
this, I would not be the person I am today. The Kurdish problem is the 
same thing, I suppose. Someone wants to suppress us, and we [Kurds] 
need to resist to reach our goals.” (Filiz, Kurdish, female, 27) 
 
Neither Kurds, nor Turks are monolithic groups, and distinctions between the 
ethnicity group members in terms of their perceptions of discrimination vary. 
Besides dealing with the aspect of resistance, Filiz's story is of additional interest in 
that it reveals the differences among the Kurdish participants in terms of their 
perception of discrimination. While the idea of being discriminated against by 
ordinary Turks especially over the last decade, is accepted widely by the Kurdish 
participants, opposite ideas also emerge, such as in Filiz's story of discrimination. 
 
“Before you ask me anything, I want to tell you a story about your 
research subject; but before telling the story I want to state that the 
negative reactions of people [non-Kurds] towards Kurds have 




an unusual thing, but I think it is over now. When you say „Kurd‟ now, 
it is to say that we are all human, living under the same flag in this 
country. The story I want to tell is related to what I am trying to 
explain. A woman was walking along the street while my mother was 
sweeping the ground in front of the house, eight years ago. She said to 
my mother, “Get away from there, dirty Kurdish woman”. Can you 
believe this? Reactions towards the Kurds were like this in the past. A 
woman walking in your street was able to say this easily. Now these 
kinds of things, these biases, have decreased. People have been less 
aggressive for last three or four years.” (Filiz, Kurdish, female, 27) 
 
Kurdish respondents are divided over on the argument of decreasing the 
discriminative attitudes. To some Kurdish respondents the transforming policies 
related to the Kurdish Question and some political moves, such as the recent 
“Kurdish Opening” project of the government, have helped to remove the taboos 
related to the Kurdish Question in society. The new political flexibility has been 
reflected in the public sphere and has provided more flexible possibilities for 
interactions among individuals, in some areas. As Onur related in his account: 
 
“Recently, we took a breath as Kurds. After the dark days of the 
1990s, under this government the Kurds have obtained a more secure 
and equal situation in society again.” (Kurdish, male, 55) 
 
While the decreasing discrimination in society over the last 10 years was cited in the 
accounts of a few Kurdish participants, the opposite was still referred to more often 
in the interviews. 
 
8.2.2. Discrimination in Men-Women Relationship: Love and Marriage 
 
“Emel: What do you think about the “Kurdish Opening”? How does it 
affect daily life?  
Yakup: When I first heard about the “Kurdish Opening” project, 
believe me, the first thing that came to my mind was falling in love. 
The only thing I thought about was there would no longer be war or 
discrimination. People will not die in the mountains or while doing 
military service any more. I felt a kind of excitement and happiness. 
Unfortunately, everything led to disappointment; but believe me, when 




and just run through the green grasses. There was excitement, emotion 
and hope.” (Yakup, Kurdish, male, 30) 
 
 
Nationalism as a founder ideology embedded in everyday life practices has a great 
impact on the relationship between men and women. In this sense, the differences 
between men and women in terms of ethnicity, religion and sect, and educational 
and financial equality appear to be the most important criteria. Even before the 
relationship become to the marriage level, only involving romantically with a person 
from a different ethnicity is seen as a potential problem by both the parents and the 
couples themselves. Avoiding a relationship with a person of different ethnicity is a 
common attitude in the society, although this control mechanism does not 
necessarily relate to the Kurdish Question and political distinctions between Kurds 
and Turks. The main reason here seems to be the differences in cultural codes and 
practices, and prejudices about Kurds that mostly dictate these structures in society, 
rather than political distinctions. While these cultural codes attempt to prevent 
relationships between Kurds and Turks, individuals find alternative ways to resist the 
collective rules in everyday life.  
 
“Of course we have relationship with Turks. For example, I had a 
Turkish girlfriend. I cannot tell this story to anyone easily, but I want 
to tell it now.  She was the daughter of a municipal police officer. 
Maybe it is really strange. Her family was rather fascist, so they did 
not like Kurds. We resisted for a while, but we could not find a 
solution. Our relationship lasted for one year. She would sometimes 
say something unwittingly that hurt or humiliated me, „I wish you were 
not that, I wish you were not of that ethnicity or from that city‟. She 
was not that mature, and maybe that is why she said these kinds of 
things. She was easily manipulated.  
E: Did her family know about your relationship? 
Y: Her mother knew, and that was why there was displeasure in the 
house. I had that kind of story. The most important thing was that she 
never knew that I was a paper gatherer. I did not say. While I was 
working in Kızılay (Ankara‟s most central district), I called her to 
learn where she was in order to avoid an encounter. I knew where she 
was, but wanted to know if she was thinking of coming to Kızılay 
(laughing). Maybe it was the longing of a paper gatherer. There was 
always a longing. To spend the weekends with the person you love. 




my real situation from her, but I never revealed it. Maybe she still 
does not know.  
E: How did you hide your job for a year?  
Y: I was always checking where she was. I sorted it out somehow.” 
(Yakup, Kurdish, male, 30)  
 
In Yakup's story it is clear that it was not his ethnicity that he kept hidden, but his 
job. He wanted to hide his poverty, not directly his ethnicity. Besides his job and low 
financial status in society, his ethnicity would also be an obstacle if the relationship 
came to the point of marriage. He always knew that this relationship would be 
prevented by his girlfriend‟s family. As he states: “There was no happy ending for 
us. That is why I did not want to admit everything about myself.” He did not even 
resist or fight for his relationship, because he was already certain of the inequality. 
He saw this relationship as a dream. After the interview he kept talking about the 
relationship subject, and added that he felt like a thief when he was together with his 
Turkish girlfriend, feeling like somebody who has stolen something belong to him 
through lies. He was aware that he could never have her, not only because of the lies 
behind the relationship, but also because of the impossibilities faced in the 
relationship.  
 
The codes of discrimination at work in society are regarded as self-evident and part 
of the natural structure of modern society in the minds of some of the Kurdish 
respondents. In some cases, such as in those related to relationships and marriage, 
the power of prejudice is accepted without question. The power of prejudice and 
discrimination in society has turned people into passive agents in their own stories in 
most situations.  
 
Besides the hegemonic and determinant nature of cultural prejudices and 
discrimination, different methods in projecting one‟s self-identity are adopted by 
Kurdish people that also make them active agents in their own stories. Although 
effective prejudices are evident and are the basic reason behind the lack of 
interaction between Kurdish and Turkish men and women, the avoidance of inter-
ethnic relationships is a kind of precaution taken by individuals in an attempt to 




unconscious responses given by individuals as strategy of self-defence, relationships 
between men and women are also seen as a challenge and as a means of resistance in 
inter-ethnic relationships. As Dilan states:  
 
“I had a nationalist [Turkish] boyfriend. When I recognised his true 
face, I broke up with him immediately. I did not understand his 
political ideas at first, but after watching news of a gunfight on 
television, he shared some fascist videos on Facebook as a protest 
against the Kurds. After saw this bullshit, I broke up with him without 
giving him an explanation. His Turkishness was not important for me, 
so long as he was not a fascist; I cannot be with a person who hates 
Kurds. I do not say that I do will not marry a Turkish man, there are a 
lot of Turkish people who defend the Kurdish movement, but if he is a 
fascist, no way. I cannot.” (Dilan, Kurdish, female, 18)  
 
While Dilan was telling her story she was clearly enjoying being on the powerful 
side of the relationship as a member of the minority and disadvantaged group. She 
enjoyed taking this decision on her own, “without explanation”. As a young and 
beautiful Kurdish woman, and as the object of desire in the relationship, she felt the 
power of being able to make the decision to punish the other side for his racist ideas. 
As she said after the interview, “It felt like I had taken the revenge of the Kurdish 
girls upon Turkish guys who humiliate and exclude Kurds.” As a young politically 
aware woman with knowledge of the politics of the Kurdish issue, she was also 
proud of herself for being able to make this political decision without hesitation to 
avoid turning her back on her identity. It can be said that Kurds talk often about the 
advantages of being assertive in the course of discriminative encounters, as the 
satisfaction that they feel after an assertive response makes them feel more 
confident, despite the risk of possible conflict with the perpetrator. The obstacle 
Cevat faced in his marriage shows another aspect of the discrimination. 
 
“I have problems in my marriage because of this ethnicity issue. My 
wife is from Bala,57 and her father says that her grandfathers came 
from Diyarbakır. He always repeats that they are also Kurd from one 
side, but my wife always denies it. She says she is a proper Turk and a 
Turkish nationalist. She won‟t accept being a Kurd. They think that 
being a Kurd is the same thing as being a second-class citizen. She 
                                                 
57 Bala is a town and district of Ankara, 67 km south-east of the city. Bala is one of the two 




feels humiliated. She always says „Damn Kurds!‟ This is the term she 
uses. When I remind her that I am Kurdish, she says „I do not mean 
you.‟ I cannot believe it. I am a Kurd, and she is also a Kurd, even if 
she denies it. Before we got married, this issue was not a problem 
between us. When watching news about dead soldiers and Kurds in the 
war, I get sad. I do not understand why she gets that angry about 
Kurds. When I listen to Grup Yorum
58
 while driving, she gets mad. She 
says that the lyrics of the song say „come to mountains. She says: „Why 
do you listen this music? Are you a PKK guerrilla?‟ She hates Ahmet 
Kaya.
59
 She has no idea about politics. The only politics she knows is 
that Kurd means PKK. She believes that Kurds want to separate our 
country, and that we have to send them out of the country. All these 
expressions are so annoying. Not even my wife respects my ethnicity.” 
(Cevat, Kurdish, male, 34) 
 
Cevat‟s annoyance at the political ideas and feelings about Kurds has different 
dimensions and dilemmas: Firstly, his wife‟s denial of her ethnicity and her assertive 
attitudes towards Kurdish people is a result of the assimilation policies of the state. 
He believes that 90 years of assimilation have promoted a negative and backward 
image of the Kurds in society caused the denial of Kurdishness as an ethnic identity 
by some Kurds, especially those who were born and grew up in western cities. He 
stresses that accepting and practising the Kurdish identity is seen as something of 
which one should be ashamed. Secondly, he stressed that he knows a lot of people in 
his personal environment that hide and deny their Kurdishness to avoid feelings of 
second-class citizenship. For Cevat, the hiding or denial of Kurdishness is not the 
result of direct discrimination towards Kurds in society. The image and low-status 
associated with Kurdishness compels some Kurds to build an identity based on their 
denial of their roots, from where they practice an exaggerated form of Turkish 
                                                 
58 Grup Yorum (Yorum meaning “interpretation” or “comment” in Turkish) is a music group 
formed in 1985 that has released twenty albums since 1987. “Grup Yorum have been at the forefront 
of a genre known as protest music.  
59 Ahmet Kaya (October 28, 1957– November 16, 2000) is a Kurdish singer who was known 
for his political protest music. During his career he recorded approximately 20 albums. Kaya has been 
among the singers blacklisted and banned for more than 25 years. “On 10 February 1999, the televised 
annual music awards ceremony, SHOW TV, at which he was to be named Musician of the Year, he 
spoke out about his Kurdish background and said “I composed a Kurdish song and I am looking for a 
brave producer and a brave TV channel to broadcast it. I know there are some among you." Upon 
hearing this statement, prominent Turkish musicians and celebrities of the time began throwing 
objects at Kaya, including forks and knives from the tables before them. He was protected from injury 
by a couple of friends and waiters. Soon after the event, Kaya was forced out of Turkey due to 
constant death threats and he died in Paris in 2000. (retrieved 




nationalism. From Cevat‟s account, it can be said that having prejudiced ideas about 
Kurds, being a producer of these negative feelings and perpetrating discriminatory 
acts may be carried out also by Kurdish individuals.  
 
8.2.3. Discriminatory Experiences in the Workplace 
 
Just as discrimination is not produced only by members of the majority group, 
resistance is not a strategy of only the minority group. As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, Kurds tend to discriminate against Turks, especially in Kurdish dominated 
areas such as the local farmer‟s markets (bazaar) in Ankara. To stress this point, it 
may be helpful to remember the auto-critique of Nazim about the powerful position 
of the Kurds in the bazaars as a Kurdish salesman.  
 
“We [Kurds] are powerful in all the bazaars in Ankara. If we do not 
allow it, Turks cannot work with us there. Sometimes I feel that we 
also discriminate against Turks; but we need to protect some fields in 
which we feel confident and powerful to protect ourselves.” (Nazim, 
Kurdish, male, 36) 
 
 In some stories it can be seen that the resistance of the Kurds is supported by some 
Turkish individuals, as in the story narrated by Cemal:  
 
“In the past, I do not remember the name of the judge, but when I was 
working in the courthouse in Ankara he started a campaign for the 
Soldier Foundation (Mehmetcik), saying that everyone had to make a 
donation. I submitted a petition saying that I would not make a 
donation, and that these kinds of campaigns do not contribute to peace 
in this country. Only 40–50 people said they would not donate; all of 
them were from my department. When the petitions were checked, he 
[pay clerk] recognised that most of the petitions were given by people 
from the eastern or south-eastern parts of the country. He [pay clerk] 
went to the administrator judge and suggested to exile the owners of 
the petitions, but this was prevented by another judge who was 
Turkish. I lived through that kind of thing.” (Cemal, Kurdish, male, 
68) 
 
As Cevat, Aliye, Narin, Dilan and Filiz state in their accounts, when new 




towards Kurds changed, especially in the workplace. When the scene changes, 
the roles and the attitudes of the players may also change very easily. This 
situation can be defined as a hidden tension between the two sides, which may 
be invisible in calmer and more peaceful times, but have the potential to 
transform quickly into a threatening situation for the Kurds. So, friendship does 
not keep outside this tension from the interaction forms in the society. 
 
8.2.4. Discrimination Forms in Friendships 
 
As in other forms of interaction, the notion of friendship is also affected by the 
prejudices and discriminative norms that are prevalent in society. Although avoiding 
political discussion in private relationships is a widely accepted attitude in Turkey, 
the transformations seen in recent decades have made political identities more salient 
in everyday life. The roots of this distinction can be found in Turkey‟s political 
history, which is based on such as the Kemalist elites/populists, leftists/rightists, 
Alevis/Sunnis, socialists/nationalists, Kurds/Turks, Islamists, 
conservatives/secularists-leftists, and so forth.
60
 All these distinctions find reflections 
in the ordinary practices of people in everyday life. In this dichotomous structure of 
daily life, people construct their lives within or out of the political frame. While rules 
heeding cultural norms may be the most comfortable position for an individual, 
taking these differentiated and closed forms of interaction for granted would be a 
naïve approach to understanding the dynamics of everyday life. People find different 
ways of reducing the importance of distinctions, or choose to ignore the differences 
on some occasions, such as in friendships. As long as political identity is not 
highlighted, an invisible agreement can work for both sides of the interaction. Such 
an agreement is based on the rule that ethnic and religious identities can be tolerated 
and ignored, as long as non-political identities are maintained. This rule works for 
both religious and ethnic identities, and any ethnic or religious identity 
manifestations are considered as attempts to break the rules of the agreement. The 
invisible agreement in society produces a two layered structure of interaction; the 
                                                 




first being the form of interaction produced by the obedient group in the agreement 
who chooses to ignore and to engage by making invisible their own differences, and 
the second being the people who prefer to remain outside this agreement and 
socialise only in groups in which they can retain their identities.  
 
“I worked in Bodrum
61
 for a while. There was a visible bias towards 
the Kurds there, in that Bodrum is a centre of attraction for 
immigrants – not only migrating Kurds, but also a lot of English and 
British people. One day there was a dinner event in a gorgeous hotel 
that was organized by the school in which I work. I went with my 
husband. It was around spring. It was forbidden to smoke inside, and 
so my husband went outside with the husbands of my friends. My 
husband is a Turk and is a civil servant, one of the guys that went out 
with him was a police officer and another one was a municipality 
police officer. They talked about the Kurdish issue for a while. My 
husband told me later that they had seen some Kurdish guys working 
in the hotel and had started to swear at them. They said: “It is 
required to kill all of them. They have bad stock in their families.” I 
was surprised when I heard this. I could not believe how they could 
say these kinds of racist things when they know my ethnicity. I talked 
to my friends about this issue, but after that I felt that they kept me 
away from their environment. They did not invite me to the meetings 
we used to have before. I think this is nationalism in bad sense.” 
(Narin, Kurdish, female, 31) 
 
When striking up a friendship, expectations are kept low in terms of tolerance of 
ethnic and religious differences, but after forming an emotional and close friendship 
with an “other”, expectations increase.  
 
“I had a friend named Esra who was from Aydın. We lived together in 
Agrı for 3–4 years and worked in the same village.  She hates Kurds, 
but she knew that I am a Kurd. So she did not explain her thoughts 
openly, but when she came to visit me here in Ankara, she was 
completely different. I introduced her to one of my friends, Osman, 
who is a Kurd from Agrı. We had dinner one night and she started to 
discuss the issue of Kurds with Osman.  She repeated the same things 
that the state feeds them. We suffered a lot when we worked in Agrı. 
“They are paid for all their children, yet they still betray the state,” 
these kinds of negative things. Finally she exasperated him [Osman]. 
He was so patient for a while; he just listened and he also started to 
talk. We [my husband and I] could not do anything. Both of them were 
                                                 




our guests. We tried to change the subject, but Osman left. I was very 
sad. We lived for four years together in Agrı. We were so close, but the 
same person said those kinds of things. I broke off our relationship 
afterwards. After all those years I realised that she was a racist. I 
never talked to her again.” (Narin, Kurdish, female, 31) 
 
The rules of the invisible agreement function as a precaution and defence 
mechanism, allowing individuals to avoid negative and destructive 
consequences, but they do not work all the time. As can be seen in Narin‟s 
account, the content and the form of the friendship depends on the time and the 
place, and accordingly disappointment, damaged relationships, giving assertive 
responses and refusing to meet again were common themes in the narratives of 
the Kurdish respondents when discussing negative experiences with friends.  
 
8.2.5. Discrimination in Entertainment Places: The Issue of Kurdish 
Music 
 
Another topic that is often referred in the accounts is related to the respondents‟ 
experiences in public entertainment places, such as pubs and bars.
62
Based on these 
accounts, it can be claimed that there is a natural distinction between preferred 
entertainment places of the members of the two groups that is based on the music 
being played. In other words, language appears as a challenging area for the 
members of both groups. Although the Kurdish respondents shared dozens of 
personal experiences related to discrimination and prejudice, the stories told do not 
mention discrimination related to sex, gender identity or religious sect, other than 
that based on the language they speak.  
 
                                                 
62 In 11 December, 2011 Gazi Bayır, a Kurdish man, was murdered in İzmir in a bar in which live 
music was being played. http://www.haber7.com/yorum/oku/819542/p2. In addition, on 28 December, 
2011 a Turkish singer named Sarp Ozturk was murdered by Metin Baydar after he refused to sing a 






There are many bars and pubs in Ankara that are famous for their traditional music 
programs. While the repertoire of such live music performances include folk songs 
with different languages, such as Laz, Georgian, Hemshin, Persian and Arabic, the 
inclusion of Kurdish songs in the repertoire may cause discomfort to people with 
nationalist ideas. Although the languages of the different minority groups settled in 
Turkey are not seen as a cause for concern, speaking and singing in Kurdish in 
public places is regarded as a “separatist practice” in everyday life.  
 
“I saw many times people being annoyed at hearing Kurdish music in 
bars. I saw people leave a bar if two Kurdish songs were played one 
after the other. There is a bar in Ankara that belongs to my friend 
from Diyarbakır; they always see these kinds of situations. I always go 
there. If Kurdish music is played, I stay, but if it is not, I leave, but I do 
not create a problem. I do not get annoyed when listening to Turkish 
music. I lived in Adana for a while. One of my woman friends invited 
me to drink something together one night. We went to a place; I do not 
remember the name now. A waiter came to our table and we started to 
chat. He asked where we were from. I said I am from Diyarbakır. He 
was from Mardin. I wanted to listen a Kurdish song, and there was 
live music that night. The waiter said that it is forbidden. I asked 
where the owner of the place was. He said he was from Diyarbakır, 
and I was surprised at how it could be forbidden if he was from 
Diyarbakır. I wanted to talk to the owner. I said to him, „You are from 
Diyarbakır, you are Kurd, why do not you let us listen to Kurdish 
music?” He said that Kurdish music was not in much demand, to 
which I replied that I demand it. He let us listen to a Kurdish song, 
and then some people sitting at the next table asked to the singer to 
sing another song called “Turkiyem
63
” (My Turkey). Can you believe 
that? We do not even have the right to listen to a Kurdish song.” 
(Mahmut, Kurdish, male, 40) 
 
Speaking and singing in Kurdish was officially banned
64
 in Turkey from 1983 until 
1991.
65
 Although there is no restriction to speaking Kurdish in law, it is still regarded 
as an illegal/inconvenient act in the collective memory. Besides restrictions of the 
Kurdish language in law in the past, speaking and singing in Turkey is considered to 
                                                 
63  Original name of the song is “Olürüm Türkiyem” (I'd die for my Turkey), which is a song 
sung especially when waving off new soldiers at the bus stations. 
64 While before and after this law regulations Kurdish was always seen as an illegal language 
till last periods of Ottoman Empire. 
65 The issue of the bans and restriction of the Kurdish language will be discussed in the 




be a show of strength of Kurdish people, and disrespectful to the martyred soldiers of 
the war. Having the right to speak and sing in Kurdish publicly are regarded as an act 
of compensation to the Kurds, and so singing in Kurdish is read as a symbol of 
acquisition of the Kurdish movement:  
 
“I went to Akcakoca with some friends for a two-day holiday. We met 
a friend who was living there who brought us to a hill place with a 
great sea view. We parked our cars there and started to drink beer. 
One of our friends turned on the car stereo; some folk songs (türkü in 
Turkish language) were playing. There were other groups there who 
were also drinking beer. After a while a Kurdish song played. We did 
not notice the reactions of the other groups, then one of the guys from 
the other group moved his car near to us. He turned on his own stereo, 
opened all of the doors of the car and turned the volume up to 
maximum. The song being played was „Türkiyem‟. We did not say 
anything, but apparently he wanted to show his reaction to the 
Kurdish music. We annoyed and left.” (Cemal, Kurdish, male, 68) 
 
The subject of playing and listening to Kurdish music brought several different 
reactions from the Turkish respondents. While the varied assertive responses by 
Turkish people against Kurdish music are defined as a form of resistance by the 
Kurdish respondents, these acts cannot be defined as resistance. Alongside the 
common tendency of denial of Kurds, the Kurdish Question and the Kurdish 
language within Turkish society, these acts can be seen as another part of the 
strategy of denial. As discussed in Chapter 5, denial as a narrative strategy does not 
include only acts of denial and ignoring the issue, as denial can also take the form of 
threats, of turning the volume of Kurds down and ignoring all the critical and 
challenging ethnicity practices of Kurds, which emerge as the different approaches 
in the strategy of denial.  
 
The story behind the song “Turkiyem” (My Turkey) is of symbolic importance in 
the collective memory in Turkey. The lyrics are full of praise to Turkey, but also 
reference the acts of torture in the coup periods of the 1980s. The song was sung to 
leftist prisoners by soldiers and police officers as a part of the torture process, which 
is why it has a tragic meaning in the collective memory. As a demonstration of the 




song is kept alive in the Turkish nationalist narrative. While in the coup period the 
song targeted leftists and communists, in the recent political environment it is used 
against Kurds.  
 
The forms of discrimination and prejudice differ within society, just as the forms of 
resistance diversify in personal practices aimed at constructing the self-identity. 
Creative forms of resistance and the insistence of expression of one‟s identity are 
carried out by individuals, despite the potential prejudiced and exclusionary 
reactions. As Dilan told in her account, while she fell repressed due to her ethnicity, 
she insist to resist in the public space by using such accessories as bracelets and 
hairpins that carry the colours of Kurdish flag. The ringtone of her phone is a song 
by Aynur Dogan,
66
 who is a popular Kurdish singer who sings in Kurdish. She 
claims that the hairpin in her hair and the bracelet round her wrist are symbols of her 




Without questioning the factuality of the macro appearances of discrimination, it is 
necessary to underline the fact that Kurds maintain a feeling of being discriminated 
against. The intention in this study is not to check the validity of the experiences of 
the Kurds narrated in this study, but rather to answer the questions of how they 
experience their encounters with Turks, identifying the impacts of these experiences 
on how they interact with each other, and showing how the inferences based on these 
specific experiences function in the construction of their political/ethnic identities, as 
a more important aspect on which to focus.  
 
This chapter has presented stories of discrimination by the Kurdish respondents, 
related to various spheres of everyday life. The chapter further analyses the stories of 
resistance against discriminatory, pejorative attitudes, practices and perceptions. 
According to Kurdish respondents, various types of discrimination are experienced. 
                                                 
66 Aynur Dogan (1975-…) is a Kurdish singer whose 2004 album was banned by a provincial 
court in Diyarbakir in 2005 on the grounds that the lyrics contained propaganda for an illegal 




The general argument put forward in the interviews is that Kurds, as a distinct ethnic 
group, are humiliated, excluded and tortured by the state [police, soldiers etc.] due to 
their ethnicity. Their relationships with the police are stressed quite often in their 
accounts. While most of the stories are narrated to show how they individually and 
Kurds in general are discriminated against, some are told to show how they [the 
participants] resist discrimination. 
 
The distinction between discrimination by the state and discrimination by ordinary 
Turks made in the accounts of the Kurdish respondents is an important narrative 
strategy, allowing an understanding of how the notion of discrimination is perceived. 
As has been stated in earlier chapters, the general inconvenience suffered by the 
Kurdish respondents mostly refer to the institutionalized forms of systematic state 
discrimination and prejudice, while ordinary Turks were added to the list of 
perpetrators of discrimination after the 2000s. The various discrimination stories told 
against such backdrops as the school, workplace, neighbourhood, bars and cafes, in 
the streets, and also in matters of love, marriage and friendship are not regarded as 
only practices of discrimination. Through the personal accounts of the Kurdish 






This thesis aims to understand how ordinary people see this ethnic conflict between 
the Kurds and Turks, how they define the “self” and the “other” in this encounter, 
and how they define their relationship with the ethnic other within this excessively 
nationalist-driven political atmosphere.  It explores the ideology of nationalism 
through the personal narratives of ordinary people, allowing us to see the reflections 
and reproduction of nationalism from a bottom-up perspective.  
 
Personal stories serve as tools in the reproduction of ideologies. In this respect, it 
may be argued that the ideology of nationalism, which provides a comprehensive 
view of life for individuals, should also be studied through personal narratives which 
are based on different resources such as media discourse, popular wisdom and 
personal experiences. Nationalism is not simply a macro national or international 
ideology that presents only macro definitions of the “ethnic others” and the “self” of 
a nation. It also affects the means of interaction between different ethnic groups at a 
micro level in everyday life.  
 
The meta narratives related to nationalism that aim to unify all diversities are 
produced mostly at the point of foundation of nation states, however, as a result of  
encounters between others at both collective and personal levels, these narratives of 
nationalism(s) become transformed. 
 
Meta narratives of nationalism are not perceived or practiced in the same way in the 
everyday lives of ordinary people, in that ordinary people interact with ethnic others 
in various ways, and make their own interpretation of the taken-for-granted meaning 
of nationalism. Personal and collective encounters with the „ethnic other‟ in everyday 
life have a significant impact on ethnic identification, and the ways in which 
individuals practice nationalism in their own lives. Related to this, narratives 
produced about “self” and “other” at a personal level emerge as a means of 




articulated in line with the official meta-narratives of nationalism, they may also 
challenge these. 
 
Narrative inquiry is employed as the methodological approach in this thesis, with the 
intention being to provide a comprehensive understanding of the ways in which the 
ideology of nationalism is produced, and the ways ethnicity is practiced. This is 
understood through the personal narratives of Kurds and Turks. As Hinchman and 
Hinchman state, “the narrative approach begins and ends with everyday life” (1997: 
xvi), with the experiences, encounters, speeches, purposes, expectations and longings 
of individuals expressed through their stories about themselves and others.  
 
Narrative inquiry, as a methodological approach, provides flexibility during the 
interviews and throughout the process of analysis. It also engages epistemologically 
with the theoretical concepts that are employed throughout the thesis. The dilemma 
between the big/small stories and the ways personal narratives are employed to 
understand and explain collective issues are overcome by following Stanley‟s 
approach. This suggests that narrative inquiry is a result of the interpretational 
overview of the researcher, based on small scale stories (2008:436). Departing from 
this approach, defining the personal narratives as “political” and situating the 
individuals in a wider political space become possible, while the ways in which 
ethnic identities are practiced and narrated become visible. 
 
Studies based on personal narratives have the potential to reveal certain forms of 
interaction and identity positioning, as well as the social conceptions of the ethnic 
identities of individuals. Following the narrative inquiry approach, this thesis 
examines the personal accounts and stories of individuals, with the intention of 
presenting the different forms of interaction and stories described by individuals. In 
doing so, it provides an understanding of nationalist beliefs, perceptions and 
practices based on the various forms of social encounters in which they are engaged. 
As Yuval-Davis (2006) states, “Identities are narratives, stories people tell 
themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not)” (2006: 202). In 




everyday experiences can provide a good understanding of how ordinary people see 
ethnicity and how they posit the “self” and “others” narratives. Through these 
narratives, and based on common and taken-for-granted forms of ideas, it becomes 
possible to reveal the overlooked or denied aspects of the subject. Collecting the 
taken-for-granted ideas that are structured in the ethnic identities about each other 
reveal counter narratives and points of resistance. In other words, the possibility to 
criticize the ways of self and the others‟ positions to challenge with the power 
relations occur when personal narratives do not match with the meta-narratives. 
 
While there are obvious advantages to the narrative inquiry approach in research, 
based on two clashing ethnic identities, some limitations also appear. The first 
limitation is related to the collection of data, during which prompting the participants 
faces the sensitivity of the topic. The violent sanctions faced by Kurds over the last 
30 years made them reluctant to voice their personal beliefs related to the Kurdish 
Question and the Turks, while for the Turkish respondents, talking about the Kurdish 
Question on a personal level was regarded as a producing way of the conflict in 
itself. These problems emerged during data collection, with some of interviewees 
declining to describe any personal experiences. The ambivalence between 
conducting interviews following a qualitative research method and carrying out 
fieldwork from the perspective of a narrative inquiry brought to light some other 
limitations in the early stages of the fieldwork in terms of the tools narrative inquiry 
provides, although the experiences gained in the field allowed these limitations to be 
overcome.  
 
A Discussion on the Analysis  
 
In this thesis the political and social contexts of Turkey are discussed with reference 
to the historical roots of the Kurdish Question, the emergence and development of 
the concept of Turkishness and the ideology of Turkish nationalism. Certain 
historical moments, more intense periods in the conflict between the PKK and 
Turkish state and the transformation of the Kurdish Question into an everyday issue 




personal narratives of Kurds and Turks allowed the production of two narratives 
about the personal encounters of Kurdish and Turkish individuals in everyday life, 
although voiced using various narrative strategies. In the following section, these 
narratives and the narrative strategies will be discussed in order to answer the 
research questions of this research. 
 
If one is to make a conclusive remark on the outcomes of this research, it is 
necessary to state that there is little opportunity for ordinary Kurds and Turks to 
interact on a personal basis, as they prefer not to socialise together within their daily 
lives. If they have already developed such a relationship with the “other”, they do not 
hesitate to maintain it, but the members of neither group are keen to develop a close 
relationship with one another. Kurds prefer to socialise within their own networks in 
their private lives, and Turks do not generally want to interact with Kurds. An 
invisible barrier based on prejudices and biases prevents the majority of members of 
these two groups from forming a close bond.  
 
The answer to the main question of this research “How do Turkish and Kurdish 
individuals perceive and define this ethnic conflict?” is obvious, in that the main 
narrative strategy that frames the personal experiences of Turks with Kurds is one of 
denial. That said, in summarising the features and functions of the narrative of denial 
it is necessary to answer the research question “How do the respondents construct 
personal accounts?” The answer to this question makes clear the common structure 
constructed by the respondents when giving their accounts. The interviews tended to 
be composed of two distinct parts: political speeches and political stories. Although 
this partition was not designed, either by me or the respondents, in the pilot process it 
was these two distinct themes that formed the structure of the accounts. The first 
parts, “talking politics” were composed of more vague political speeches based on 
media coverage of the Kurdish Question; while the second section, “telling stories”, 
was based on the everyday experiences of participants themselves. So it is possible to 
say that personal narratives are structured by a macro evaluation of the issue by 
reference to the resources of media discourse and popular wisdom. The summaries of 
the ethnic conflict made the first part of the interviews more superficial than the 




functioned as tools by which to frame the issue, specifying the political ideas of the 
individual by evoking dominant political clichés, slogans and common-sense 
references. In other words, the first part of the interviews was devoted to general 
political talk in daily language, and functioned as a means of framing the issue within 
the borders of the narrative of denial.  
 
It is necessary to clarify the difference between the parts of the interview dedicated 
to “talking politics” and “telling stories” in terms of the intended targets. Within the 
accounts of the Turkish respondents, the target would appear to be a relatively 
ambivalent entity in the first part of the interviews. In other words, the “other” to 
Turkishness and Turkish nationalism is identified as “all of the Kurds” or some 
Kurds living in the east of the country, or, in contrast, the Kurds living in the west of 
the country. The Turkish respondents deny the existence of a conflict between Kurds 
and Turks by relating their positive experiences with Kurds whom they know 
personally. In this regard, the target becomes some (bad) Kurds that they do not 
know personally. This uncertainty of the target in the accounts of the Turkish 
respondents reveals the situational and unfixed nature of the perceptions of the 
Turkish respondents towards Kurds. While the Turkish respondents tended to define 
the Kurds with which they interact personally in a positive light, the ambivalence of 
the target should nevertheless remind us of how positive but “unfixed” perceptions of 
the “other” may gain an exclusive and racist character. This situation highlights the 
way in which the well-being of Kurdish individuals is linked directly to the tone of 
the political situation in the country. For the Kurdish respondents, however, both in 
the first and second parts of the interviews, the “other” is the Turkish State rather 
than ordinary Turks.  
 
Denial of Official Recognition 
 
One of the questions posed in this research aims to identify the narrative strategies 
employed by the respondents in their accounts. The accounts given by the Turkish 
respondents were built upon such strategies as exaggeration, humiliation, contempt, 





In the context of Turkey, where a sharp ethnic divide has emerged in the last decades 
between Kurds and Turks, the perceptions of ordinary people and the ways they 
maintain their ethnic identities in this tense atmosphere is of great importance in 
understanding nationalism at a micro level. The armed conflict between the State and 
the PKK for the last three decades has not led to civil war, although perceptions of 
Kurds have diminished dramatically. By the 2000s, the Kurdish Question was high 
on the agenda in the western part of the country, among both Turkish and Kurdish 
populations. The forced migrations during the 1990s led to the rapid movement of 
Kurds to cities in the west of the country, making everyday encounters inevitable and 
intense. Although the Turks and Kurds had already formed a relationship in these 
western cities, the characteristics of their interaction changed the 2000s. While 
significant steps were taken to solve the Kurdish Question, the mutual perceptions of 
ordinary Kurds and Turks about each other have taken on a more negative tone. This 
paradoxical situation underpins the need to focus on personal interactions at a micro 
level through the personal narratives of individuals and their thoughts of the “other”. 
Despite encounters in everyday life, at both abstract and concrete levels, the 
perspective of denial remains unchanged. While interactions between the Turkish 
and Kurdish populations have increased, the settled structure of the official ideology 
of denial continues to determine the perceptions of ordinary people. The current 
government, which has achieved great successes in all elections since 2002, launched 
a “peace process” to resolve the Kurdish Question. This “Kurdish/democratic 
expansion” project failed in garnering the support of the majority of society. In other 
words, while there have been attempts to open to a more positive meta-narrative 
regarding the Kurdish Question, the perceptions of the Turkish people have become 
all the more sharper. When the stakeholders in the discussion (i.e. the Kurds) are 
denied in a political sense, all of the encounters and the forms of interaction, as well 
as the means of defining the self and the others, are designated within this 
perception.  
 
Denial functions as a block, preventing negotiation between the two groups.  Despite 




encounters with Kurds, Turkish respondents tend to deny the problems in 
communicating with Kurds during interviews. Any problematic encounters with 
Kurdish individuals are, in their minds, not related to the Kurdish Question. Rather, 
Turkish respondents narrate their interactions with Kurdish individuals with a denial 
of the impact of the negative and exclusionary perceptions of Kurds that has been 
created over the course of the thirty-year history of the conflict. Ironically, they 
continue to accuse and humiliate the Kurds based on their supposed ignorance, 
poverty and cultural practices. Defining the Kurds as terrorists and separatist in their 
attitudes, ideas and appearance also creates an ironic situation that challenges the 
narrative of denial. This dilemma is overcome by defining “bad and good Kurd”. In 
this way Turkish respondents believe that the Kurds with whom they interact are 
mostly „good‟ Kurds, while those who they do not know are „bad‟. They are thus 
able to depict themselves as well intentioned people with no prejudices, and in their 
narratives, the problems they face with Kurds are referred to as sporadic cases un-
related to the settled narrative marking the Kurds as separatist, terrorist and 
uncivilised. That said, defining the problematic experiences they face as sporadic 
cases does not prevent them from making prejudiced generalisation. In this way, a 
paradoxical narrative appears in which the Kurdish Question is denied and in which 
bad Kurds are presented as responsible for the emergence of the Kurdish Question. 
As a result, it is possible to say that the narrative of denial serves to cover all 
negative perceptions of the Turkish respondents towards Kurds in a paradoxical and 
inconsistent way. 
 
That said the transformation of the Kurdish Question from a taboo into a political 
problem that can be discussed openly in the social sphere, make possible to develop 
counter narratives. The tendency to create empathy with Kurds, who have been 
discriminated against by the State for the last 30 years, cannot be explained only 
from the policies of recent governments. The lack of information on the war in the 
eastern part of the country and the one-dimensional perspective presented through 
mainstream media delayed encounters of the Turkish people with the reality of the 
Kurdish Question. With the opportunities provided by the new media channels, it has 




and the personal experiences of Kurdish individuals. The sorrow experienced by the 
Kurds has begun to be shared through alternative media channels, such as 
documentaries and movies. Also scholarly studies into the Kurdish Question today 
present the destruction wreaked in the eastern part of the country. Media texts and 
works, both academic and non-academic, addressing the Kurdish Question have 
provided a more humanised aspect to Turkish eyes; however, personal encounters 
and the dissemination of alternative forms of representation of the Kurds have still 
been unable to change the settled perception of the Question. The resistance among 
Turkish respondents to recognise the Kurdish Question was based on the belief that it 
functions as a conformist political position, necessary to be considered as an 
approved citizen in the eyes of the State. The peace process has failed to expand the 
cultural and political rights of the Kurdish people and to change the negative 
perceptions of Turks towards Kurds. Any positive political steps taken by the 
government have yet to be applied in the field. This tendency makes political 
developments useless in the eyes of the Kurdish individuals, and negates any efforts 
aimed at building trust. In this regard, it would seem that the narrative of denial 
continues to be a persistent part of the political perception of the Kurdish Question. 
 
Taking all of this into account, it was important to focus on the narrative of denial at 
a personal level. One of key contributions of this research is its focus on the 
justification of denial, and how Turkish participants underpin this in their personal 
accounts. Furthermore, counter narratives produced by both Kurdish and Turkish 
participants became visible, based mainly on criticisms of the suppressing of 
executions carried out throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The 1990s are widely 
recognised as the darkest era in Republican history for the Kurdish people living in 
the eastern part of the country. Awareness of the violent policies of the State 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s has made it possible to develop an empathy with the 
Kurdish citizens. In these counter narratives, rather than ordinary Kurdish 
individuals, it was State policies that were seen as being responsible for the 






As a Dependent Variable: The Narratives of Kurds 
 
While this narrative of denial had a founding role in the personal accounts of both the 
Kurdish and Turkish respondents, the Kurdish respondents generated an additional 
narrative in the form of their personal ideas and experiences relating to the ethnic 
conflict. Recalling the research question that seeks to understand the narrative 
strategies employed by the respondents, it is possible to say that discrimination was 
the main feature in the narrative of the Kurdish accounts, manifesting as strategies of 
self-defence, accusation, resistance and silence.  
 
The narrative strategy frames the personal experiences of the Kurdish respondents‟s 
with Turks was self-defence and challenging the biases about Kurds by their personal 
effort. For the most part, the target of the accounts, the actors they encountered, was 
not ordinary Turks but the Turkish State. These encounters were, on the whole, 
violent and harsh, and determined the narratives they created. Even those Kurds who 
have not personally experienced ethnic discrimination can produce a narrative of 
being discriminated against. There was a tendency among the Kurdish participants to 
refer to collective memory rather than their own personal experiences, and to 
conceptualise their own situations through this bitter memory.  
 
For Kurdish respondents, both the collective and personal experiences with official 
agents of the Turkish State are shaped within the narrative of discrimination. Besides 
exceptional accounts, Kurdish participants tended not to make judgements about 
ordinary Turks. For many, it was during the humiliation of encounters with the State 
that they recognised themselves as discriminated against as Kurds. That said, in some 
accounts, it was not only the State that was held responsible, but also any Turk who 
supported the official denial policy of the State. 
 
The Kurdish narratives are formed in response to the arguments developed through 
the State and media, as well as those put forward by ordinary Kurds about 
themselves. The stories, which express their desires, vulnerabilities and sorrow, 




by others about themselves and try to show how these perceptions change when in 
personal interactions with ordinary Turks. They also stress the importance of these 
interactions in an attempt to correct the negative image that prevails in the eyes of 
Turkish society. It is for this reason that they tell stories about the moments in which 
they succeeded in changing the negative perception of an individual or group in their 
daily lives. Showing hospitability and helpfulness predominates in their accounts.  
 
Self-expression emerges as a supplementary part of the narrative strategy of self-
expression, and can be read as a resistance strategy developed through their 
practices. The personal encounters with Turks are composed of two distinct phases. 
In the first phase they narrate how they faced a discriminatory attitude, while in the 
second phase they explain how they managed to reverse this negative perception. 
They are aware of how they are perceived by Turks and wish to change these 
perceptions. Occasions in which they manage to change a negative image in the eyes 
of Turkish individuals are treated as success stories. Efforts to express themselves 
can also be seen as a means of resistance. Kurds see success in this regard as being 
not only the establishment of communication with Turks, but also the launch of a 
challenge against the exclusive meta-narrative produced by the state and media about 
Kurds. They want to embarrass the prejudiced Turks. In this regard, any apologies 
from Turks for their previous behaviour are held up as proof of the success of their 
resistance.  
 
The other acts of resistance of the Kurdish respondents that are developed and 
practiced in everyday life are narrated in a reactive tone, and include such acts as not 
refraining from speaking Kurdish in public, sharing messages referring to their ethnic 
identities through social media channels, wearing items that indicate their support of 
the Kurdish movement, ending friendships in which they feel they are discriminated 









The period in which the field research of this thesis was conducted does not overlap 
with the Gezi Park protests in Turkey in 2013. However it is necessary to mention 
these events as a final note of this thesis. The Gezi Park protests started in June 2013 
in Istanbul, launched as an act of resistance by a small group of environmental 
activists. Heavy-handed interventions by the police produced a sense of insurrection 
against the police, and relatedly, the government. Protests rapidly spread across the 
entire country with millions of people on the streets. For one month, hundreds 
occupied Gezi Park and established a communal settlement there. The treatment of 
protesters by the police across the entire country turned the initial protest into a mass 
anti-government action.  
 
Importantly, the protests were not focussed on supporters of one distinct ideology, 
and united people with quite different political ideas. Besides the environmental 
activists were Kemalists (secular nationalists), Turkish nationalists, socialists, 
liberals, Kurds, Alevis, LGBTT individuals, anti-capitalist Muslims, feminists, 
students, housewives, and workers. While Kemalists protested the anti-secular social 
and political policies of the government to limit the secular way of life in terms of 
alcohol consumption, right to abortion, compulsory religious education in schools 
etc., the nationalists protested the security policies related to the Kurdish Question. 
Furthermore, Alevis and Kurds targeted policies limiting their cultural, social and 
political rights. The motivation behind the protest depended on the political 
standpoints of the protest groups and of individuals, but all were able to come 
together against the police.  
 
Besides the unifying function of the protests, I wish to highlight one particular 
encounter here. During the protests, many who had never before encountered the 
violent face of the State saw this side of the government, just as Kurds, Alevis and 
Leftists had experienced previously. This was a historical moment, when ordinary 
Turkish people saw for the first time in their lives the harsh face of the State. The 




newspapers and it was social media channels that were used as the main means of 
communication by the protestors. Across several months, Turks, Lazs, Circassians, 
Georgians and so forth experienced oppression and assault, forcing many to think 
about the situation of the Kurds who had endured such treatment for the last three 
decades. Protestors shared hundreds of tweets referring to the pain of the Kurds and 
their terrible experiences with the State and all that had been kept out of view for all 
those years. Many stated that this was the time when they recognised what Kurds had 
endured for so long.  
 
During the protests, two kinds of encounters were experienced. The first one was the 
encounters of Turkish, Kurdish, Alevi, Kemalist, nationalist and feminist people with 
each other, while the second was the encounter of non-Kurdish individuals with the 
State. I believe that both of these encounters were a great opportunity to develop 
empathy between the members of the different camps. Not wanting to present an 
over-optimistic approach, I felt it necessary to stress the importance of these 
encounters, which may in some way contribute to possible peace between Kurds and 
Turks in Turkey. In following the developments related to the Kurdish Question 
since the Gezi Protests, it is apparent that attitudes towards the Kurds have seen no 
positive change at all, however the importance of a historical moment in the 
collective memory, in which a Kurd and a Kemalist are pictured walking hand-in-
hand to escape the attacks of the police in Gezi Park, is something that cannot be 






The yellow flag belongs to the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), 
while the other is the flag of the Turkish Republic, modified with an image of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This version of the flag has been the flag of choice of 
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No. Name Ethnicity Interview 
Location 
Level Of   
Education 
Religion Sect District Of 
Residence 
Age 
1 Umut       Turkish Coffee Shop Postgraduate SUNNI Yenimahalle  29 
2 Ufuk        Turkish Workplace Primary 
School 
SUNNI Çankaya 39 
3 Emine Turkish Workplace Primary 
School 
SUNNI Mamak 36 
4 Kenan  Turkish Workplace Primary 
School 
SUNNI Mamak 31 
5 Ali Turkish Workplace Primary 
School 
SUNNI Mamak 24 
6 Onur Kurdish Workplace High School SUNNI Keçiören 55 
7 Mehmet Turkish Workplace Graduate SUNNI Etimesgut 32 
8 Nihan Turkish Workplace High School SUNNI Mamak 43 
9 Selen Kurdish Her Own Flat Graduate ALEVI Mamak 31 
10 Doğan Turkish Workplace Graduate SUNNI Yenimahalle 40 
11 Aslı Turkish Coffee Shop Graduate SUNNI Etimesgut 24 
12 Pelin  Turkish Coffee Shop Graduate SUNNI Çankaya 23 
13 Dilber Kurdish Her Own Flat Secondary 
School 
ALEVI Sincan 47 
14 Şahin  Kurdish His Own Flat High School ALEVI Sincan 50 
15 Demet  Kurdish Her Own Flat High School ALEVI Sincan 18 
16 Nursel Turkish Her Own Flat High School SUNNI Yenimahalle 56 
17 Mustafa Turkish Workplace High School SUNNI Keçiören 55 
18 Adem Turkish Workplace High School SUNNI Mamak 42 
19 Hasan Kurdish Workplace Primary 
School 
ŞAFİİ Altındağ 25 
20 Yavuz Kurdish Coffee Shop High School ŞAFİİ Çankaya 26 
21 Ömer  Kurdish Coffee Shop High School ŞAFİİ Çankaya 30 
22 Neriman Kurdish Her Own Flat Graduate SUNNI Etimesgut 54 
23 Nermin Kurdish Her Own Flat High School SUNNI Etimesgut 53 
24 Nazım Kurdish Coffee Shop High School ŞAFİİ Çankaya 36 
25 Barış Turkish Coffee Shop High School SUNNI Çankaya 21 
26 Özlem Turkish Coffee Shop High School SUNNI Keçiören 20 
27 Cemal Kurdish Coffee Shop High School SUNNI Keçiören 68 
28 Mahmut Kurdish Coffee Shop Secondary 
School  
ŞAFİİ Çankaya 40 
29 Filiz Kurdish Coffee Shop Graduate ŞAFİİ Sincan 27 
30 Narin Kurdish Her Own Flat Graduate SUNNI Çankaya 31 
31 Fatmagül Kurdish Coffee Shop Graduate SUNNI  Çankaya 48 
32 Cevat Kurdish Workplace High School ŞAFİİ Yenimahalle 34 
33 Gülsüm Turkish Her Own Flat High School SUNNI Etimesgut 49 
34 Yakup  Kurdish Coffee Shop High School SUNNI Altındağ 30 
35 Dilan Kurdish Coffee Shop High School SUNNI Keçiören 18 
36 Güliz Kurdish Coffee Shop High School SUNNI Keçiören 17 
37 Aliye  Kurdish Workplace High School SUNNI Yenimahalle 43 
38 Volkan  Turkish Workplace High School SUNNI Mamak 36 
39 Adil Turkish Workplace Graduate SUNNI Yenimahalle 55 





































Figure II. The Map of Central Ankara 
 
 
 
